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1j. -CHARACTERISTIC of Idealism to study the 
nature of individuality by an examination of knowledge 
and. value. The basic principle of individuality is 
revealed in the structure of experience. The organs- 
nation of the contents of human experience - theoro- tical and practical - can only be understood in terms 
of value. Value is the main clue to understand the 
nature of Individuality. ven the apparent gvil i "ý»ºe'giUnd+s cra o ä jai tie +ý; iä3" väluý. - ,.,..., r mýi , ö4ww« .. ns&cws, o-a,. ys s ro.. -; waý, >+ua}_. ws, Aw, ý, a . 4+ °, ýc'. a., u,..,, . z, ,: 4: ti . s. r 'ý 5-= rE + ... ao+ada kv%A . aýK4sY+mirsitý9'wa`. 
The essence of the. concep t of teleology con- `nW 
clots in the presence of value in the result and not in 
the full anticipation of the end. In the light of this 
analysis it is poobible to understand the lower types of 
Individuality in terms of the higher. 
'Human personality is distinguish©d from the °ÄK 
lower types of individuality by the presence of self- 
conociousness. The development of the 'me' Is lar- 
gely a result of social, intercourse, and the unification 
of the constituent `oelvea' In the 'met posits the ,: 
operation of the Ideal Worn. The trans-subjective 
reality of the storm is also responsible for the objective 
significance of human values. 
The finite individual has a relative indopendenco of 
his own. But the development of human personality Is throughout` 
conditioned by the sharing in the social and the divine life. r 
The religious consciousness reveals the spiritual unity of all 
.. µä. the finite individuals in an Infinite and supra-personal Life 
From the finite point of view the world of nanifectati! 
on is characteriaod by its differentiation into a multiplicity `'"° 
of relatively independent and mutually distinct finite lndividuw; 
als. But it seems impossible to carry this multiplicity into the 
Eternal 'w which is the ground of Maniffestation" 
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IN-TR0DUCT roar . 
THE TERM' IDEALISM' has not any definite 
connotation on which its exponents or critics might 
be said to have been agreed. Idealistic philosophy 
has proved so elastic in the hands of philosophers 
that it has given rise to widely different systems 
which come into conflict with each other owing to 
their divergent doctrines on many important questions. 
Some philosophers have refused to use the term. Bo- 
sanquet, for instance, speaks of his philosophy as 
being speculative instead of idealistic. There is not 
any partiaiar full-fledged system of doctrines which 
can exclusively call itself idealistic. At the same 
time it is possible to group together under that appela- 
tion a variety of systems animated by a common spirit 
and embodying certain fundamental tendencies. 
4 
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Idealism may be broadly defined as a philo- 
SOP] which attempts to understand man and the univeroe 
chiefly through the examination of the nature and the 
significance of ideas and ideals - of knowledge 
and value. 
It is characteristic of idealism to regard 
the relation between°the subject and the object as a 
starting point of philosophy and giNe in this relation 
a certain primacy to the subject. Descartes may be 
said to have founded Modern Idealism by his insistence 
on hie dictum 'CoSito ergo cum'. In his conception 
of the subject as the only indubitable reality and as 
such a necessary starting point for philosophy he 
Initiated a tendency of thought which was carried 
further by successive idealist thinkers with new results. 
In England=Berkeley gave an unique expression 
to this tendency by evolving a oyatem of spiritual 
pluralism in which matter came to be displaced by mind- 
dependent ideas. The world of objbcto`is, on his view, 
entirelýi dependent on some mind - human or divine. 
Berkeley arrived at this conclusion through 
the criticism of the representative theory of ideas. 
On this theory the individual was supposed to be enclosed 
r 
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within, the circle. -of his own' ideas : It was only 
through the medium of his . dean'that he could have any 
access to the world of external reality. But if the 
separation of ideas and the objects to which they 
refer is once accepted= in pri. ncipx$, the existence of 
objects external to the individual becomes questionable 
since, ex hypothesi., he has access only to his ideas. 
Berkeley, 'therefore, dropped the world of-external 
objects altogether and maintained that the esse of 
things id pereipi . 
The general criticism of this epistemological 
doctrine has been that while the act of perception 
is mental the object}. of, perception is nöt mental. The 
object is certainly dependent on the subject for being 
known; but it is not or that reason so-dependent for 
its existence. The cognitive relation is an external 
relation between-the subject and the, abject, and both 
of them might exist even An the -absenceeof. that. relation. 
The ©xietence of any object, therefore. need "''not be 
dependent on any mind -- human or divine., 
rie. cannot . hopp' to prove anything of great 
consequence. to philosophy by Insisting-that Nye cannot 
. know anything-, to exist unless. by that very act it enter. 
-6- 
our field of knowledge. ThiC -only means that the 
unknown thing cannot be-proved to exist. So far as, 
the actual dependence of the object on the mind is' 
concerned we do not 'seem 'to be able to-prove anything 
conclusively* .t "ihn doctrine 'oe 
1o percipi' may be true although it aan''not be proved 
to be But whether true or false it -does not 
help us to understand the true significance either of 
the subject or of the object. 
The fundamental idealistic position is not so 
much staked upon this doctrine of Berke-ley ac , upon the 
recognition of the self-validity and objectivity of 
knowledge. But on this point the idealistic position 
remains unshaken. , 
The validity or the objectivity of ýinowledgo 
is intrinsic to itself and is incapable of being derived 
from anything else. It is quite legitimate to give 
a natural or physiological explanation of knowledge 
in so far as it is, from the °limited-point of view of 
psychology, a course of events in the mental history of 
some Individual., But such an attempt 'will clearly -break 
down when it comes to explaining"tlie cognitive function 
of these menthl events. The fact- of there being, a 
7_ - 
judgment ma,, J possibly be explained on the lines of 
evolutionary naturalism, but the truth-value of judgment 
will still remain a mystery. But knowledge is not 
Just one fact among others. It is a unique fact with 
a cognitive function. Any naturalistic explanation 
will fail to explain the capacity of menttil events 
to be the medium of judgments which have an objective 
reference to a common world. 
Tor can this result be avoided unless 
evolutionary naturalism involves itself in a circular 
argument. For any theory which pretends to explain 
the validity of knowledge presupposes that validity 
in claiming to be itself true. And it it throws doubt 
u? on the general validity of knovilec:. ge it throws doubt 
upon its own validity, since it claims to be itself a 
girt of knowledge. We are, therefore, driven to hold 
that while the genetic method may be legitimate for all 
the objects of, knowledge, it is inapplicable to knowledge 
itself, qua knowledge, i. e. in its capacity for validity 
and objectivity. 
Berkeley did not clearly see the full 
significance of the intrinsic objectivity and validity 
of knoviiedge. His ©piotemological doctrine that the 
-g 
esse of things is percipi, which is sometimes supposed 
to be the cardinal theory of idealism, had a tendency 
to make knowledge a subjective attribute of the indivi- 
dual. 
The truth is that it to possible to look 
C 1ý 
rý `w upon ideas as mental events within the mind of the indi- 
vidual or to look upon them as having, a necessary obje- 
ctive ctive reference to objects which are outside the Indi- 
vidual. `Then they are considered, only from the former 
point of view, in abstraction from the latter, we tend 
to`undermine the validity of all knowledge and pave the 
way for some form of solipsism in which the individual 
is imprisoned in his castle of private dreams without 
any relation to o t, her individuals or to the universe 
at large. 0 
knien the ideas in the mind of the indivi- 
dual are', thus, taken 'in complete a'bst'raction from their 
logical import they 'become one 'kind of facts ähön 
, other 
facts and are incapable of cotprehänding any part of 
reality in the sense in which the object `of knowledge 
must be said to be included in knoväledge. If westart 
from the position of subjective idealism it is impossible 
to 
=Ltte 
inner mental states of the individual by 
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somehow bringing ttleni mtchantoally -into relation with 
reality. 
The only way out of the impasce or subjectivism 
is to retrace our steps and 
ýthe 
logical import 
of ideas. 'ro n the epistemological point of view know- 
ledge- is, the very opposite of a cage isolating the 
individual fron reality. It takes him out of himself 
and. directly establishes a contact with reality. ý'Uthout 
such objective. reference it would not only be incapable 
of being true but it would also be incapable of being- 
false., - In complete subjectivity there is no, rpo1 either 
for truth ox' for a genuine falsehood. 
Ming to the failure of. jorke)ey to recognise 
the intrinsic objectivity of knowledge, he could restore 
objectivity to his ideas only by reverting unconsciously-, 
to the representative theory of idoa4-which he, himself 
attacked...,. -,.. no vJedge, in his vier;, waq-L result of 
the participation by, -= he-n individual; in, the divinq,,. ideas . 
in knowledge the inä. ivid. ua . =. wac , supposed to part. icip , te 
in the mind of God.. Being In the nilnd}.. of Gods, ideas were 
not encased in the mind of any particular individual 
but were ncco si, ble to, a11 individuals! 
but although. tbeßo. ideas are supposed to. exist 
in the mind of, God, they-do not exist by themselves. They 
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are dependent on the mind of God for their existence . 
The only cell'--exiet.. ng entities in the metaphysics of 
Berke ley are the spirits of finite individuals and God. 
: verythinR else is dependent on and derived from them. 
This idealistic principle of the primacy of the subject 
was, however, lost sight of in the system of Hume who 
carried the doctrine 'esse is perciPi' to its logical 
extreme by resolving the spirit itself into a mere 
bundle of ideas. 
On the continent idealism rllied Itself 
with rationalist 
It is true that 
subject came to 
which swallowed 
n and sought to counteract msterialism. 
in Spinoza`s pantheism the catggory of 
be replaced by the category of substance , 
the individuality of man and. sod. But 
the rights of the subject ; -, ere emphasized again by Leibnitz 
and golf even went co far as to attempt to deduce the 
wor1a of objects from the laws. of thought. Vie thus find 
in 
. iolfig a 
logical fanaticism which exaggerates the 
importance of the mind at the expense of its objects. Kant, 
however, made the critical effort to adjust the rights 
of both. 
Kants critical idealism is built on 
the ruins of formalism and empiricism in their extreme 
forms. His main contribution to the study of the 
- 11 - 
nature of the subject has been to emphasize the part 
played by the activity of the human mind in the con- 
struction of the objects of experience. He showed. that 
no experience is possible apart from the function of 
the Unity of Apperception through the application of the 
=m" categories of the Understanding to the sensuous manifold. 
And this Lln ßt"7 of Apperception is not abotract but 
synthetic, not an entity but a, function which lives in 
the synthesis of the objects of expc, rience. Yet it is 
the very condition of there being any experience at all. 
This answered Hume and reinstated the subject. 
Kant was, however, nob equally successful 
in the attempt to reinstate the object. in spite of 
his uncompromising condemnation of subjectivism he 
himself gave the impression that the worla of objects 
of experience is solely the work of the inaividual mind. 
He failed to emphasize the universality of the activity 
which creates the world of experience. Here Berkeley had 
the advantage of attributing. the activity which creates 
the objective order not to any finite mind but 
to God.. It has -boen said -that - tKant should have 
allowed to the principle which is not witc: ain., us 
more kinship with -to i, ntelligonc© which i3; 
Berkeley to us märe- kinship with the intelligence 
12 
which is not' . (1) 
In his enthusiasm to emphasize the 
ý .ý ý`ý, 
function of the individual mind in building the world 
of experience, Kant even went so far as to make the 
whole of knowledge a transcendental illusion. The 
distinction betv: een the world of knowledge and an unknown 
reality behind it is a fundaýrental part of his philosophy. 
But as all agnosticism is"a 'bed-ridden compromise' 
he was driven to seek some light on the nature of the 
noumenon by turning to the field of practical reason. 
He based his conclusions about the nature of reality 
on the implications of practical life. desthus 
initiated a line of thought which seeks. in value the 
clue to the nature of reality. (2) 
In the later development of Gorrnan, 
Philosophy the unknown reality behina the known ph©- 
nomena was, quietly dropped and attempt-vias made to 
substitute for it;; the Lao as , rin Act, as in Fichte's 
practical Idealism, or a. blind, Will, - aa, -in Sehoperhauer'a 
(1) 'A comparison of Kant's Idealism with that of 
Berkeley. ' Annual Philosophical Lecture to the British 
Academy by H. W. B. Joseph, p. 20. 
(2) Kant's clear-cut distinction between faith and know- ledge was an outcome of his view that knowledge is true not of the noumena but only of the phenomena. 
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system. It was, however, given to Hegel to take 
over the result of his predecessors and work out an 
imposing system pf Objective Idealism. 
Hegel insists that the Absolute is not 
to be conceived as a substance but as a subject. it 
is an immanent reality which 1s self-conscious. It. 
lives in the development of Nature and a, ýind, but it 
is at the same time self-complete. It is 'the result 
together with its becoming. ` It is both an eternally 
self-rgyised and complete self-conscious whole and 
the principle i-manent in the process of development, 
ch9racteristic of natural and human history. 
The Absolute of Hegel is not a mere subject. 
; xiere subject and mere object are abstractions. Both 
presuppose each other and are only aspects of one 'whole. 
The object is only atexpression of the subject. The 
subject recognizes Itself in the object and -comes . to 
self-consciousness through it, 
All the mAnif©otätiono of the spirit 
in ßrt, Morality, Religion, or Philosophy are, therefore, 
data relevant for the study of the subject. Every 
experience reveals the nature, of the spirit. It 
Is.. therefore, full of significance for the attempt 
14 - 
to form a comprehensive notion of the self-conscious 
subject. 
He gelianiom has been a powerful influence 
in modern British philosophy. But at the same time 
Berkeleianism, which sprang from, the same soil, also 
remained an animating principle of thought. FVe can, thus, 
notice two tendencies of thought which have on the 
whole remuj. ned distinct. They give rise to two types, 
of idealism. 
The main difference between these two 
types has been clearly indicated by boernle. As he 
says, 'the type vir. ich follows :; erkeley throws emphasis 
on the problem of existence, whereas the type which 
follows ; 'egel throvvs emphasis on the real nature of that 
which exists. The former builds its theory on the 
definition of existence. The latter strives to elicit, 
a coaprehensive view of the nature of the world aaa whole 
from a reflective survey of il different forms of ex erl- 
ence. ' (1) The former culminates in, s) me form of 
pluralism (theistic or atheistic) while the latter leads 
tp some form of absolutism. 
(1) Idealism, p. 146. 
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in T. H-Green we have one of the earliest and 
most prominent British HegelianB. In a- review of 
John Caira's philosophy of religion he says, 'that 
there Is one spiritual seif-consc, iau4, neae. i being of 
which all that is real is the aetivity and the expression; 
that we are related to this spiritual -being not merely 
as parts' or the world which is its expression, but as 
partakers in some tno" ate measure- of the self-conscious- 
ness through which it at once distin5uisheß itself from 
the world; -- that this participation is the source of 
morality and religion; this we take to be-the vital 
truth r"hich Hegel had to teach. ' (1) 
It is, however, interesting to notice that 
along with his strongly pronounced THegelie, niam Green 
had a curious resemblance to Berkeley. Berkeley. also 
held that. real things are the expreocion of Goa's activity. 
For ^roon, however, God. is not something eooontially 
outflide us and concealed behind : hie ideas. - ,.,, He is within 
us ' comrnunico. ting' his nature to us In :, art, Morality, 
Philosophy and '. religion. 
' Stx _ 
(1) Y7orks , V01- III, pp. 146. 
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(-reen folloiwed Kant's lead in re jecting the 
sensational atomism of Hume. He brought out clearly 
that instead of re7ardin self-consciousness as one 
term in the series of impressions which'it connects 
we mt'st reg. nrd it as ' being basal for knowled. 4re as well 
as morality. He also rejected the naturalistic 
explanations of consciousness which make it only one 
of the events in e succession of natural events, because 
these explanations could not account for-the conscious- 
ness of succession. The unifying spiritual principle 
of self-consciousness has to be equally present to all 
the terms of the succession and is, therefore, essentially 
out of time. 
Soon after "reen's death a number of philosophers 
- among them Seth, Haldane, Bosanquet and Sorley - 
published 'Essays in Philosophical Criticism. ' The 
dominating idealistic tendaicy of these writers was symbo- 
lized by its dedication to the memory of-, Green, and was 
brought out by Edward Caird in the preface. There he 
speaks of an agreement among them: ' as to the direction 
in which inquiry may most.. fruitfully be prosecuted, rather 
then a conauurrence in any definite results that have 
yet been attained by it. ' 
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Inspired though these thinkers were by common 
idealistic principles It is but natural that they 
did not arrive at identical conclusions. chile accepting 
self-consciousness as an ultimate cntagory, Seth in his 
second series of Balfour-Lectures roseýin revolt against 
some aspects of Hegelianism. His protest was mainly . 
directed against its'radical error' in the 'identifi- 
cation - of the human and the divine conacionsness; or* 
to put It more broadly, tthe unification of consciousness 
in a single self. '(l) 
This identification , he pointed out,, depends 
upon the tendency, 'to: talte a mere forte for a real being 
- to take an identity of type. for a unity of existence. ` 
The doctrine of the universal self is thus accused-of 
substantiating an abstraction, of taking for a real, 
existent 
,, 
the notion of the logical unity of all--knowledge. 
In one school of idQalist there-ia. thus a deep suspicion 
of, the abstract univeroal a_n& an unwillingness to surrender 
the rights of man anti God. 
But the question of the nature of the individual 
(1) H©gellaniom and +orsonality, p. 215. 
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was also taken up by another Idealistic school of 
thought whose chief exponents were Bradley and Bosanquet. 
This school was more closely allied with HegeJ. iauism althoug 
it was etually critical about some of its aspects. It 
sought to analyse the content of the consciousness of 
the. individual and put it to the severe test of inclu- 
siveness, and consistency. Bradley employed his 
damaging dialectic to undermine the validity of the 
concept of the self as something ultimate, on the ground 
that it is riddled with contrac? i. ctIoo4s. In his Absolute, 
therefore, , ßa. 11 the finite selves are somehow transmuted. 
And it is in itself fen from being anything like a self. 
Zn the metaphysics of Bosanquet the absolute is conceived 
as a kind of individual but It leaves 
finite individuals. It includes all 
ties but they are so transmuted in its 
they have no independent existence of 
problem of individuality thus becomes 
in Modern Idealism. 
no room for any 
finite individuali- 
s existence that 
their owm. . The 
the central ptoblem 
19 
THE CONCEPT OF 
INDIVIDUALITY. 
ALL THAT EXISTS is individual. Neither 
the particular not the universal can exist by itself. 
Both are abstractions from the total nature of existents. 
The particular exists in and through the universal and 
the universal exists in and through the particular.. 
? or can we form an adequate concept of the individual 
on the analogy of a bare point of existence in space 
or ea kind of indivisible atom. There is no 'that' 
wit'iout a 'what'. Individuality is not constituted 
by a kind of centre without a circumference. t is 
both the centre and the circumference. And the problem 
Is whether there is any principle by which to determine 
what tha". centre o7 circumference is. 
It seems that with regard to the constr. - 
-- 20 - 
tuenta of so-called inorganic nature much of what little 
, ß. P- individuality we see 
in them is really projected--into 
them by us, according-to the specific purposes, with which 
we are at the moment concerned. `r'huo, a page is regarded 
as one, while vie are engaged in reading the book; but 
if we want to place the ýi; ook in the shelf the indivi- 
duality of the page is svialiowed up In the individuality 
of the, boot, Nhat is called, a 'thing' is, that part 
of reality which serves some purpose -- ( practical or 
theoretical) -- . of the person who 
is-concerned with it. 
An electron is a'thin ; 'from the point of view of- the 
physicie, to in so far. as it oubserves some theoretical 
purpose. A mountain Is. a , 
ýttith ' In ao far as it 
obstructs the way or protects the frontier or shelters 
" the people from. gold wvl äs , 
0 
But-the vast immensity of 'inanimate' nature 
does not necessarily, break Itself into auch . 
! things'.. 
There -re many rortions of nature which seem to have no 
roa1' ý and direct relation to purely human puvposaa, except 
perhaps in a remotQ ana, purely theoretical- way, And the 
question arises as to the kind of individuality, .f any, 
which belongs to these , portions or their constituents. 
It will be seen in the chapter on Teleology that there i3 
21 
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nothing that excludes the possibility that these 
constituents are really'some kind of rudimentary or- 
ganisms whose nature as organisms we are unable to 
appreciate owing to our incapacity-to understand or 
enter into their purposes. On the co ntrary, it is 
very probable that this IS so. 
it is only vrhen we come to the bona. f ido 
organisms of-which biology takes oo8nis , nce, that we seem to 
get some principle helping us to determine the indivi-' 
duality inherent in the object itself, apart from, the 
obstruction or furtherance of the purpbses of others. 
An organism does seem to have, through its sensibility, 
a certain capacity' to aPp reciate, in none rudimentary way, 
the round of its life. It -comes to have individuality 
ih virtue of this ccpacityo The-individuality of an organism 
Is not primarily due to. the structure of its body but to 
its capacity to 'appreciate in- came sväy its, own existence. (1) 
(1) From the 'point of view of merely bodily existence, the 
unity of the organism is a matter of degree and may be included in or inclusive of similar unities. The r l; tion between the parent 'organism and the embryo is, for example, 
an instance of indistinct Qntities, the former including the latter. The mere presence of' differentiation and integra- tion cannot make of the body a genuine whole. It would still lack real individuality, if it is totally devoid of value 
- 22 - 
The organised body is the condition of the vital activities 
of the life of the organism; but it does not in itself 
constitute the essence of its individuality. Apart 
from-its life and in the capacity of beine_a mere body 
the organism cannot have, on thE; round of its special 
structure any more claim to individuality than the 'thing'. 
But life or any vital activity can ultimately be dis- 
tinguished from the notions in inanimate nature by 
introducing, in some sense, the notion of value. Only 
in so far as an organism has or can have some kind of 
value can it, therefore, have any individuality* 
in human personality, the principle of 
individuality is more clearly expressed because of the 
presence of self-consciousness. Man not on"_y has value 
but he knows himself as having value. He exists for 
himself and has value for himself . It is self-conscious- 
ness that distinguishes personality as such from other 
types of individuality . The existence of self-conscious- 
ness, however, makes possible the emergence of a type of 
individuality which is not only aiff©ront from, but 
higher than the type of individuality which is possible 
below the level of self-conociouaneso. The individual ity 
of a person is hither in virtue of his capacity to pursue 
- 
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and realise the higher values of moral and religious 
consciousness. 
There 'seem to be zsio ways of looking 
at-human personality. It -is po8sible to look upon a 
man from the-standpoint of an-observer or from the 
standpoint of the man himself. From the standpoint 
of the observer the individuality of a person consists 
of -an . overgrowing series of events or effects partly or 
wholly initiated by him. But as the causal Bones or 
events-is, never complete but always in the making-any 
limitation o the re 4ity or the individual is., ' from this 
point of view, bound to be more or less artificial. k'rom 
`,. j 
the standpoint of the man himself, his reality is 
constituted by his own direct experience. It will be 
seen -that the contents of his experience are also constantly 
increasing-.. The contents of his experience are not a 
fixed quantity. (1) -It is, therefore, 'not possible 'to 
asl . gn any definite limits KA N existence on the basis 
of these contents of his experience. 
(1) It is even unscientific to look upon either birth or death as necessarily limiting the scope of his experience. His linear existence as an experient admits of indefinite extension at both ends, from a theoretical point of view. 
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It is true that everyone feels. within himselr 
that he does exist. for himself and is aware of his self- 
identity In spite of and in and through the changing 
. contents of -hi experience . -.,. 
But as this amounts to a 
bare af-l irm-tion of his existence we have to look to 
-something else to determine hie nature:, One promising 
way of, understanding his nat, aro is to examine not the 
specific contents but the general structure of his 
experience. The examination of this structure reveals 
,, that In spite of the 'diveraec and -cometiraos even confli- 
cting elements of his consciousness, there is in him 
a pri. nciplaof organisation. This principle introduces 
some order into the contentE of hic theoretical as well 
as of hic practical consciousness. And the essence of this 
ordh, r consists not in. the bare 'absence of 'inconsistency 
or conflict, but In the significance it has, for the 
individual. The., i, ndividuality of., human, beings, no less 
than that of other 'organisms-, - r nisna, : ia, conatttuted by their 
capacity to be bearers of glue. Value, the, in the 
clue to the understanding of individuality. 
Whatever is individual is unique in some 
sense. In the lowest types of individual existent this 
uniqueness-is probably mainly . constituted by the occu-- - 
pation of a special place in space or by living; thr ugh 
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a particular period. This, however, does not Five us 
really Significant uniqueness. " Significant u_Anueness 
is not a matter of merely 'being in some way different from 
other t'hc existenta. 'Therefore, in order 
to get clear instances of significant uniqueness we have 
to come to the realm of persons or self-conscious individuals. 
Their uniqueness is aiain1y constituted by the uniqueness of 
the purpose or the purposes animating their life. But 
i 
the concept of purpose throws us back upon the value 
towards which it is directed. Value is, t'herefore, the 
principle which makes any existents either individual 
or unique. 
Since value is most clearly expressed in 
human individuality, it sei=; m: obvious that analysis 
of the nature of human personalittr would yield fruitful 
results in the interpretation of the nature of the indi- 
vidu litI* of organ isrns- or of the annstituernt; of what is 
usually considered to be irriariithate 'nature: But sometimes 
an attempt is m de`°to explain the realm of persons in 
biolotticai terms or to understand the realm of persons as Weil 
as the realm of merely organic life with the help of natu- 
ralistic categories. 
The naturalistic explanations ii1ake light of the 
- 26 - 
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prima-facie variety and the individuality which characte- 
rise the concrete world of facts. In this procedure 
all facts come to be treated as mere instances of some 
blind and invariable abstract geberal law. The opera- 
tion of some mathematical and mechanical uniformities to- 
gether with sonne primary constituent elements of an 
identical type is supposed to be the reality of that which 
appears as varied and individual. The naturalistic 
ex-oianat ions are inspired by the old and faulty logic 
of abstract universals which have a multiplicity of 
instances. And this implies grudging recognition 
of the individualittr of the actual existents. But the 
aim of knowledge is not to stamp out or explain away the 
multiplicity ß, n2, the variety of the world of 'experience 
y 
but only to <ntroduce order into it. A-true explanation 
of the world of experience must do justice both to the 
unity and the multiplicity of the concrete world of facts. 
Any adequate explanation, therefore, needs to be governed 
by the concept of a, 'cöncrete universal' running in and 
through the multiplicity and the differentiations of its 
constitubnts. It is a dominant principle which at once 
sustains and explains the individuality of its parts. 
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III 
11ATURE, LIFE AUD I IND. 
Z HAVE S EN that naturalistic explanations involve 
a faulty logic ans. erroneous assumptions. it is not, t'; here- 
fore surprising that t zev meet with a liaiite-i measure of suCc- 
ess in the realm of what is generally taken to inanimate 
matter, laere indivi Iualit7 is least pronounced. But 
even in this realm the limited success Is attained by 
deliberately oin; iitting from condideration those characteri- 
stics which make the existents individual. And the fixity 
of laws w Ach is irparently characteristic of this rcalm 
may be duc to this deliberate abstraction. The natural 
sciences, as distinguished from history, are not primarily 
interested In the constituents of their subject-matter, qua 
individual existents. They are explicitly concerned with 
general laws. 
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3ut even if we examine the ideal of a purely 
mechanical explanation it will be seen that such 
an explanation cannot explain everything in terms of 
only General -¬ß4 or fixed uniformities. It pos its 
along with these uniformities some kinds of ulti; nate 
constituents of matter. The uniformities are conceived 
to operate on and through some molecules or atoms or 
electrons. And whatever else these ultimate constituents 
of matter might be they are individual existents whf6h 
are as much requisites of a mechanical explanation as the 
unifor, ities themselves. They cannot themselves admit 
of a further explanations in terms of machanical unifor- 
mities, and have to be accepted for what Vey are. These 
ultimate constituents are suppose'' to be exactly like one 
another for the sake of convenience. 'And in r far as 
: science is notýAnterosted in them as individual existents 
the supposition might be perfectly 1erritimatc for Its 
own purpose. But the supposition might nevertheless 
be 'wrronc, from the philoooChica1 poir$'of view since the 
uniqueness of the constituents may be indiscernible but not 
non-existent. Like organisms they too have a structure 
of their own. And they mýý ; ht all be having some degree 
of individuality. 
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But whatever limited success the purely naturalistic 
categories may have in the realm of matter the7 clearly break 
down when we come to the consideration of higher types of 
individuality. 
In the organic ord.. r, 
", t, he realm of life the application 
of natur? list. ic categories becomes quite indefenäible. It 
is true that even 
of the aspects of 
F 
?t ; tic cat g oriee 
here it is pos,,: ible to consider only some 
w-' 
the livinn, beings and apply the nut a- 
to them with a certain measure of success. 
But this method leaves unexpl-ainec, the special churacteri- 
stics of organic life. 
It is not vosoibie to look ýLpon the ortganism as a 
kind of a machi ne . Un1 iko a man-r ade machine the 
orry, anisnl keeps itself in a ; work eng order in spite of - 
or rather in and tiarough its metabolism. The organism 
is c, c~nstantly QhWdng the material of which the body 
i constituted. There is t ne assiml r, tion of now natter 
in the form of food andjthore is a constant Gli, ninatlon of 
worn out or unecessarýr m', tter. iut alt. 1ouRh the organism 
Is thus constaw-ly recreating . is own Material, it yet 
remains a self-nyintaininr erhole.. But s man-m Ee Liachine 
does not, like this, Zia. l. ntain itself through ý,. ie const:, nt 
creation of its -)arts. 
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There is also a radical difference of principle in 
the manner in which the organism comes into existence 
and the manner in which the machines come to be created. 
41 machine is built by the bringing togeth©r`of parts 
Which exist previously to the machine. Tut the tonst nt 
Vy OP 
J), 
,ý parts of the organism are creations of a process of 
, 
4Q'ß 
dE ociation of the germ-cell. The parts of a machine 
ý4ý 
4* are -. the °efore, relatively independent of the whole 
in 
Yet vlhich they enter. The orgz: -As. n on tlidothe7 hand is 
in a sense prior to its parts. t creates its own parts for 
sake of itself. To put it p redo ically it creates 
itself. 
The breakdown of the mechanical catagories in the 
explanation of biological reproduction has been well. 
brought out by J. S. Hialclane , in a oynpoo ium of tho AriE3to- 
te1ian -Boci iety. 'For a mechanical - explc, n , tAon; 
' hQ 
says, 'the reacting parts rust fir. t be ; ivon:.... 
Any m©chaniarn there may be to the parantorganism is absent 
in the'process of reproduction and must reconstitute itself 
at each generation from a more tiny speck of its own body. ' 
There can, therefore, be no mechanical explanation of the 
coming into being of i new organism. 
., Atý `', 
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: hut even if we examine the structure of its body 
/r 
1 
i 
ý 
'4 
when it is fully built up, 1; e have to postul_ite -a teleo- 
logical. as dist. L-nruished from the purely mechanical action 
in the -oroce$ses of which it is the outcome. The consti- 
tuent parts of the individual organism are adapted to 
the interests of the whole. The life of the organism 
is something over and above the life of zte constituent 
Parts. It has a unity of its own whick it maintains in 
andItkrou, ah the variety and multiplicity of its parts. 
Yt'i, true that a maimne, too, seems to 
be a whole of f. i kind, having 
unity 
of its own, over and 
above the multiplicity, of its parts,. owing to some specific 
; nurP. 
Pose ^through 
ny'+r `0-6 
,, none 
of the parts can by themselves serve that function. But 
the unity of the organism is of a kind different from 
this unity of a machine. The mac: iine nerves the purpose of ý 
its designer without in any way purposee itself. 
The purpose of the machine 1S thus completely extraneous 
to itself. But in the case of the organism there is , no 
extraneous purpose to -serve. - . given when it serves the 
ýurpoae -of ite cpeciei, it does so by making that purpose 
its a"Nih. ! n7 purpose, therefore, which the or. _; an ism may 
have is entirely : immanent In Itself. The or n am , unlike 
ýýý, 
ýr 
9Fs 
ý4 ý. 
ýrä , 'ýPý 
ýs! 
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a machine, has an int-insic value of its own, and its parts 
are so ^äapted as to subserve , nc. 
L maintain this value 
which b'. lon ;s to itself as a whole. 
The purposive adr, ptation of the parts of the 
organism to its in. erests is discernible under such a 
variety of c,. rcumstý,. noes and becomes ef, ective in the face 
of so many obstacles that it cannot be an accidental 
result of mechanical interaction between the organism 
and its environment. To take only one instance given by 
Driesch, If I cut the head of a 'T'ubularia 'a new 0 ad is 
restored by the combined cork of many parts of the stem.... 
Furthermore if 70u cut out of Tubularia stem Pieces which 
are ledä than ten millimeters in length you will find the 
absolute size of , he head restored to he in close relation 
to the length of the stem-piece. 
Vie have here an analogue of intelligent nd_ 
purposive behaviour of the or ; orz o° who e ýM "' "; 
orr; anisin goes on making all kings Of er ö until the 
particular purpose of its activity is served. If a parti- 
cular kind-- of action doeo not subserve its purpose it 
tends to vary its efforts within the range of its irn i i- 
nation until the purpose of the lnitiq. '. 
, ctiv1t'r is thereby 
attained. And the specific efforts are adapted to the needs 
-r 
of the situation within the limits of its intelligence. 
in more or less the came %ay, the organic p-`rocesces 
seem to be controlled by the operation of some principle(1) 
of selective synthesis, which is guided by the interests 
of the whole. Organic activ., ty, thus, se- m. -, to be essentially 
teleological. 
(1) Dr1©sch suggects that this something which controls 
the organic processes is a non-spatial entelechy. The 
principle of 'individualising causality' which is res- 
Ponsible for the ' dyn .:: ic-teleological processes' vii thin the organirr must not be conceived as being' an extraneous 
entity. it is not just one e'i. ment interacting with other 
elements. Although Driesch emphasises the.. non-spatial - nature 
of the entelechy it remains , omcjthin xternai to the 
natural processes within the organi=, acting upon them, 
as it tigere, from out side. This action of the entelechy 
ab extra would be very much like mechanical action the 
protests of riesch notwithsttaud. ing. 
The principle which contro? ä end directs the processes is immanent to the organism. The conception of tha 'elan vital' or life force, avoids the necessity of im- 
pobting a host of entities froh -, outside-, since 
it i.. s- not 'an- 
extraneous entity but an immanent principle. But the concept 
of 'elan vital' is vac. ue.; It- is-. =supposed to be an 
immense potentiality to cope with matter, and is essentially 
creative. But its adaptability 'as reell as creativeness 
remain vague until they are related with the concept of 
value. The concept of a- 'nlsua' suf=geate a rising in 
e4ýtion to some value and emphaoises the es,. ential. Ly tcle- 
ologieal nature of the immanent. - principle and Is, therefore, raorep; omprehen ive and adequate than the concept or the 
'elan vital' .. 
0 
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it is not possible to account for the function 
of the pits by referQnce to a structure existing prior 
to such a function as a result of accidental modification, 
introduced in the organism by a mechanical impact of its 
natural environment. it is true that the function cannot 
exist Trithout structure. But the function is not a 
result of a de-facto structure existing on its own 'ecoudt, 
without any reference to the function. The function is 
on the cöntrary that for the sake of which the structure comes 
into being. The development of any organs of the organism 
is controlled and directed by the specific features of the 
environment with which it has to cope. But the creation 
of a useful ýorRan -preaüpposes an operation of 'a principle 
which resronds to its environment not in a mechanical and 
blind"wray bait in a gray which 'will secure` the mar intc7nance 
Of' itself and its wpecies. } Ttiere Is, thus, purposive 
adaptation of the or anisnt to its, environrne-nt': ' As a matter 
of fact, the essentially creative pürpo; ive'ness of th', principle 
ý 
`ýC ka which Is i: m a. nent In the life or the organism becomes clear wil 
when wo V ke into consideration the fact that it not only 
adapts itself to its environment but also adapts the environ- 
ralent to Itself, within certain limits. 
The t©leolopica1 action of the orgy n is oces Deo, 
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hoiever, seems to be different from the teleological 
action char cterictic of --any consciously purposive 
behaviour. The cite; oty of teleology in biology is 
different from the same category as used in psychology. 
The vital phenomena seem to be 'blind'. It is 
i misleading to in erpret them on the analogy of a person 
who realises his conscious purpose faith a cieliberate 
plan !, nee foresight. In the development o± an embryo 
the Term does not seem to have any conscious plan about 
the type of organism which it seeks to become. 1'he constitus 
ent parts of the organism serve some useful function 
ýý i 
vet` ý' 
tý ý 
iC 
4 ý'ý-. 
'i 
t an 
In the life of the organism, but they cannot, therefore, 
be considereý- to be the work of an intelligenthe similar 
to that of the architect. The germ-cell cannot 
be creidited to have foreseen its own needs and to have 
provided for them in advance by evolving suitable orgy nd. 
Ehen, however, we come from the 
field of biology to the field of psychology, we find 
the conscious behaviour of an individual organism 
involves the operation of 6 planning intelligence 
which has a foresight of the end which it is sought 
to attain through the activities. The activity 
of planning as seen in human behaviour 
, 
11)0 involves 
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the anticipation of a potential future any acting in 
reference to it. (1)- 
OwIfing to this influence of the future on 
the present in human behaviour, we have in the realm of 
persons not only the breakdown of purely n. ^. turnlistie but 
also -f biological catagobies. The -prima f^cie difference 
between the purposive action of human beings on the one 
hand, and the mechanical or organic action on the other hand 
tins also shoran clearly by J. 9 -Haldane, in the sarge sympo- 
sium of the AristotelL an society to which i have already 
referred. 'In the physical or phys ioloGica, 1 action, ' 
he , oints out, 'one object reacts directly with another 
in snace; the reaction is irnme(, ixte or blind. Into 
conscious action both the -actual past and the potential 
future enter directly also.... 1i psychological object 
thuo, In dynamic relation with other objects x .y 
£n - surrounding it, not only in s 4ce 'but also in 
time. ' The object of the plan cannot be in a physical 
(1) The capacity of planning belongs perhaps oven to 
some higher animals; but it is Most pronounced anu clear in human beings. 
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or mechanical relation with the individual simply for 
the reason that itj oes not exist prior to its realisation. 
It exists, in a sense, not in thff 'rosent but In the future. 
It is true that the plan of the object as distin- 
7uished from the object of the plan Is a force which is 
ooeratttve in the consc11_ousness or the indivIduai in the 
ILEW it is not the sensor or motor constituents '? resent. - 
of the idea but its meaning which can really help us to 
understand the planned action. (1) And the content of 
(1) Ais the meaning; of qn idea and not mere. its 
psychic constituent elements which really accounts for the 
consciously purposive acts of the individual. This v: Ill 
become clear from the following instance. in individual 
mn danger and as a result might be warned that hi s 11fe is i 
of this warning he mi, ý"ht take some course of action which 
is cCý--p4suis. ted to save himself. His action is solely guided 
by the meaning of the warning, irrespective of whether it iff 
communicated to him by some gesture or in writing or by speech 
and whether it is given to him in nglish, Chinese Hebrew or 
ýýsperanto; (as. ýu ii ý; th j he is a linguist); alt.. ou h his 
sensory co. -, vtitu , nts of 
the idea in these different case s 
will be different. 
Coming, to the rýiotor-constituento of hic idea, we find 
that the course of the ct' on, which theJinü. ivi . ual takes can be truly purposive only when it i41btji. eterriiined by 
the automatic release of the impulse excited by the warning. In ord r to be truly purposive, the individual lust control his action by an intelligent appreciation of the I^ture of this situation and an insi ; ht Into it- Potential development. If h© can : age his life by combat1in ; the , 4'rt i. culpr situati on he , rill try to overcome it; but if he can save his life ýý +""ý only by escaping he will take resort to different mode of 
t, ý 
action. 
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this mean: n ; is not merely an object in the present but 
;, probable object in the future. 
In the realm of parsons, therefore, it is 
seen that tae action of the individual can be controlled 
by an intelligent a )nreciation of the results which they 
tend to bring about. other words, the notion of value 
It is, therefore, the meaning which the 
individual reads in the situation, as a result of the 
warning which can ultimately explain his purposive beha- 
viour. 
This is not to suggest that the warning or 
the situation can have any meaning for the individual 
in the absence of certain de facto psychic factors 
in his mind. The intelligent purpose does not just 
hang in the air but is necessarily connected with the 
psychic apparatus of the individual. But although 
the existence of a purpose is, thus, conditioned by 
the existence of such an Rnparatus, it does not constitute 
its mean nR. The meaning involves an objective refe- rence to the s:. tuation. And the reference is not 
merely to the existing situation but also to the potential future implicit in it. 
ý; ýti 
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alone helps us to understand the action of the individual. 
It is not, therefore, surprising that the natura- 
accounts of 
listicAhuman individuality are not ade uate to account 
for its specific features. it would be a miracle if either 
knowledge or value emerged accidentally as a result of the 
ee* 
operation of blind and mechanical uniformities on6thoughtlessý 
atoms or electrons. It seems that mechanical categories 
qo not do full justice even to the constituents of the 
pýtrsical world) twhen they come to be consIdered in their 
individuality, instead of as mere types or instances of some 
concept. 'But the breakdown of the mechanical categories 
becomes more evident when we come to the realm of organic 
life or the realm of persons. 
we thus find-that it is futile to try to under- 
stand the higher tupes'of individuality ; With the help of 
categories which are primarily divided to understand the 
r. 
lower types of individuality. Organic indlvidua6ity cannot 
No's- c064"- 
be explained-in purely naturalistic terms. 4 ;;.; -the realm 
of persons r. »i- be adequately explained in purely natura- 
listic or biological terms. 
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IV. 
TELE0L0GX. 
IT ',, AS SEEN in the last chapter that any attempt 
to understand the higher types of individuality with the 
help of such categories as mny be adequate for the lower 
types of individuality must fail. The specific features of 
the conscious behaviour of persons as well as those of 
the vital activities of or; ýanic life demand the introdu- 
ction of new categories. are, therefore, unable to 
discern any intelligible principle of continuity running 
through the v)rioue types of individuality, by following 
the procedure of explaining the higher by the lower. It, 
however, still remains open for us to seek for that p: ýrin- 
ciple of continuity between the different types of indi- 
vidu: i1lty by an attempt to understand the laver tirpe of 
individuality In terms of the higher. By following this 
new procedure it may be possible to bridge the gulf between 
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the planning teleology of human behaviour, the immanent 
tel©ologyc of otganic processes and the apparent mechanism 
of inorganic nature. 
A close examination of the planning teleology 
reveals that it is instrumental to the realisation of an 
immanent purpose largely beyond the consciousness of 
minds which contribute to Its realisation. Human acts 
seem to subserve a purpose which is larger and sometimes 
very different from any ""trc purpose which might 
have been contemplated by any of the agents. The inven- 
tion of the steam engine and the spinning jenny was 
certainly paving a way for the industrial revolution 
and Bret we cannot attribute any such intention to the 
inventors. Similarly we find that Darwin paved a way 
for Bergson, Newton for Einstein, or the discovery of the 
Hertzian' waves for the widespread use of the wireless 
in education and politics. As J3osanquet has pointed out, 
In history we discern the'principle of a teleology beyond 
though exhibited in finite consciousness. (1) It is 
(1) The principle of-Individuality and Value, p. 154. 
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impossible, ' he says'to attribute to finite consciousnessee, 
as agents the identity of agents within finite consciousness 
as a whole. This identity is exhibited in a development 
Which springs from a linked action of. s©parate and successive 
finite consciousnesses in view , of 
the environment. ' (1) 
'Every step of this development, though in itself Intelligent 
and teleological Is-in relation to the whole unconscious; 
and the result is at. ill a'naturc' though a second and 
higher nature. ' (2) 
It Is true that we do not l,. nd from our obser- 
vatdion of the course of. human historya complete and, 
unbroken harmony and correlation. of all human actions so 
as to exhibit some definable and coherent purpose. But 
it is equally true that with, the increase of rational 
and moral element in human action eliminat Ion of all un- 
meaning conflict, -'and a, gradual em6rgence of significant' 
. harmony bec. owes pcs$ible. :, 
11 human. 
'acts`in do far as 
they are rational however Iriccpen , ont in origin 
; have, In fact,, such significantbearIngb'pri räch other 
that they actually -make 
'or,: a_, condition of life which in 
(1) The principle of Individuality and Value, p. 154. 
(2) Ibid. p. 1,53. 
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ita. totality is found to realise greater value than could 
have been contemplated by any or the agents dt theta acts. (l) 
The prevision of the ends which human agents 
contribute to realise is on their part vers" limited and 
sometimes even faulty. And yet the history of their acts 
seems to involve an operation ot- h 'iThnanent purposiveness 
which is very 1^rgely above any or all of them. öle thus 
find thftt certain phases in the history of mankind have 
value and that these are necessarily conditioned by the 
existence of certain previous phases. And these 
previous phases are, constituted by acts of human agents 
who are consciously purposive, although their anticipation 
of the future is limited and imperfect in varying degrees. 
A fruitful way out of this difficulty would 
be to disassociate the idea of teiooioßy from Pull conscious 
(1) 1t. 1snot here suggectod that human-beings are i rely tools in the hands of some external power which works like human minds, by having, -a -conscioueý°dez`lgn about come 'far-off divine event'. Thoy do not seem to be used merely as a means to an end which is entirely extraneous to themselves. 
They seem to be sharing, to a certain extent, in the creative 
and significant activity of the universe. They share"-its End, in some degree, however imperfect that sharing may be. 
creative ac 
In,, faQ. t t 
exists only in and through 
levels 
the 
ý the 
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anticipation of the end realised. what is necessary for 
a wa- arc , ri 
Justifying a teleological interpr©ta Lion of 
is not the full conscious anticipation of the result 
actually attained but the presence of value in the result. 
In the words of iloernle, 'Uhere B requires as the 
condition of it existence, there AB 
has value, we can 
reasonably say that ± is that for the sake of which A 
exists. ` (1) 
In fact, the eiere presence of conscious 
anticipation of the end is not sufficient to justify the 
application of the category of teleology unless the end attain-' 
-ed has a value. This will be clear from the consideration 
of some tcrpes of ideo motor action, An individual who is 
learning to ride a bicycle, for instance, may actually drive 
it against a tree in his anxiety to avoid it, owing to 
his attention being fixed upon it. The collision with the 
thee is, in this cases, brought about by the individual 
himself with full conscious anticipation of the result. 
t 
But in so far as there is no value in the result the action 
(1) ätudios in Cintenpcrary Metaphysics, p. 187. 
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can hardly be said to be, really purposive,. 
The only-requisitas of teleological action, then, 
seem to be that 
1- the-action should be- accompanied by some 
degree of consciousness, 
2- that it should be . the outcome of a conativc. 
attitude, 
that it should. result in the creation of some 3-: 
value whether it happens to be partly or fully 
I 
beyond. the anticipation of the consciousne 
of the agent. 
In the light of such analysis it, seems possible 
r) to bridge the apparent gulf between the immanent teleology 
which Is chat, acteristic of organic activity and the, COt13Q. ous 
Purpos"iveneec which i characteristic of human individuality. 
It is characto, riatic of organic Individuality 
that the functioning of the. rparts. of 
the. whole i, o, determined 
t . the, 
'requirements ' 
. or, the- : erhole. ý,,. But as iobhouae pointed 
out (1), the organic activity will resolve itself 
1-. into mechanical activity if the 'require- 
ments: `o'f, 'the whole expresa themselves aa 
(1) Life and Finite individuality, p. 66-7. By Vr. Oarr. 
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force, a push or a pull, or 
2- it will resolve itself into a species of 
purposive activity if it expresses itself as 
`uneasiness' or a felt want. 
it has been seen that the first alternative or 
interpreting the way in tihich the 'requirements' of the 
organism express themselves has to be given up as being 
un$atisfabtory. Blind mechanism cannot in any way lead 
4' to the creation of a value. But the organism which 
comes into being as a result of organic activity has a certain 
1G. ß". 
*A .. ý` value of its own. And in eo far as, theiorganic activity 
leads to the creation of an individual existent which has 
value, it cannot be purely mechanical. But the other 
alternative of interpreting the way in which the'require- 
rnents I of the organism are yet- still remains open. (T. ) 
The analogy between the conscious purposiveness Of 
human behaviöur, and the i. mmctnent teleology of organic pro- 
ceases is further strorigthened by two considerations. 
(1) It would even seers to be indluated b-; the fact that the organic procee see (as In the case of Driecch's Tubula-- 
ria) like conscious purposive 'behaviour, seem to exhibit the evidence of persistence with varied e0forts until a Particular end, with some value, is reached. 
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1- On the one hand, hale, 
', " as seen in the last chapter 
the constituents inv'ldved in the organic processes 
cannot be credited with any full prevision of 
the 
ends actually attained through them, 
even 
the planninE 
of human beings itself, seemsto contribute a greater 
immanent purposiveness which is at times totally 
betrond their consciousness. 
2- On the other hand, since conative activity Might. 
exist alon7-, with va ring grades (1) of consciousness, 
a very rudimentary conative activ ty m,, -, y 
be experi- 
enced even by the constituents, of organic procec esý, C, 
(1) Compare, for instance, the habitual and deliberate 
'purposive: actions in 'Lucian beiaviour. 
; 2) The major difficulty in attributing even a very 
low grade of consciousness to the constituents involved 
in organic processes would probably be the absence of the 
nervous system. But as the nervous system is only an 
inctrance cf the specialisation of function, it seems to be 
the condition only of the higher grades of consciousness. 
'T'here are no traces of nervous organisation in the 
lowest known organisms (tho aLaptba for instance). And these 
must be credited with some kiftd of consciousness, unless 
there is. I fundamental discontinuity of principle between 
the lower and the higher organisms. The constituents involved, 
in organic processes, e. ;. cells, seem to be themselves orgs- 
nisms in so far as they live on some kind of food and repro- duce themselves. But if the ame ba may have some rudimentary 
consciousness, why can the cells not have it? 
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In view of these facts a comparison - drrvn 
by MacDougall, - between a, low form of conativo activity 
like the construction of the comb by the bees and the 
organic activity of the construction of the bone by the 
cells becomes very illuaffinabing. As McDougall says, 
'None of the bees .. " consciously forms a plan of the whole 
structure and directs the building operations as a whole. 
But each bee io, a teleological agent exercising a lowly 
form of . ntalligence and purpose and the natures of all the 
beep,, are so nicely- adjusted to one another that their 
Jo: ilt efforts bring about, in a new way which we do not 
't fully understand, the, adaptations f the growing 6vrtp m 
struc ture to all the special circumstances that obtain and 
arise In the course of the work. (l) The constr uction of 
a bone night be esocntiaJ, ly of the sae nature as the constrtr i 
etion of a comb. 
The cells do not have a ooneciouo plan 
about the entire atruct, ure thichgthey_bui1d, but their 
activity may nevertheless be teleological like that of 
the., bees, although attba still lower grade of consciousness. 
(1ý Modern Zdealiam p. 160-1 
ýý 
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The cell, the bee and a human being are all alike in their 
capacity to produce values beyond their consciousness. 
It therefore, seems possible to as, ilszilate organic teleo- 
logy to pur_7osive activity. 
When we come to cone ider the physical nature 
which is generally looked upon as inanimate, the extension 
of teleology to this re-lm involves some dif 'icylties but 
is by no means indefensible. The concept of the mechanical 
as distinguished from' the teleological action is regarded 
by science to be more adequate for this realm. But i+ 
he to resolve the antithesis of the mechanical 
and teleological action i subrittýthe concept of mechani- 
cal action to logical criticism. The concept of mechanical 
action is ina? opl*_cable cihen we are concerned with any 
genuine whole. It posits a mere aggr©gnte of --parts 
which can exist Independently of the aggregate. Then are 
ao supposed to be capable of exiot n in ep©nde'ntly 
of each other. The action Of the agSre , atc au a whole may 
be very complex, but, i explicable in terns of mathernatiaaf 
law ,= as it is d©terra ift0d by the force Which are ex©rted by 
all the parts. reut in the lieht of 'such analysis it is 
clear that (1) the -very' possibility of the action and inter- 
action'' of rc n tho". different parts of an` aFgregate, icaplioc 
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that their independence is not absolute bjt relative and, 
ff, q ý2 the action of the ' its themselves cannot 
fail us in explaining even purely p'_ýysical actions. All 
that we can do is to draw a forec,, st of a probable action 
basin{ it on the averages drawn from empirical observation. 
But there is no rigid and invariable determination of 
action even in the physical realm. The principle of 
indeter, nal-nation seems to be at the very heart of physical 
reality. 
:, rtb, ur Lddi. n ; ton, believe that ultimately all uniformities 
itself be mechanical, in so far as there nre no further 
parts of the part to determine the ýr act-Lon. 
In fact, some eminent scientists, like Sir 
Apart from the 1_oß 1e1 d}. ffiouitiee involved 
in the concept of mechanical fiction, and the practical 
difficulties in actually understanding physical action 
with the apn'ication of that concept, there are other 
philosophical reasons why the mechanical categories should 
Le given _p even from the realm of physical nature. f'hilo- 
sophy seeks to find rte.:. a principle of continuity between 
the various ordert of' reality. we cannot look i. u; on there 
ab-discontinuous ad unr'e'lated to each other. In the liF; ht 
of 
4 
then 
. co cepto of mechanical and toleologi.. 
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cal action have to be treated n. s being incompatible with 
each other. The mechanical action is blind, in the 
sense that it has nothing to do with value. ýih le as we 
have seen, the essence olteleological action consists 
in its capacity to lead to the . 'roduction of some values 
And we must look for some comprehensive and unitary 
principle which will brim-, to r>etaer the dif er©nt realms 
of reality, we are entitled to be 10S: suspicious about 
teleology than =tbout meck nisi , or we are directly 
and intimately acquainted with teleolo4, ica1 action in 
our daily life, while mechanism Is at beat a postulate of 
science for its limited purposes. 
$ore, over, while we cannot exp1, i. n teleological 
ý. 
activity if we start from purely blind uniformities, we can 
explain the appearance of mechanism - and it may be, for 
all we knovw, only an appearance - If wo ot: trt fron tele- 
ological action. In: tho words of James ; ard, 'while 
it may be possible octt . ng, out from int id to account for 
mechanism, it io imposaible eetLin, out from ; iiechanism to 
acc, }unt for . hind. ' (1). 
(1) Realm of Lnds, ý. 1ý. 
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When an action which in the beginning, is completely 
purposive is repeated again and again it becomes habitual. 
r' lkin , for instance, invioves in the beginning a 
deli- 
borate and purposive control and movement of the muscles. 
rrhen a child leaxls to walk: we do not get the same type of 
more or less uniform and almost automatic movements which 
are characteristic of the walking of a man. It has to 
make sevel-al attempts apd deliberately stamp out unsucces3fug, 
essays in wallki. ng until it learns to walk, witfhout auch 
specific attention on its part. OAK ,#a an expression 
of habit is chabacterised b7 a certain amount of regular 
and uniform action which is varied only when the man encoun- 
ters some ou't. -off'-the--Tay 
situation. If, for insta -ice, he is 
crossing the rails while a train is coming towards him he 
, walk, more quickly thin is usual with him. So, in spite of 
apparent mechanleation of his behaviour, he is able to vary 
it purposively in case there is any need for such vari-, tion. 
This shows that the mechanical uniformity is only an apparent 
feature of his really pur aosive action. 
thoI rchsnicnn1 uniformitios of n-ýturo might be, 
for -11 vie know, eo:, ent1911y of the nature of 1ong. -utaneln7, 
habits. Instead of saying that habit i-3 oocorj nature, we 
ýý 
might with truth say that nature is probable second, habit. 
It, therefore se ras that line organic teleolo, r, mnýcft nical 
action is also capable of being as^i., dlatet' to purposive 
behaviour. 
As :, e have seen, the idea of the machine itself 
is bound with the notion of a purpose. ý_ut as in the case 
of the machine the purpose involved in external) it is 
pos ible to consider it in complete abstraction from the purpo 
. se for which it exists and to consider its , vorking as being 
due to forces which have no refernce to this purpose. It 
is not u%1ikely that, the constituents of mz tter are some 
kind of wholes which have a capacity of having some dim 
and rudimentary purposes the nt ture or -,,, which we re not 
in a position to unCerst-nd off' -ppreciate, And in 
tree, tth them as having a capacity only for rnochaniual 
action, e : night be unconsciously looking upon taem in 
abstraction fron their urposiv©nona, 
it is not, improbable that the constituents of 
the so-called ' inor{? nnic nature' m echt themselves be 
some kind of rudimentary or; -Tanicme, although wo are unable 
to determine their nature or otructire. As bradl. ey asks, 
'Uan Vie äste, because we have found out the n: turn of some 
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organisms, that we have exhausted that of all? ' (1) The 
parts of nature might be constituents of some lind of 
organisms Which Rn- not like our bodJ. es. 
The important features of an organism are 
1- the organisation of its bocly, and 
2- the presence of value. 
The organisation of the body is, when viewed in 
abstraction from value, only a definite pattern or structure. 
But some kind of structure is also characteristic of 
crystals or molecules ob atoms. ASIs« ffýr ao. value -is 
concerned it is not possible to Ascertain its non-existent© 
in tie constituents of matter. All that may perhaps be 
said about their valuo io that we 6.0 not definitely know 
that it characterizes these constituents. But oven this 
icnbr-nc© is not co complete as it is supposed to be. The 
great nature poets and the mystics have intmitively felt 
the value of physical nature. 
Philosophical speculation cannot rest satisfied in 
an unreconciled dualism of the -nr nate ranci the Inanimate 
iýA; ppattranco and xeality, p. 271. 
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world 4nd rust seek to introduce intelligible continuity 
in the diverse orders of reality. Any dualism between the 
two orders confronts us with the enigma of the origin of 
life. It has also been seen In the last chapter, that the 
naturalistic attempt to assimilate life to mechanical 
action is bound to fail. On the other hand, the exten- 
sion of teleological activity and life to the inorganic 
realm involves no theoretical difficulties and set is on 
the whole justified on philosophical grounds. (1) The 
attempt to undertenact the lower types of individuality 
in terms of the higher is thus more successful. 
/ 
(1) Even from the purely scientific point of view the distinguishing line between the 'animate' and-the 'inanimate' Is ever receding further and further into the domain of the latter. 
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V. 
ELF --ý C0NS C- 1- 0USNFSS 
17B HAV"L SN that the principle of inte3rpr©ting 
the lower °t-Pes of indiVid. ualit -is more coünd 'and fruit- 
f'ül th. a*; º the principle of interpreting the higher types 
by the lower. in human beings we get the highest type 
of individual icy known to uc, The distinguishing feature 
of human individuality `ie not eo rauch consciousness ao 
self-cons, ciotzcnesS. 
The individual becom©`c aware of 'hi lf'-identity 
only through the' activity which hcclps &ita to build r 
systematic wo'ld of ai'verse nrid relcttc objects out of the 
flux of preoent^tions given to him through his se , es. It 
is through, the awareness of the iriantity of his object of 
ýf°"" knowledge that the self comes to be aware of its own identity. 
°, {, ', 
ý: 
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It is as if the self were to say to itself, 'I have seen this 
thin; yesterday and 1 see the same thing to-day, therefore 
1 am while seeing, this thing to-a. ay the s^rne person as when 
1 saw it yesterday. ' It is not here sugg, asted that the self 
comes to be aware of its own identity throu ,h any such 
conscious and explicit inference. Its awareness oi' self- 
identity in conditioned by its awareness or the world of 
objects but it proceeds pari passu with the same. If a 
person is confronted with a plethora of sensations without 
any rhyme or reason so ns to make it impossible for him 
to lay olct of any significant and intel1isible/bject 
he will probably never arrive at any awareness of self-- 
iclentity. 
The unity of the world, sind the unity of the 
subject are thus distinct but compleme ary aspects of. one 
whole. Through the world the subject knows itself, and 
through the subject the world knows itcel1'. The subject is 
in a sense a part of its world, but it is a part In which 
the wor1a reflects itself. In the `vorad of Hoernle, 'the 
life of the whole pulsates in the parte(l) 
(ý1 Studies in ! ietaphycica, p. 292. 
ýý 
The subject and the object of knowleC ge 
c^nýct, however be regarded as being co-ordinate with 
each of ef. It is true that tiieyy , re essentially 
correlates. The subject 1mpiicc the object of which 
it lo the subject anO. the object i. -,, plies the oabject of 
V. wnich it is the object. : 3ut at the sane time, In this 
reiýRtion of tae subject and of the kbowleci ; e, the subject 
has a certain amount of primacy. 2u%, subject it must have '4 
, 
Is 
' v\ 
some object. But it need not have any particular object. 
The objects of knowledge are constantly changing. But 
the subject remains the subject in spite of this change of 
objects. And even if there is no- object of knowledEp 
for it it : Till not necessar'_ly be re,: ucei to nothing. It 
can of course, no lonmer remain a subject of an object 
of knowledge, 3ut it does not therefore follow that it 
will have no reality whatsoever. Empirically speaking 
there:, are practical difficulties in being conscious of the 
subject except as having sone_objoct of bnowledpo. But 
therr. is no reason in theory why a subject having no object foß 
its consciousness oxcept itself, chou4d be inconceivable. 
Can the subject know itself? Some tcheoretica1 
objections-ha 
, 
ve been raised against such a possibility. 
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Hume said that we do not and cannot know any subject became 
whenever we look within the stream of conscious s we find 
nothing except Ideas. It is not surprising that 1oo yin as 
he did, for the subject among the objects of his cons- 
ciousness he did not find it there. Had the subject been 
one of its own ideas t . ere would have been some p-, ossibilitp 
of his hitting upon it in this way, But ns the subject 
is not one of its own ideas he missed. it. 
The essence of th- logical difficulty in 
knowwinE the subject seems to be that Lever fa11e ;,, Ithin 
knowled. -o becomes by that very fact an object of ? cnowleýge. 
Since it is by the aubjr, -et that everything, else is known 
t whom can the subject be known by?. $wt if the subject can 
know -everytl. In ; Why Ghould it not be able to know-itself 
as well? It is only an uncritical dogma that in all 
cases of know1, et, j. go , the object must be different from the 
subject or that the subject and object of knowledge can in 
no caso be the same . 
Thera is no reason for the viow that the 
distinction between the subject and the object of 1nowlc, gc 
holds rood for all forms of : tnowledge. Such a distinction 
seg o to be icy it 'to and necessary' In the case , of 
the knoww1e. " 
dge of any objects other than the sub ject. 3ut it in out 
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of place in the case of that form of kno, %, ledf-, e where the 
object of knowledge happens to be the subject. 4ibself. 
It is true that even her it is possible to 
distinguish between the subject as knower and the subject 
as 'mown: But it is not legitimate to 7o further and 
maintoin on the strength of th'_s logicg1 distinction that 
the subject as known is different from the subject as 
knower. The two terms in the relation of knowledge which 
ordinarily stand for and indicate different things refer 
in this case to one and the same thing. The dirt inct lon 
between the knower and, the =known in this case emphasises 
two different logical properties of one and the same thing. (l) 
In its capeec it-Tr to know it is the subject; in its cap, -, city 
to be known it is! the object. in self-knowledge the knower 
is the known and the known is the knower. In other worlds 
the knower knows ritseif. 
The subject, ther,: ýforo knows itself as well as the 
the objects of its knowlct; ge, and knows itself as a subject 
in and through the objects of its knowledge. But there seems 
(1) I do not of course wish to iply that the subject is a kind of a substance. The rot-ati. on of the subject to its ob, c ct is entirely different from tb. c: relation of the substance to its attributes. 
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to be no theoretical difficulty about its knowing itself 
even without knowing its objects at the same time. It 
is true that if the subject could know itself witiiout 
knowing its objects and also forget the implications of tk 
fact that it can know obj ects, it would knotig itself, but 
not as a subj ect. For, to know itself as a subject, it raust 
think about it in relation to its actual or potential objects , 
of knoývi edge. But there is still a theoret_cal possibility 
of the subject having pure self-aw eness in which it does 
e 
not know itself as being a subject or as having any logical 
prop.: rties. It would be self-awareness only in the sense 
. "t of being aware of itself. But it will neverthelesa not 
", - tR: ' be aware of . "calf or aware of itJ-self as a self or a subject; 
In order to distinguish such self-awareness from the subject'a 
knowledge of itself as asubject it is better to refer Ito 
It as A 'ure Awaronesp" 
It is, however, important , to consider '. 
" exact4º 
+ -natura of thiv furs , Aviaronesp. ,, It is not t nalogouc 
to a judgment. in wh1Ch something is pret tcated of something. 
In Pure AwaronesG, pe, cannot, h., vo any distinction of the 'that' 
and the 'what'. All that 
. 
wo could say on its authority would 
be to ray that it ext to as Sall'-know] j' . But Further 
than this we could not say aYnyttiing about it. Vie subject 
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know.: itself directl;, r in a primary intuition and not'' 
int, ermediately, through ideas or predication. 
But if we posit such Pure' Allareness, and start 
from it, we cannot even call it a subject, for to call it 
a subject is'to-consider it not in itself, but in its 
relation to the objects of khowlec_Se. The subject as, well 
as the object are both distinctions within the knowledge 
of' which it is an irm: ianent ground. In 'itsolf, - therefore, 
there i& no reason, why it should be called a subject any 
mo. -re than an object. 
It seems that this Pure Awareness is as much 
behind the objects of consciouoneco as it is behind the 
subject of conscioüonecc. I Qu : df, of course, exist as a 
back-ground of ythooe particular objects of ay consciousness 
which are represented by other human beings. But there Is 
no reason why' this should not be-true of even those objects 
of, consciousness which do not seem -to be, su'bjec'ts "A 
philosopher is, apt to ldahtify the puro concoIousncae with 
the subject rather than the objects, because he arrives at- 
it through his-knowledge°of-himself as a subject. But this 
is only a. p, ycholoßi, cal ana not a logical nece8r,. ty. If vie 
4t in_k4wn. 
tA,. ^f , , pc"t therefore posit Pure Awareness behind e^nsciousnasj, 4J ? 
A 
0 
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at once assume the character of subjects and all knowledge 
takes the form of a self-communion of that Pure awareness 
through the medium of subjects who are, as it were, its own 
modifications . 
The conception of a jure Awareness behind all the 
subjects nnLt the objects of cnowledCp neeu not snake unreal 
the individual unity, centrality and integrity of the. 
subject. It is not a kind of a universal thinker which 
thinks icky all and knows all that is to be known. it 
knows only itself. And its knowledge of itself is differort 
from the knowleage which the subjects which appear in it 
have of the world of objects which also appear in It. The 
activity of knowing through the medium of subjects is 
different from tos direct seif-awareness. 
Fror the standpoint of the knowledge of the 
world of the objects by thy different subjects, the subject 
looks upon h imself as an 11, which is distinct from 
otter subjects. It is true that every other subject also 
looks upon himself as a similar ' I' . But this use of the 
(1) This need not be startling since, as e have already seen, consciousness is probably immanent in all t, le')rdero of reality. 
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same term by all in indicating; the nature of their 
existence does not Laniply their Identity. Nor does the 
term 'I' sand for some abstract universal having 
so many instances. It indicates an individual existent 
different from other similar existents. 
, ut at the same time Pure ya ; ^eness seems to be 
more than a substantiated abstraction. it is a necessary 
-Postulate of knowledge, in so far as it accounts for the 
fact that the subject can know the object at all and also 
the fact that the different cub ject s can understand 
each other. 
The unity of all knowledge implies a unity 
of the world of objects as Well as the unity of the world 
of mtbjoctsR_. This unit-- , however, is a unity in difference 
and therefore does not swamp the individual existence of the 
oubJoct as an 'i'. 
ýý 
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VI. 
THE EMPIRICAL SELF. 
WE HAV: 3' S MEN that the subject of knowiodEp 
knows itself as an 'I' or an individual existent distinct 
from ot'ner subjects or objects. But the awareness of self 
seems to ae a feature only of human beings. In all 
probability animals do not have any consc'. ousness of them- 
selves. They are directly aware of the perceptual world 
and live and --ct with reference to it without introducing 
anywhere the idea of a self. :; ut owing to the capacity 
of man to rise from the merely percoprual to the reflective 
consciousness he comes to build up an idea of 
'me' Is a logical construction. He does not stL rt with 
any knowledge of himself any more than he starts with 
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1npivledge of anything else. The consciousness of the self 
or the 'me' has a psycholo; icLryl gen©s is and dovelai,, 
ýnt. 
WWhen the individual is only a newly born child 
he does not seem to. have any consciousness of self. From 
all sides sensat-on3 beat upon him.. He has not yet 
learned 
to distinguish betreen different binds of sensations. 
The world is, for his consciousneso, a single blurred' present' t 
tati. on continuum' wit! iout any gignificýnce or naaning. His 
innate J,. natinctivc ap, paratuo, however, helps him to 
d . ctinF, uish different wholea within 
t'hi, continuum. This 
activity of differentiation. and integration within the 
continuum is throughout. uide _; 
by a , principle of selection 
based, upon his interests TouchinG his own body is 
dif''erent from touching something else.. xesiotance 
offered by his body fools different from the resistance 
A offered by,. ot1her things. `The falling of a thing upon 
his body Is different from its. falling upon somethindelse. 
on he learns to distinýuiah, .. 
between, 
othe eensations which 
he has of his own body through its exteroceptors from the 
eensattons which- ho has of other, things Besides while 
other sensations come, _and 
go there Is ,a certain amount of 
permanence about the organic cenoations coming from the 
ýýs 
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interior of his body, -like thirst, hunger or ooenesthesia. 
A-complex of sensations, therefore, becomes isolated 
from the main continuum and is integrated into a system) 
an entity (his body) with which' he is concerned with 
a greater warmth than other- entities, which also come to 
be distinguished. within the continuum. 
At this stage the individual might become 
aware of his body but he can hardly be said to be aware 
of his body as being his own bbd y. He might feel 
towards his own boxy in a different way from the way he 
feels towards other bodies just as he-might feel towards 
tics al ythings, in a way °d`ifferent' from- tha way he feels 
towards a book on relativity. -But this does not mean 
that he Is aware of his body as being 'his own. " Such a 
possibility can only ar1. se when he has-' come to have some 
idea of pelf. The 'mä' ° cannot appropriate 'anythin °'; 
before it Itself comet 
The inciividühl begins tb htjve''sälf-bons cjouenemis 
only when he has learned to recognise 'other, peroon$ -' ancd 
di$tingui hý ý th r`froni other =thtngä'. --', Hiia mother -'responds 
to his rie©ds 3s. 4very d-ifferirit= from that 
of his, cradle. - ' 3aforaý'he' ß. a, ' Conscious of °=hi, m, olf he is 
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conscious of her loving eyes anct cheerful smile. The 
warmth of her bosom and the kiss of her lips have for him 
a kind of reality vrhich is unique. If he is hungry his 
mother is always there to feed him. When he is in 
suffering nothing treats hlowso tenderly as his mother. 
He therefore begins to recognise his mothet and others as 
individuals. And very eobn he begins to think of himself 
as an individual on the analogy of these individuals whom 
he has coma to know. 
It must not be supposed that the indiviaual 
arrives at the consciousness of his self-hrood through a 
process of conscious inference. He does not say to 
himself `A's reactions and behaviour are unique and, 
therefore, A is a unique entity. Liy reactions and 
behaviour are more or less similar to A's and I'm also 
therefore, a unique entity. ` Such a process of inference 
viould be impossible without onsciousness of so1f-hood. What 
really happens during this process of arriving at self- 
consciousness is much simpler. The individual begins to 
find mocninf; in the'entitios' represented by his mother 
and others and ea rInassu begins to find meaning into himsoift 
The complex of sensations, which is his mother, is not for him 
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a mere organisation of sense-data. She has a special 
meaning. And as he begins to understana more and more 
the meaning that belongs to different individuals he is 
able to find meaning in himself. The process is unconscious 
and implicit rather than conscious and explicit. The aware- 
ness of other individuals and the awareness of himself 
develop simultaneously. 
There is probably a period of confusion 
preceding the awareness of the self as distinct from others. 
This point might be illustrated by the confusion in the 
mind of a baby whom I happened to know . Whenever she 
was asked by another 'What 'is your name V she used to 
reply 'you'. Whenever she was asked by another (pointing 
to himself) 'What is my name? ' she used to reply 'V. 
The baby was very alert and used to give these replies with 
persistent tenacity. 
The explanation is, not far- to meek. Everyone 
referred to the baby as 'you. '. as when telling her 'you 
mustn't cry l' So she came to think by a kind of uncon-- 
scious empirical generalisation that her name waa'you'. On 
the other hand everyone, while talking to her referro to 
himself as 'I', as when saying 'I will be angry with you 
if you cryd:! So a similar process led her to believe that 
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the name of everyone is ' I' . In the light of these 
considerations her replies seem to have had some logic 
behind them. 
The individual cannot bepaid to become clearly 
conscious of his selfhood unles- he has learned to use 
the word 'I' or its equivalent accurately. In the above 
case the baby had certainly made an effort to ascertain 
the meaning of the words . 
'y' and 'you' and had made 
a mistake about their meaning. ßut it was more that 
a mere effort to understand the lang language use by others 
around it. Language and thought are so closely wodde'J 
together that understanding one is the same as understanding 
the other. The baby had probably learned that the words 
'x' and 'you' are used to signify persons but she had 
not yet understood the distinction between them. The 
distinction between 'You' and 'I' cannot be apprehended 
before the rise of conscious self-hood. It is almost 
certain that in the experience of a baby colf-hood is a 
gradual growth and is considerably, helped by its intercourse 
with other persons. 
The growth of'-seif-consciousness, however, does 
not terminate with learning the use of the word 'I' or 
`me' " In a sense, it begins there. The 'me' only gives 
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the form of the self. But the contents of the 'me' are 
always growing. It is very interesting to trace how the 
'me' gradually comes to be filled with a more and more 
varied, content. 
The development of self-consciousness 
like its birth is tilrouRhout conditioned and influenced 
by the social environment. The opinions which other 
people have or will have enter imperceptibly into the 
idea of the 'me'. To-day the individual receives a 
gown from the university and to-morrow he finds it below 
his dignity to be churlish. in the morning he becomes 
a Lord and in the evening he rei'uses to dine with a 
commoner. Somebody praises him for his valour and so 
he feels ashamed to exhibit cowardice, at least in that 
person's presence. It has been said that the individual 
has as many selves as there are persons who know hits. (1) 
The denunciations and the praise sf others as well as their 
expectations about him enter into his idea of 'me' anti 
they lie come motives of his actions. 
{1) i11iam James, Textbook of Psychology, P. 179. 
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Through memory imagination and reflective conscious- 
ness the individual comes to think of himself not only 
as one who has some experiences in the present but also as 
one who has had certain experiences in the past, and also 
as one who is booking forward to otbe experirences iii 
the future. Thus : 'napoleon's idea of himself on the 
battlefield o, g Vaterloo probabl,, r was, 'I have triumphed 
in manly a stnnmy battle and I will certainly winfx 
this one too. ' All the joys and sorrows of the Individual, 
his tears and smiles, hi. s successes and failures, his 
humiliation and glorification, his anxieties and fears 
and hopes and plans enter into the 'me' as its consti- 
tuentA contents. 
The'me'of the indiv'_dual is thus constantly 
expanding. In fact, it Includes everything that he 
can call 'mine'. He feels hurt if his enemies pull 
down his house. He is annoyed if any one casts a slur 
on his college. Iie is happy if his clothes are well- 
ironed. He likes to see his fields yield a r-, ood harvest, 
Ire wants hic gardens to produce plenty and his friends to 
prosper. Ile wants his partilaular theory or system of 
belief to be universally accepted and he feels that hj, a 
fate is closely bound up with thu way in which it is 
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received by the eminent and the learned. In short, 
anything he calls his in virtue of his interest in it 
becomes a part of 'me'. 
That happens to that which he cannot call 
'mine' because it runs counter to his interests?. He 
mir ht find that the existing structure of society twarte 
his ambitions. Or an epidemic of influenza might sweep 
away several of his personal friends. Things of this 
kind do not admit of being incorporated into the 'me'. 
His enemies are his, in a sense, and yet cannot be a 
part of his 'me'. They are a part of 'me'A in the 
sense that there are in the 'me' many 'desires and 
activities dirOcted towards them. But they are regarded 
throughout as'not-mb'. So everything within the expe- 
rience of the individual which does not admit of being 
assimilated to the 'me' is converted into the 'not-me'. 
When the'me' and the 'not-mo' are formed 
there is a tension between them. This tension has a 
tendency to modify both the 'me' and the'not--me' in 
such a way that they become more and more harmoniscu with 
each other and the discord between them is Fraduaily 
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diminished. The changes in the 'me' and the 'not-me 
are brought about through their interaction. 
The contents within the 'me' as well as within 
the 'not-me' are constantly changing. 3ometimee the 
contents within the ! me' are expelled Crorn it and incor- 
porated within the 'not-m8' and sometiaies the contents 
within the 'not-me' are isolated from it and taken 
up into the 'me' . As Bradley has pointed out 'welýnigh 
everything contained in the psychical individual may be 
at one time part of self and at another time part of not-self' 
(1) Some such thing, happens for instance in the case of 
a membor of the opposition arty who is offered a seat in 
the r'-overnment and accepts it. r? e hoginc to justify 
course of action which he would have denounced in his 
former capacity. A similar change Is illustrated by the 
story of a pedestrian. Ile used to complain bitterly that 
motor-ears are rnereltr a nuisance o, -i the road. : gut some 
time later he haripened to purchase a car for hi ioelf. ; nC 
then began to comnlsin that pPett: testrinns are merely a nui anee 
on the road. , chat was formerly a part of himself berýamo a 
(1) A--ppearanee and reallDtv, p. 81. 
>ýý 
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' not-self' and whit was a cart of his 'not-self' became 
a Part of liiillself. 
Is there any content in the self which Is 
Permanent? It seems that there is nothing in tie contents 
of the psyche whica is not capable of being made an object of 
theoretical or practical consciousness. Everyt: °, inP t.. iat 
is 'nine' can also often be2 part of the not-self. Feeling 
and ideas seem to belong to" bhe self more intimately. 
But it is possible to ti-}ink about the innermost feelings or 
ideas as being so, nethhin , apart 
from our self gndldes ire 
certain ch n; -os in them. It is only so long as we 
identify ourselves with any feeling or an idea that the 
feeling or idea is really a part of the empirical self. 
As soon as the subject apprehends it n an object or 
distinguishes itself Now it, it bccomac a part of the 
'not-self'. It would seem that a disposition to think or 
feel Ina particular manner is more Intimately a part of 
the self than particular thoughts or feolingo which are 
ito iuan, ifes tat ions . but, it is posci'ble to put ouree1vuc out 
är our 1ispoolt one and contemplate and desire u change also 
" in thorn. 
iý 
i 
i 
t ,. 
r The ph; rs ical body of the inä9. viiiua 1 see , lo to belang 
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to the 'me' exolusively. `. Through cooneasthes is it is 
more or less constantly present as a back-ground for 
anything of which he may happen to be conscious. ýý. oreover 
it is_ present to consciousness in a war in which other ttlings 
are not. But it is also possible to, '- look upon the 
body as an external object and desire certain changes in 
It. In doing so tine individual put;, his body into t ho 
'not-self'. So far ao the contents of consciousness 
o, r©, concerned twerp, seam: to be nothing that can, exclusi- 
vely belong to t lie self as against the not-self. 
How t, ien are we to understand Vhe relation 
between the 'me' and the 'not-me'? The 'me' is that 
provislonal organisation of some contents of the psyche 
which becomes the nucleus of special eignifict: nee for the 
organisation of all the contents of the psyche. it 
might be compared with the fulcrum of a lever with which 
a man can lift a stone. Although the assignment of 
particular contents to the 'me' and the 'not-mo' ic 
provisional, it is neither acclaental nor uniiocee::, ary. 
äuch a diviaion of the psyche into the 'ipe ' and the 
' not-me' is essential for the rational life of thc, 
Individual. 
when we look at the Ime 4 not merely from 
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the point of view of the linear succession of its contents 
but also laterally by taking a cross-section in its linear 
life, we find that tha contents of the 'rie' and not only 
changing in time but that they my be so diverse as to 
break up into various'selvOs'. And some time'theso var1ous 
solves of the individual may to so antagonistic to each other 
and, vet so per, ictent in täeir claim to be -he sole 
c o,,: iinnting factor in 17is life that the contents ° of hic 
pc 7Che might actually break up into aevotal 'MCM4I., This 
is how we get the a': normal phenomenon of an alternating 
or a multiple personality. B1 modern psychoanalysis 
has proved. trat tic fStfference betY, oen the : o-cox.! ed 
normal itditidual. and the abnormal individual is only one 
of, degree. 
It Is true that the avert behaviour of an 
average inaivir1ual fa11s within certain oxpectatian. n and thin 
Implies a certain capacity. to control and direct the innen 
sub- 
stream of consciousness. EUt dccp down in his, , conscious- 
pees mind ttiore are caiapiexos which persistently shape and 
Influence the-course of his consciouono9E anG the pattern of 
hiw behaviour.. Flo, too, has compuloiono"and discordant 
element,..,, in his conscioueneaa. AIUd at times the oeei. Lia tuns 
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of his moods rzav be so pronounced that he can hyidly 
know with which mood to identify himself. Ana in the 
: nind of a philosopher such o situation is often repre- 
sented bar conflicting conceptions of life. 
The normal individual, then, goes through the 
same storm ann. stress whictz leads an abnorm. -111 inaividual 
to insanity. The only difference bet,, een t em is that 
the one has been comparatively succesoful irý'rcoplving 
his conflicts while the other has failed in the attempt 
to do so. In the long run, the individual in charge 
of an asylum and its inmates sail in the same boat. 
Unless by normal we mean an individual who confnrrn to 
the averarre type, most people will E1nve to be conoiuere. 
abnormal. True normality to an attainment and not a gift. 
In the life of an average individual there 
is continually some rivalry anü conflict between the different 
selves. ije ', 71.. 17 iam James has vividly pointed out, everyone 
would, if he could, like to be a millionaire rind a saint, 
the bonviv: anL and the philanthhropist, the philosopher and the 
lady-biller at one anu the name. ti::, Q. , ut, as he says, 
'the iniliione, ire's work would run counter to the Sainte' pt 
the bonvivant and the philanthropist vrouid trip each other 
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up; the philosopher and the lady-killer could not well 
keep house in the syme tenement of civtr. ' (1) As :t is not 
possible for any man to be everything, he has to g ý., h go through 
a process of self-crmcifixion 
3ut the very fact- that those different selves 
can come into conflict i:. pJ. ioa -that t arc is a single 
subject which owns both of them. Had It not been for 
auch an identical point of roferonco, no euch constiouc 
conflict could ever have arisen. if A wants to be a 
and 3 wants to be a philosopher, they can have 
no consciouonosa of internal conrlict although In fact 
they might in their actual life be involved In a nutual 
conflict. But the peculiarity of the conflict of the 
different selves within the individual is that it is felt to 
be peculiarly internal. Although in a moment of drunkenness 
A might be involved in some unworthy action, in a inornont 
of oobriot", he feels aohamoa of it. in other words he Goes 
IS, 0 not altogether disown the action by hic lower 
; elf but 
Textbook on Fcychology, p. 186. 
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accepts res : ans ibility for the sa«ie and tries to subordinate 
hic lower self' to bis higher self. 
, 1: he '. ndividual makes his ownership of these dif: fo- 
rent selves felt tftrough a 
them, if their are involved 
perspective, considers all 
themsievee to him, makes u 
action he is oing to take 
is not in harmony with h, 
Philip drunk. 
deliberate choice between 
in a conflict. he takes a wide 
ttae alternatives surr vesting 
p h, $ And about the line of 
ran<< rejects everything which 
dec _oLon. Philip sober admonishes 
The individual Is thus able to choose betwweon 
his various solves. in the light of his ideal his selves 
arrange t ýe.. ý: elves in a hierarchy. And when the competing 
selves are thus arrahled with reference to their axiological 
status, the ins iviciual has a principle of selection 
whereby he may reoolve the cont'lict between his various 
selves. 
The principle of the unity of concciousnooo thus 
exbraoses Itself in a gencral tencicncy towards greater and 
greater integration in the life-history of the average 
individual. The various selves grarjua1i tend to be 
subordinated to Some t.! o;:, j n-Dnt purpose of life which is 
:ý 
Sl 
regardeo as central, until the teleological unity animating 
them may be so strong as to make it i.: _: pos c ible for any 
self to exist except as an harmonious element within the 
whole. (1) 
The unitir of c"unsciousno$s, therefore, is not , 
as su ested by an eminent psveholo ist, merely 'a cant 
exnrossion utterecL by some unsophisticated ancient philosopher 
and repeated like an ? rticle of faith by each successive 
genera. t:. on"'(2) It is manifest not only in the integration 
(1) It is true that there are instances in which some 
abnormal individuals seem to have move towards the dis- 
interration of their personality. Sut in such cases 
almost arrays there is some psychological. abnormality 
which prevents integration. The unit º of consciousness 
is thus the dominant functional unity running in 
and through the variety of the contents o1 the psyche 
ana expreoE. ec Itself as a principle of organisation 
creating a growing harmony wit«in the constitue nt e :e rents 
of the empiricnl self. 
12) The Unconscious, by Torton Prince, p. 643. 
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of the conflicting selves but is the very condition of 
there being any conflict between them at all. 
into, ration i' plies the- acttJity of integration 
and taere cannot be any activity of integration unless 
there is some rigent of this ý: ctivity. '.,,, '., or is it possible 
to look ux on '. als, activity as a mere content of the 'me' 
or a part of the stream of consciousness (1) which is on 
the same level as other similar contents or parts. It 
id the principle of their organisation. 
By the unity of thle self we might mean either the 
actual Integration which has been accorzpiished within the 
constituent contents of the 'me' or the principle of inte. 
*ration Itself. In the former sense the unity of the self 
is al m rs in the mAkin,. It admits of de-, reoe. In its 
fullness It,, IS, always coming to be, laut not actually 
existent. In other words the unity is in this sense 
an ideal. But in the latter sense the unitary principle of 
(L) It seems that the activity as such cannot bo, like .Y other contents of the 'me', an object of consciousness. When we speak of'boing conscious of activity a careful anRlyeis of the experience shows that it is only some sensations which accompany activity, Which can be the objects of consciousness, and not the activity as such. The pure 
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integration is not some thing tja it is 7o-*Lng to come into 
operation in future p but is ac tug :? 1y oDerat ive in the 
present and is neceosary for the increasing accomp1_-ehanent 
of integration. But these two different senses of the 
unity of the self do not i,:; ply two distinct selves. Jecauco 
it is the ideal which is o pern t ive in the present as a 
principle of organisati©n. And it is the nature of an 
ideal to be capable of tieing an operative principle without 
itself being necessarily realised in actuality. 
ý .ý 
activity implied in tha awvar. enene of objects or the integration of the various conotitucnts of the 'Tae' is not itself a constituent content of 'me'. 
distinction io,, ther -fore, comotimec dravin between the transcendental self which is the source of this Pure activity and the empirical self or the 'me' which is R growing individual existent. 
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VII- 
THE STATUS OF VALUES. 
3j 
r sý 
`fit 
WE HAVE SENN that the unity of human 
individuality as implying an accomplis'ned integration 
of the contents of the psyche is essentially `Intentional. 
These diverse contents - theoretical and practical - 
come to be integrated and 
$ 4rrnonisod owing to the operation 
s" ý^ in them of a principle which is essentially t©lcological. 
The concept of teleology thus gives us some insip; ht into 
the fundamental principle =anent in individuality. 
3ut It has also been seen that the concept of teleology 
is Itself inextricably bound up with the notion of v-, iue. 
The princi; -, 
l. o of teleolo6y will, therefore, rennin an 
obscure and empty foriaula until it acquires some Meaning 
by a study of its end or ends. And the best that can be done 
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hero is to study the expression of teleology in human 
individuality by considering the values realized tiarou ;h 
conative processes. Caving to the egrosrth of ce1g-con- 
scIousnoss htzaan beings not only live under the rule oflawr 
but they can also live, os Kant seid, under the idea of law. 
They not only strive to attain values but -. ro also - to 
some degree at least -- conscious of the values which 
they strive to attain. It is, therefore, necessary to 
examine the nature of maues. All values are solnet aaa 
regards:. as being purely subjec, -. ive creations of the human 
rind. It is, therefore, argue, ' that they have no objective 
or cosmic significance. On this 
view value 
becomes an 
accidental product of the caticfattion of c.. rtain desires 
of the Individual and is entirely subjective. 
Before doubting thissubjectivity attributed 
to values it would be well to see how much euch a view of 
v_nlues would prove even, if it were in essence true.. 
The value-situation 
D 
ýto 
S 
Desire ject 5ati0faction 
i 
The total value-situation may be an11y,,,, Qd as 
r 
- 86 - 
consisting of a specific desire D for a specific 
object 0 and the specific satisfaction S derived 
from the attainment of the object 0. Even if value 
is tentatively identified with S it is not completely 
devoid of some kind of rudi mbntary objectivity. i ven 
" 
, 
`.. 
" the most confirmed subjectivist cannot pretend 
to know 
any way of going from D to a except through 0. 
But, while D and S are subjective, 0 is clearly 
objective; and yet no value can arise unless 0 is one 
of the terms in the total situation DOS. 
It may be granted that in many cases the object 
might be capable of being substttutou by some other object 
without any detriment to the value arising in the situ- 
ation. Lhie is, however, only true In the case of Vhose 
desires of the individual, which are directed not towards any 
specific object, but towards any object of a specific kind. 
Thus, it is not any object, but only any object of a 
specific kind, which c ,n enter into the situation without 
detriment to the value arising in it. 
This capacity of an object to satisfy a desire 
cannot be a mere accident and taust ulttraitely be derived from 
some inherent characteristics of the object itself. And 
w 
y 
yý 
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in the sense that the object his such a cnp : city value may 
be said to belon; to the object. A certain -zmouwnt of 
rudimentnrv objectivity must be said to belong to value, 
even If it is identified with the satiefac"tion of a desire. 
e qbý 
The identification of value with satisfaction, 
however, rests upon aYke theory. Valuation ie more 
than a mere recognition of some relation between the attainment 
of an object and the psychic state which follow, such 
attainment. Whatever might be the view of a4thinkel, an 
unsophisticated view of vvluation would recognise that 
when we say that 'A is good, ' or 'B is beautiful' 
we do not merely mean that A gives us satisfaction or, 
that the sight of B causes in us a plop`eant emott ob. 
", "hen a philosopher begins to analyse the notion of goodness or 
beauty he night trey to reduce our notion of goodness or beauty 
to c rtain pleasant sensations and than later account for these 
as being a result of the satisfaction of certain desires, 
but this cer - ninly is far from being the)ri,! i. nc1 meaning in 
the mind of individual who is ong,!, god in tho pct of v lu-. 
ation. 
" ,"ýý The arigIna1 import Of any aeta of valuation 
In the words of $orley, 'Their 1meaning is not, that the 
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subject desires -a certain object or is pleased with it, 
any more than the jud-ment of sense-,, perception means 
that ho has certain sensations. ' (1) In fact, the 
individual making value-judgments is not thinking about 
himself at alle A is rood and. 2 is beautiful are, 
in fact, Genuine judgments attributing some kind of 
value to the object ;i or L. And the prima-facie 
validity of such judgments noetrL not be doubted unless 
there are very , ood grounds for doing so. 
The denial of objectivity to values is a 
result of confus für de pc, ychological procos of of desire 
or being pleaded, wita the ii, rport of the judgront of 
value which has an objective ref eroncal. " ýýut , just ass we can a 
never got any truth if we start withi/"mere idea or sensation 
we can never got any judgment of value if we start With a 
purely subjective desire or feeling. Starting with pure 
sub, ject:. vity we can never get at objectivity. gut pure 
subjectivity is -, fiction of the : sind. There is no more 
desire or fcelin ; any more th.. n t:; ero is mere iLiea or 
(1) j "oral Values and the Idea of :; -oä, p. 72. 
t 
t 
i 
i 
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sensation. Just as an idea or sensation is 1ways of 
something the desire or feeling is always for sOme-l- Ing. 
1-1 is Joes not mean that every desire or feeling 
Ipso facto reflects accurately the value-judgment which 
is c rloletely aL[equ^. te to Vac rl,: Aure of the object to 
wwhich it refers, any more than merely having an idea or a 
sensation or a belief about an object is tantamount to 
knowing Its nature correctly. But just as tacr© may 
o4tcn be some discrepancy between the content of the judgment 
of fact and tae nature of the object to which it refers, there j 
may often be soLae discrepancy between the judgment 09- value 
any. the real value of the object to which it refers. But 
all the judgments of value like those of fact, always claim, 
to be adequate for the nature of the objects to which they re_ 
for and also Flirr at being completely adequate for this 
purpose. And neither the truth nor the value of anything 
can ever be revealed. to uo except in , hd through ouch 
judk, mentc. in making judgments of value, therefor©, an 
in making judgments f fact, the indivi uaal has a , rip upon 
the nature of objective reality. 
To value a quality? In tUc light of tiro analogy 
between the jua xuent of fact and the Judgment Of value, talue 
9o _. r 
seers: to Lo1on7, to the object to Bach It seeps to belong 
at least is much as an7, ý -ens ory qua it. Taut it is cu ! t© 
a differe ýt s ue: t ion a cc, to whether it :: la. v be said 
to belong 
to the object in the caLre tray as a quality- The analogy 
between the Judger Ant of fact and the judgnent of value 
may be passed only iiithIn certain litnltu, since the thoore- 
tical anCL the practical aspects og the consciousness of the 
intllvidual7are riot exactly co-ordinate activities running, 
as it were, p ra11ol to each other, but on the contrary 
are related to each other in a spvecia1 way* 
it is quite true that in an important cense a 
judgment of value hau to -be ;' jüdýmdnt of fact also- -` 4hen 
we ; ar that A is good wo are certain !y adding to our 
knowledge of what h is. It r be maintained that 
a value must have some reference to. actual or potential 
existence or 'it is no value 'at all. it `. c quite impossible 
to be i i©v4that X has ne . then --ti`ctüi l 
hot " ötant ia3. e xis tanee 
aria `y8 to maintain that t ho value'. 3uppäce we imagine 
4 
ýr ýe 
ýý ~antrýý 
that X harf value 'and at the sarge time believe that X has 
neither actual nor 'potential OXIstence. A critical analysis 
of the belie will show that What we really moan is that 
X would have value If it had actual or potential existence. 
1 
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It therefore seers that value must characterise the 
realm of individual existents in -order to bd value at all. 
And if it is thus a feature of existents it seolns to be 
a kind of quality belonging to them. 
if value is regarded as a quality, the judgment 
of value becomes only a kind of a judgment of fact. It 
mould differ from , 16ther 
just cants of fact only in having 
the specific function of expressing that particular 
quality which we call value. And there would be no reason 
for distinguishing between a judgment of value and a 
judF, ment of fact any more than there is any reason for 
distin uishing between the judgments about the colour and 
the size of an object. 
To say that an object hap tha quality of 
value is to say that it Is worthir 4ße or that it is as 
it ought/ to be. 8o1ne 
ivory 
aw1w rd cono©quencoc, however, 
coem to follow if we treat valuesaa boin;, uiarely a quality. 
:" As t3orley has pointed out, 'if this predicate were 
ci. rnply a quality constituting the nature of the object, 
then the assertion that the object ought to be as it is 
would ý-bc--, equivctlont -. to-tvying, that it is as it Is, which 
would bo a tautology as-Croce holds the assertion or positive 
value to be. Or again, when wo call an object bad or ugly, 
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if its negative value were simply one of its constitutive 
qualities this assertion would Im a logical contradiction, 
as Croce holds is always the case with the negative value- 
jud : rent. ' (1) 
This objection can, however be answered from the 
logical point of view. The judgment 'A is what it ought 
to be' would not be a tautology, even if value is a 
predicate, because it means explicitly recognising that A 
has a particular quality which is value. for is the 
judgment 'J ought not to be what it is' a contradiction 
because it simply means that A has not got a particular 
quality which is value. 
he first judgment is not a tautology any more 
than any pure judgment of foot, "Like 'A hao a green colour'; 
nor does the cooond judgment Involve a contradic4ion 
any more than any pure judgment of fact like 'A has not 
got a green colour. ' r'roai the logical point of view such 
an explanation removeß the `tautology' anti the `contradiction' 
from the judgments involving respectively 'ought' und 
ý, 1} Moral Values and the Idea of God. P. 77-8 
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'ought not'. 
The really important feature which distin- 
guishes value Judgments from judgments of fact is that they 
are not merely descriptions but imply approval or disapproval. 
The Judgment 'A is what he ought to be implies a desire 
on the pert of the individual that A should continue to 
be what he is and the judgment 'A ought not to be w iat he is' f hf 
TF,., 
impliedthe desire that ii should be different from what he is. 
But the judgment the triangle has three sides'does not 
imply any des re on the pr, rt of the individual that the triang 
le should continue to have three sides. Nor does the 
judgment 'the triangle has not four sides' imp, any 
desire on his part that althought the triangle has three 
sides it would be bettor if it had four. 
It is not hero 
suggested that the individual vho :, reis 'A is What he ought 
to be' a ý. wa rs consciously owns to himself any des ire tip i. th 
regard to A; but such a desire is iilplic it and incipient 
in his judgement. His erio t of l : -nd conativo response 
to the situation is a condition of hic r, ia! cin va iue- 
ýudgment" The judgmcnt is reali. v ade by hie practical 
consciousnoc and it i;, only for the Purposes of corzmu ý, ec- 
` ýrý tion that it takes the form of a proposition which seems 
Izj 
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to be a mere recognition-of fact. 
We now come to see why on the view that value 
is a more predicate the judgment 'A ought to be wheat he i, ' 
looks like a'ta. utoloWW' and the judgment 'A ought not 
to be what' ho is' looks like a'contradiction'. in fact, 
the `tautology and the 'contraciicttor are not of a logical 
but of a practical kind. As soon gis we treat the judgment 
'A Is what he ought to be' as a mere description of we 
eliminate fr6ra it the : mpcrt. whi. c hh it has in virtue of 
i 
the approval of the practical consciousness of the individual. 
But as auch an approval conet. itutea the very lifte-blood of thei 
jud, gment 'A ought to be, what he . _ra' , when vao omit it, 
tt is 
as if we have said nothing. - : -It ascumos the appearance of 
tautol, o$y: Similarly if we look uoozi the judgment 't 
ought not to be what the ißt' an a mere description o omit 
from tt"his disapproval, This Dr , etical dornarid that 
A should be differont cannot be a constituent element 
In a purely descriptive judgment and creates in It an 
appoaranca o `contradiction;,. ro , 
trim-fhcia tho judgment of value sums to be 
exactly Iii c the juclgnent of fact. The kind of cognition 
Involved In paying 'A to good' sec ins to be o tm1iar 
to the cognition Involved in saving 'A triangle hae three 
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sides .' But the similarity can only belong 
lance in whic1-1 thctr come to Ne expressed 
Valuation or the recd , nit 
i on of exlotin, vale 
a reflection in theoretical consciousness of 
brought. into existence b, r a creative will. 
consc ;. ousnees in which the jud _', aent of value 
to the 
as propoo it lofo . 
a, es Is only 
that has been 
The practical 
is ultimately 
rooted is diffarcnt in 'ind fro; the theoretical con; -Iciouo"- 
n©sc in which a Judgment of fact is rooted. 
Value, then is entirely dif r'erent from 'quality- 
and vet it must, like quality, characterise come existent. 
It is, therefore, 1 portant to ask vthat exactly Is the 
nature of those existents which can support value'. Appc, - 
rently value seems to belong to such diverse things as 
money, machines, pictures, musical co positions,, poems, km'-e cQoowý 
io ,. 
a- ý'i't.. "a ? ý. e 
natura. scenes, experiences or ins vic uale. A But it is a 
difficult thing to decide f-&r a poem or a picture or a 
musical cornpos 1ti on` han any intr . 
ri is value. It seem: that 
these have value only in virtue of their boing the oxproaoion 
or embodiment of some experience or other. The experience 
vihich. . s; thus given a form need not be ouch as can be 
Surveyed through the. mediun" og into? loctural concepts. ; _3aotht 
very, for instance, might through his coxapoaitions cause in 
our hearts a (lue? -) stirring Wittlou4, our bcir plc to h rye 
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that which has thus affected us. . vf-, ry form of nrt 
might setze upon some aspect of experience which it alone 
can adequately-express. But although ordinary language 
may fail to describe accurately that particular aspect 
of experience, it : gis nevertheless by virtue of expressing 
sorge aspect of exonrience that any art has value. It is 
therefore, very misleading to say tciat works of art have an 
l, ntrinciq value. 
Even the beauty of nature is probably felt 
owing to sonne kind of subtle contact with the life behind 
it. Tho e who had a great capacity to enjoy the beauties 
of nature have interpreted the. in come euch play. (1) 
"orasworth in his Intimations o Immortality says: 
'To me the meanest flower that blows esn give 
thoughts thr. t do often lie too deep for tears. ' 
It goes without saying tkiat if the 'th. ou uts' 
are too deep for tears they might also be too deep for words 
(1) Even a biologist like air Arthur Thompson suCre t,, a of ºi1ar vi©vr. lt may bo, º he says that the 
extraordinary beauty of flovrora z. nti coral,, - Is an oxprao, ý, ion of their dreaming, mnontolity. Forlirý o tlio beauty of cryata1a -ana corals is a oo gn expression of their nietakin©tic aspect. ' Contemporary i3ritiuli Pftilou, ophy, grid aeries, p. 327. 
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or any kind of intellectual formulation. In fact they 
might not be thoughts at all - in the ordinary sense of 
the word. The essential point is that the aesthetic value 
which belongs to =Nature is probably due to some type of 
experience of which it is an expression. (1) 
Can any experience be said to have any intrinsic 
value ? : rove, for instance, Is good or has va. l. ue. - :: t 
has been cuigested that what we mean In such a case is that 
'lote is 4wrorth having for its own sago' (ý) It will be 
a good thing to have loved even if it led to no further 
results. It to good in itself. But a. more careful 
analysts will show that these pthraGes of ordinary life 
conceal the bearing which an experience has upon the 
individual who has it. +ihen it is said that love is 
worth having for its, own sake what io really meant is that 
it would be worth having by an Individual, even if there 
waG noticing Ol3O In addition- to it. lýn 1ndlvidual 
(1) The probability that the conctituonto of n9ture are 
Come kind of organicmo hac been dofa ioü. in te previouo 
chapter 
£. E. Mooro. Ark. , totolia, n 3oc ioty, 5ympoa ium on ' ja oodn as a utility. ' 1932) P 1ý3" 'ý, 
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conceive'. in totn, i abstraction from his experience is 
? probably a nonentity. =_ut at the Came time an experience 
is ec? u^lly an abstraction ap/art from t1ne person having it. 
"Love cannot, t'rlere fore, exist apart from the individual 
experiencing it nor can it have any value by itself. It is 
more groper to say that value would b, eionp; to the individual 
ex-eriencing; love, even if he had or did nothing else. But 
at this point of analtrois it is not so , auch the crpevience 
as the individual having it that einer : es as 
the true 
bearer of intrinsic value. Ir, therefore deems that individu 
als are the oni, r bearers of intrinsic value. Even animals 
or plants or the constituents of nature may be be arera of 
valuo in so far as tie are intliviituals. de have thus 
arrive, - t the identity of individuality and value from 
another point of view. 
Owing to the presence of self-consciousness, 
rorconc are canabio of boing the bearers of valued which 
4. l are higher than the vaiuos that mi%: it btAonr to lower types 
of Individual existents. 
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Viii. 
PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS. 
WE, HAVE SEEN that the esoence of valuation 
is Primarily an exrrescion of our practical consciousness 
and is constituted by approval or disapproval " But it 
would here seem that this really involves going back upon 
the position that values are objeci', ive. It mifrht be said 
that the subjectivist contention is exactly the same. 
`hose who : Look upon values as subjective are also emphasising 
the essential relation of values to approval or disapproval. 
It is, therefore, imoortnnt to enquire twriether there is any 
contradic icon in recognising that . approval or Ldsa w roval 
constitutes the very essence of va iuation and at the sa ae 
time holding the view that ýralues , 1-j none-eile--less ob jective. 
0 
. oo ' 
A careful examim Lion of tie ques t, ion, however, rev©alo that 
the appearance of contradiction is 1: )rzely due to a narrow 
conception of object vity. 
©ný the first vt-ew it aeetns as if 
there is not ine igle in our aonrov is or d isapprolrals, 
but that they fire all unreIätdd to each other. Chaoo 
seems to be the raozt = s. tr . l%ing feature of. our value, 
- 
--judgments-But 'It .. a possible, to discern in them evidenoe of Ancrcacing 
reference to an objective , noran,. 
And this nor is seen 
to have clzlms upon all individual; 3 alike. jis this norm 
Is not go. nettaing private to a ai, n; le , 
Ina: Lv ! dual but le 
a universal re ultatty© principle, all value-judgments redo 
by reference to It are objective. 
The objectivity of values is taus 
ultimately derived from the operation in practical conscious- 
ncss of a universal princ .pe" 3orna such uýiiveroal 
princhple giving unity to the realm of values is a, necessary 
postulate e all moral science. Ph ; ý. or op? ýw. cai Gpooulation 
cannot root catifie'. with an unrooolved pluralism of values. 
aeeko to, discover, coiue co aion meaning it and t1iouEh them. 
it Is possible to look upon the unitary 
principle of values Rs the Ultimato Goal of t ie life of the 
d 
io1 
individual vlio events-illy ---, twins it through the pursuit 
of the apparently diverse and unrelateýl values of his 
pr, ctical consciousness. They are not like oo many 
sill-oL the-vi lops leading him nowhere-. -They' might all in 
the long run bring about some kind of attainment which has 
an ultimate and eternal significance, (1) 
It is sometimes -argued that the pursuit of values 
is in Its nature nererendinp. The individual can at 
best hope to approx to to his ideal increasingly, though 
the ideal always eludes hire and remains beyong his reach. 
He must, therefore, learn to take delight in the progress 
towards perfection. Not perfection but progress toward`b" 
perfection is his real concern. From the philosophical 
point of view, such. a . Dosit;. on secros untenable.. Life cannot 
be a perpetual going on and on wit. aout arriving A. nyv, here. 
Tiere can be no approximation or progress towards the ideal 
unless it can be attained at some ctage. If it always 
rr; rn ins is unAttalbnable as ever how can it be . geld that he eve, 
co. -.,. es nearer to it than before? On this view then all 
(1ý The possibility of . iui: 1ortality leaves enough time for this 
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p%rcgrress becomes illusory. There is no escape fror 
posit, Win ;i perfection ; irýich a the goal of hunt ,. n )all- aawour. 
But at tic same time that ultimate 
perfection is not a purely tram ndental goal to which 
the ordinary values of practical consciousness are rarely 
instrumental. The end is also in a sense In the process. 
We cannot deplete the present life of the Individual of all 
true value and make of his dim future its real repository. 
Is also immanent throughout the process of attaining The goal 
it. jlnd from this standpoint the realm of value: is a 
kind of cif'erentiate,: whole, a unity in difference, 
expresoing itself in diverse values which are so many moments 
in t totality. 
The so called (conflict of values is a 
misleading cx,!,. reooion. There iee no real conflict between 
true values. If there seems to be a conflict among the 
diverse values of practical life it is due to the lack of 
the true understanding of their real meaning. in fact, 
the conflict really exists bot between different values 
but between the different 'selves' within the individual. 
They tend to run in diverse directions owing to z^ confusion 
born of the ignorence of the true value. 
The realm of v ,. Iups rust not, however, be 
- 103 - 
looked upon as being a rigid system from which the individual 
might derive fixed and eternal rules for the guidance of his 
practical consciousness. There is no standard outer 
the indivictuall with which he might measure everything and. 
, give it its proper glace in the schei., e of life. : Tor is 
life, properly speaking; a scheme p ,, lifO, comparable with 
some accuratelr scanned and a definitely outlined map. 
it is essentially a creative process. 
In life there qre no recurrent instances of a 
particular type. Every situation in life is unique and 
demands a unique solution, a specific response for which 
there is no precedent. An earnestness to respond to the 
situation " in a way that would express the true value is 
in such cases more helpful than an allegiance to some 
dead formula. It is through the movement of life itself that 
it is possible to see and realisq the true value. 
The norm, then, is not some principle external to 
the Individual. it is operative within the individual as 
his innermost being. In a very important sense it Is the 
very reality of the Individual. The individual becomes an 
utterly false abstraction when he is regr, rded :s complete 
apart from the Ideal which he tries to realise. Ie is a 
continuous becoming and that which he tries to become is the 
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c'S. üe to unäerst_- tid 'the process or that becom1n ;. 
1 
The 
norm ic, howover, not always explicit1l r//resent to human 
concciouone. s. Men nev values 5i'e created the individual 
does not begin by apprehending them in the realm of facts. 
A negative value- judgment on a cituat, ion , lay seems to 
precede any attempts to cre . t, e -, new value- All that 
{; ý, ý 
practical consciousness is aware of is that a particular 
situation is unsatisfactory. This starts the movement 
for ' altering the situation. But the very possibility of 
the indiviLual being dissatisfied with a situation/ pre up- 
Posses an iraplic it a, . areness of that ` w. iich will bring him 
satisfaction. The norm i thu clos, rly necessary for 
aiýýl Si nii'ic"int Practical activitýr. 
lt Is true ti gat the individual cannot know 
the actual contents of thie norm in their fullness, '. All 
that is 8ignir1ed by words, like oodnes$' 'truth or `beaut ý, Y, 
c -, in give 
hin obly the formal featureo 
do not help the individual to know, in 
are rep-11y good or beautiful or true. 
victual know the total contents of the 
vat ion of everything which is od" or 
even if it were possible folhim to do 
of the norm. They 
advance what things 
: or can the in . 
i- 
norm by actual obser- 
beautiful or true, 
so. -Wor life iS not i 
.; 
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1-' a sealed book. It Is dynamic and creative, not 
static and. complete. The creation or new values is an 
i. r, ortant feature of pructical consciousness. 
There can be no doubt that the individual can 
ereýqte new values. But the values ýire not, therefore, his 
private creations. Who creation of she sense of realising 
'r VAL values in the realm of existente is an inäubitab Le fact. 
I3 the creation is not lawless. values arc; not the 
prrduct3' of the unrestricted fancy of the individual any 
more than the truths revealed to him through his activity of 
thinking. The Individual creates values in the sense of 
being the author of the act>ity which brings them into 
existence. But he can 'bring item into existence only 
by virtue of the operation in him of a universal norm. 
The reality of the o peration in practical conscious- 
ness of a storm, may be doubted on the ground that no such 
norm is explicitly present to human consciousness. But 
, 
it is the paradox of moral and spiritual life that the good 
has to realised before it I s known. The moral life comes 
before the science of ethics. It is not at all the 
business of the moral philosopher, qua philosopher, to 
provide life with a- s't ndard or create a value which is not. '" 
existent. His task is simply to analyse the lives or moral 
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people and bring out the concept of the Food which wjo 
already implicit in them. The 'concept of the'good. ' 
is in a sense an outcome of, post-mortom examination. It 
is not aua concept that '-. he good can tiecorne a dominating 
factor in shapins the life of the individual, but rather 
as a kind of reality which invites him to itself. The 
`'ý' moral philosopher wanting to have a science about it grins 
to isolate it fromm the, material in which it haB dot inextri- 
cably woven, names it and turns it into an abstract concept 
and sometimes finds to his own astonishment that the 
phantom of his mind can not explain the many-aided facts. 
of life. 
The norm can. only be knoten through its realisation. 
aiuman beings are mostly in the process. of realising it. 
The self-integration or seif-knowledge of an individual 
" 
admits of degreee. The individual tries to attain It 
piecemeal. A clear-eyed understanding Of the supreme 
good in -ts completeness can only come to those who have 
carried on the plurouit of self-knowledge -and self-intogration 
to its successful termination. 
IJUr Uo-a e. EUt 1-i Örct'er to achieve it lie probably wants to 
found sonne institution. i or the cake of the institution he Y,. 
wante a building. In order to het the building erected h 
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it is possible for an individual to pursue 
the norm unconsciously for a long, time and become conscious 
of it only towarde the later phases of the whole procoss 
of realisation. That such a thing can happen to 9 man 
need not be startling. Mize nossibility of such an 
unconscious : ursuit of the norm becomes more plausible 
when we examine somewhat si-ailar cases in ordin^^V lifo. 
it is certýinl; ýv true of all instinctive a; ct-lV"Y. The 
child which foods itself instinctively does not dß SO 
with the 'inowledge that feeding is necessary to keep his 
body ; oi: ng. " his knowledge comes to him later as a result 
of empiric--al observition. 
The norm might be operative in the practical 
activities of tKe individual more or less in the same manner 
as a wider ur ose controls i, smaller purpose related 
to it. A wider purpose can coca 
ehend 
a smaller purpose 
without always romaininE; before the mind. 
Let us take for instance an individual who 
viants to be a social reformer. Ie wants to remove certain 
i 
evils in the life of his society. This Is his real 
purpose. But in order to achieve it Ue Probably wants to 
found some institution. J? or the oake of the institution he 
w. nts a building. In order to get the building erected he 
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m. -. y issue an order to sorge contractor. Iýh3. ý. a he is thus 
issuing an order to the contractor the evils of the society 
which he wants to remove may be far from his mind, But alt'Li 
these evils are not there consciously, it is iaiposszblb 
to read the complete significance of his order to the 
contractor except in the light of his prior purpose. It 
is litirally true to say that in issuing his order to the 
contractor he is really taking ptepc to remove the evils of 
society. His wider purpose of social reform is in his 
wind though not before his mind. 
It Is not here suggested that the norm is 
present to the mind of the individual in the way in which 
this, wider purpose is present to the mind of the social 
reformer.. - ,,, 
The. difference between the two cases is obvious. 
The social reformer was once clearly conscious of his wider 
purpose and decided to-, give the orä. r to the, contractor 
as t means to an end. The meant- were decided upon after 
considering the manner in which he could achieve his wider 
purpose. 
in the pursuit of the Supreme good there seems to 
bqno euch conscious apprehension of the ultimate objective.;. 
,, 
Not is there any arriving at the ordinary values of life 
- 
log 
- 
... e_ 
A ,,. a. Cv.. -e-. through a deliberation of the conditions of 44 attainment. 
But the example of the social reformer does prove that at 
any particular time particular actions can actually be s igni- 
ficantly related to a purpose although neither the purpose 
nor the relation are explicitly present to the consciousness 
at that time. 
The analogy of the social reformer is not 
given to doacrtbe the modus operandi of the norm in the 
practical consciousness of the individual. The operation 
of the norm in -practical consciousness is unique and has 
no analogies tivhich can be completely adequate to its nature. 
The analogy of the social reformer. however, in spite 
of its limitations establishes the Plausibility of a 
- `" norm which rnny have an effeeti,.. 
ve reality without being present to human consciousness. 
As the norm is not present to human conscious- 
ness in the same way in which other facts are, the 
LL reality of the norm is essentially different from the 
kind of existence which belongs to facts. It is always 
something that ougtit to exist. It may or may nob be real ed 
in faotu l existence. As a rule it Is only partly realised 
in existence. But that Which ought to exist is not in 
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any way less real than that which merely exists. TO 
Vror/ld of the ought has e certain amount of Independence 
of its own and cannot be derived from the realm of 
facts as such. There is nol transition from the merely 
{M d o{"ýa ... o. 0 ) 
V is, to the 'oup; Itt' .A The norm, therefore, is both 
real and iniversal in spite of the fact that it is not 
explicitly present ft our caýgnit, ive aonociouoness II 
in all its completeness. 
As seen above, the reality of the norm 
is different in kind from the reality of facts. But 
the norm is no,., something altogether unrelated to the 
realm of facts. It is alwayp being realised in the 
tr 
ream of farts. Individual existente become signi- 
ficant by virtue of their capacity. 
j/, 
% is that for the 
sake of viIl ich facts exist. ,' 1ýs Lotze points out 
we are on the right track when we 'seek in that which 
should be the ground of that which 
Corresponding to this essential relation of 
(1) Quoted by Sorley in : oral Values and the Idea of God, p. 3. 
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0 
_, ý. 
ýýý 
ýýý ýý 
value to individual existente there is the primacy 
of practical consciousness over the theoretical. There 
is a very real sense in which love for 'knowledge 
. 
for its own sake' might be compared with the love of 
a miser for his ho°,. rded wealth: in both cases there is 
s, ýpreýonderance of moans over ends. 
But knowledge for Ito own sake 1-1 Itself 
in an important sense a part of practical consciousness. 
It cannot come to exist except as a result of a desire to 
know the truth. But trut becomes 4, n object of a 
p' LA 1aLt? ýx 
conative attitude only when it is recognised as a value. 
In the wider sense, therefore, value explains 
the total conscious life of persons - the theoretical 
as well as the practical consciousness. 
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IX. 
S' 
THE 
. 
PROBLEM OF EVIL. 
ý' SEEN .., z-ý '"wý'ýj'ý Eý. that the real and 
ultimate bearers of valueo are the individuals. Yee thus got 
from another approach a confirraation of our ; enerai guiding; 
principle ýhicn attempts to understand the essential 
nature of individuality with reference to value. But 
while the realisation of values is the fundamental characte- 
ristic of individuals, the presence of 4vil In their lives 
presents some difficulties. The pro/ion of evil, however, 
break, itself into two 
nc4stinct 
parts., There is, on the 
dne hand, the purely natura, evil, like pain and suffering 
and death. And on the other hand there is the moat evil, 
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which - in a-bro d'cense - includes 
facts litte 
selfishness, cruelty, h.,, tr©d or injustivb or 
ignorance 
or ugliness. 
Of ; the two kinds of evil, moral evil presents 
a more acute problem. But natural evil also needs 
to be 
understood. what meaning, if any, can these 
two kinds 
of evil have for the life of the individual? Are 
they 
only hindrances in the development of individuality ? 
Or is it possible to look upon them as having some 
significance for the life of the individual? 
The existence of evil is d condition, of some 
kind of good which cannot exist except through its negation. 
Just as an". individual cannot acquiesce in the existence 
of evil, as such, he c-in get satiated with a perfectly 
rounded paradise. Even if a man could live in n voUl . 
r, r which is, in the rords of '. °, ill yarn James, 
'without a sin 
wi. ttiout a victim, without a blot, without a tear, ' he 
wou'113 st 11 pine to desert such nrounded päradise in 
öraer to take ci, ancos 'in the big wordly wi 'derneso with 
all Ito sins and sufferings. '` There can beAroom for courage 
enterprise, sympathy, dt. drsacrific e in a world from which 
evil is complete1ir eliminated. al.; _ 
-- 114- 
Evil is, thus, from another poInt of view, an 
opportunity. This recognition, ho, vevo r, need 
in no 
,,,, ay result in the acquiescence of the 
inc. ivIL"tual in the 
exist ce of evil. 1{'o. r it i not 
in the bare existence 
F _N7 
of evil but in the overcou uiný,, of It t: ia ! some or 
the 
lý ghee ~ýor^ values come to be reali , eä. 
Any estimate of the ultimate vo1ue of life 
10 bound to remain shallow until talLdea of value itself 
is purified from the limitations of an unqua,. - if ied, and 
hedonism. why is it that we instinctively 
1oo1k tivit« disdain upon the gods of the lotus-eaters?, 
i1'ey 'lie beside the nectar and 
' .......................... suý. le in secret, 
loo king over wasted lands, 
Blight and famine, plague and eartbqüake, 
roaring deeps and fiery sands, 
Olan ing fights and flaLaing towns 
and sinking ships and praying hr nds . 
"7 
It is not mcre1y selfish resentment for beim; neglected 
that i . spell a man 
to recognize that the existence of t ieW,; ods 
lac=>s so,: aethins which gives dignity and worth to the life 
of an ordinary Individual iö 'prefers to i fight the precarious 
battle against the ehisting evil and euere the sufferings of 
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l. is fellow-men. `; he truth about the natter is that 
perpetual bas? ý. in7; in sunshine is not congenial for the 
development of the kind of individuality which is 
characteristic of a spiritual being. if an ina.. viaual 
is to be more than a drows; r and a dreaming idol he must 
evolve threurh the storm and stress of suffering and evil. 
He grows as much through the sorrows, tears and struggle as 
through the joys smiles and rest. 
r 
. ýoreover the ind. iviraual hims4of is 
partly res ? onv ible for area l-, deal of suffering Sehich 
appears in ii: 1s life. He rnicrht, in his Ignorance pursue 
lines of action which are not in consonance with his 
own b iMnest rood =end everitua. '. ly suffer through his 
mistaken essnýrs for .) ness. In such c . ses suffering 
has a treat ef uc , tl. ve and purifying effect. 
// 
üomin: to 
E1 
tie s necific question of moral evil . as distinf^; uisheä from 
the n, ý, tural evil, one ray ask whether t is also is in antr 
way necessary for the spiritu ,1 growth of the individual 
An+a it sccros c1 ear ßi1-: L. although, moral GvßLl is not in any 
sense necessary, it is inevitDbly present, as a possibility 
in securin-, tile very fundamental condition of there 
wLtL being any indivi_äua. lity in^any genuinely moral values 
:. can ever appear. Loral evil cri be traced to the 
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freedoot of the will of the individual. No individual 
can be capable of realising any <enuinuly moral values 
in the absence of such freedom. it is the volu ar3 
renunciation-of the evil in favour of the Food which 
given w3rth to the ins 1vä. dua1 who chooses the good. And 
there is of course the real possibility that all the 
}tom '° individuals might hake th. t chöice. The universe 
which makes moral -evil possible 
is, therefor©, better 
than the one which would make It impossible. 
Besides, it seems quite le3itimatQ to hope 
that on the whole there la the preponderance of the good 
over the evil - natural and moral - in the totality 
of existence. ' It is true that tfti. s implies freely 
drawing cheques upon the unlimited and the unknown 
immensity of the pest and the future of the universe. 
: ut in the abeence of any k: owlet ge to the contrary 
such a hope is, not less legitimate than the absence of 
such a hope. (1) 
(1) At this point, it will be , wwell- to consider some of 
the warnings of philosophers, like 13ertrand Itus; alb.. X7e are told that it Is none of the .. bu inccs of philosophy to flatter or ccnso], thie individual. Philosophical reflection must not be allowed to-deflect bye-the influence- _of_ 
his prLvatc_ . 
hopes,, 
- or desires. CCt should be inspired by the austere search 
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If there is, such a -considerable preponderance of 
the good over the evil the presence of evil rli ; ht assume 
the role of incroasing the worth of the totality, of 
existence by accentuating the goodness of the ; ood- by., 
contrast instead of the role of tal., ing away from its worth 
by nod;, 2tion. From, a quasi-aesthetic po. nt of view, it 
fit 
after the truth and nothing but the truth. The true philo- 
sopher accept and faces the truth with a stoic resignation 
whether or not it is palat ble. The noble function of phi- 
losophy should not be degr ed to the building of a world 
of flattering illusions. 
Psycho-analysio has revealed to us how an indivi-- 
dual inevitably tends to rationalise desires which are often 
prior to the reasons with which he tries to justify them. 
. 
And sorget Imes. huge metaphysical systems in the history of 
philosophy have been vitiated by the domination of unconscious 
desires. As Braä; ley has pointed out, philosophy, is often giv- 
ing bad reasons for what we already instinctively knows 
'his 1 ne of thou ; ht has in it a good deal of 
truth. It is true that wish is often the father of the thou, t 
Nothing is so tragic as self-deception nourished bfr an un- 
reasoning desire. ä; ut at the same time we have no ri ht to 
start with t1-_e assumption that the lcnowleug, e of truth till 
frustrate the whole ton t ive nn tune of the inüiv qual. 'iahe t 
truth need not make all his striving utterly irrational. if t :e truth happens to be satisfactory it neod not on that account 
suffer in Its validity. It cannot suddenly-become untrue in 
virtue of its being favourza'ble for the real l cation of the 
highest aspirations of thlit d ividüal_. 
There ia psychological, alde to all beliefe, true 
-! Z8 - 
mould enrich the existence, more or less like the p 4'resence 
of tracedlr in art or ^n undertone in a composition of music. 
't'here is, however, every justification for any 
one to refuse to be content with an h ttpotfzetical prepon- 
derance which no individual in particular seems to enjoy 
in its concreteness. There is nlso further kestlessness 
in the fact that in the lives of the finite individuals who 
are the actual centres of feeling, moral 7oodness and 
happiness do not always seem to go together. 
73ut the possibility of the im1,1ortality and preexist 
--enco puts t a2 
ihr ý. "ý: j. stitl 
the lives of 
1- 
2- 
vthole quest on ixi a different perspective. 
discrepancy between moral (rood and tia, ppinecs in 
ind 1v I1 ua? is , -, I-ay tlaen be 
partly compensated for in the lives to coao, or 
as In some oriental roll, ions, it may be 
Partly attributed to t, 
ý`" 
proviouo lives. 
or false. it is znossible to treat them from the pstrcho- 
c enetic point of view and explain theca -frei-the as events in tao history of the month life of a particular individual. 
: _. ut since this procedure 3s c=apable of , ein , applied equally to true or false be"' iefs it cannot bo , in ltself, a deciding factor In determining their validity. 
? ln 
And in the absence of any proof about the impossibility 
of these two alternatives any emn/irical observation 
of the discrepancy is not enough to shake the faith 
in the 'moral order' of the world of individuals. 
It seems that we need not treat the facts of natural 
and -moral evil n. s either ui timate in t .. selves or 
inexplicable in terms of values. It is possible to 
go be,, "ond them and treat then as having some important 
sign fic-nce for the life of the individual. In a sense 
they are indispensable for the full development of 
human individuality. 
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A P10ý'E ON THE ILI:, ýORTALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL. 
ZILF I Tip im,, ortality of the individual 
is ogten criticiser for involving the withdrawal of 
intereot from our world and the pitning of all. hopea 
upot the other world. The force of the ' eth.: ioa! ' 
objection ar, ainst taming an interest in the other 
word depends to a considerable extent upon the assumption 
that there in no world except the one with which we are 
ordinarily familiar. Moreover, any exception. that 
could be taken to an Interest in the of r world on 
moral grounds as umeQ that it must inevitably result in 
the withdrawal of interest from our world. And the 
objection really hits only those individuals who neglect 
the poo, oibiliti©s and the opuortunities of this life and 
keep hoping for the best in the life after death 3ut 
Indifference towards thin life is not only 44L non--eß ential 
accompaniment to the ro l i. Lious fa . th but is the very 
antithesis of what it staii, - s for. h ere and now is tree 
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opportunity for the individual. :., e riu3t make the 
best of the world in ;. h c'n he finds himself, instead 
of ninin; after new vaajlds. But this fact doer, not 
In any way tend to disprove the im. *, ortality of the 
individual. 
irmnorta i ity of the finite ins ividual may be 
1e0it ini^ tel r postulated on the strength of the :. 11ioncat ions 
of dotal and religious consciousness. If we st=irt with 
the faith that every finite Individual will u'timately 
attain the hiRhzest that i, possible for him or that 
there i: at the heart of reality a spiritual principle 
expressing, itself in a moral order, the logical 
os but-te of this faith would be a belief it; te immortality 
of the finite individual, co that death should not 
prevent the ulti ate fruition of his life "nd the reign 
of moral 1, -ivi should reascort itself by suitable compen- 
sat"_Qns. 
In fact, here cannot be for irainertE; lit, y 
any proof which is stronger than thcpne which is based 
on adequate philosophical grounds. I sychica1 research 
or any scientific Investigation. into the nature of life 
aý to death can at beat on1zT prove the survival of the 
_' i2 fý - 
finite zndiv U-ua. 1 after 'nis death ana not his im,. lortality. 
e should still be s,, ianting a furtt r guarantee t . at 
the 
life after death will not itself come to u termination. 
And no amount of scientific investiggtion into the 
past or the present is enough to entitle a confident 
forecast about the future. It is a matter of a 
primary faith in life. 
But, it might be argued ttiat life aft Or 
depth is not a tom Kcal postulate of the : ideals and 
aspirations of the inüiv: Idua1. . Ihe 
"Individual can 
be content with the survival of, values, az yuch, aw 
distin6uislied from the survival of the indIvi . uals " 
It It not e: nougLi teat tile, . nä. iv ciua1 contributes to the 
immortality of the species and also leaves behind hi: 
a spiritual heritage of bool: 2, inventions' i 
irmtitutiono 
And a subtle but, real influence on all that comes . into 
contact with. lilm? He livee in the e, norieo of hie friend 
for -a conciderablo tLiaejbut even vrhen lae is, utterly 
forgotten by everyone the effects of his actions or thoughts 
i :° yet be . Suc. influence oh the society 
r; iý t. " not be very appreciable but may n©verthe? ee: be real. 
And in so far is ttiis influence might 'cc rzeservet, t`rirou rh- 
ýa 
'aý 
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out the 'nurn^n hicfi, ory which is in the making, the 
indivwdu^I : night be sate to h ve &* a vicario. _-s 
Immortality through others. jut the inciwv2ual neefýýý no t 
attach any importance to ýiis terson ,1 
imntortaitty. 
yAere is .; -ooa deal t: aat w a.: irabl 
in this attitude to life. she moral elevation of the 
tone given to life br eliclin, ating all, - personal considera- 
t -ons 
including any hope for lersonallim.. mortal'_t! * is 
unquestionable R gut the im, ý, ortalit; sr of the individual 
is not i os'i, ul_, ted on the ground that he desires it 
at his hi M. hest . ut it is postulated that the h i;, hest 
t: iat he desires is not neees., arily attainable within 
e. lifetime, and cannot come into existence except by 
a rradualh, 2a. GAO? ion of Laib idkj. 
/f 
. erc continuity 
of the individual in time cannot, as such, have any value. 
3ut ns t hss been lreaä77 seen, value as such cannot 
itself ^lmve any meaning if it 'is taken in abs Ur^ction from 
the individual existents which it cELracterises. it is, 
therefore, not possible to set up the survival of values 
as a. better and a higher ideal thin the survival of indi- 
victuals. 
In iaict, the higher spiPitual values cannot be 
automatically inherited by one indivýldual front anot ier. 
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their have to be etzlt ivate r and built up into the ners on l ittr - 
by every single individual h_Insel_f. x", 11' that 
the social environment created by the acts of an indivi- 
dual can do for other indiv: idualc is to create for erM%Zl.. 
an 3t: aosphere iu TtilCh they will hive 
opportunit-es to see rnnd realise the values which he 
saW and reali., ed. Lut the real values are themselves 
quite Inalienable from the individual in whom they come 
to be real sec . There is, ther fore, no survival 
of values, in _ii gen inc sense, except in the survival 
of tie inO. ivi. 'ua si WhoM týie; r are r©aiieeu. The 
ind. 'vloual cannot be lookeu upon as a mere instrucaent 
for t'Cle : life of the society. 
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X" 
3OC I TY AND THE I1 bIVIDUAL . 
:: 1V S ý1 that the real significance 
of the individual is not exhausted by the mare fact 
of his being in some ways inntrü mental to the realisation 
of come values by other individuals. : )ut the red tion of 
the individual to society is very Intimate and - pro ; nant 
with important im nliea Lions for the understanding 
of the eyoential sture of "tie individual" 
AAn ° actu ,i Individual always ex sts 
as a member of some whole. Conceived as being in complete 
isol-ition from somc natural and social envi. ronuient he 
is only a figment of im g, inf-; tion. He does not and cannot 
exist in a vacuum. ; Äe is alvra,, rc , in element in some 
wider whole which at once ilicludes him -end rankes slim what 
he is . 
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in the long run, any limits shich '; e give 
to tho ý hole of ; V, icA he ý. p_ýrt aý. 
ll be - ound to 
be art ficia1! `fhese i. '. i. iits have very often some 
val ic', L] 
ty for practical purposes, but from the ph11Q OPil 
icä. l 
point of view their re ý1ti l te. L7r indefensible. The 
re-)I _ bac': c ; round 
for the study of the nC; ý-v iüual 
Is the 
erhole of t'1e universe in its cntirity. it is, however, 
fruitful to_ consider, in. porticular, tho individual 
in relation to his social environment: for he is 
const.: intl7r :; eint; moulded by t is dynamic 
action and interaction 
with his fe liorr be inrrs . 
Apart from the interest directed towards his 
family, his friends, his country or ot: leý' social institu- 
tions, h- life becomes, in the well-worn words of Hobbes 
'sultry, poor, nasty, brutish and short. ' All tLio 
contents of his lifc which ; r- give meaning . rid 
Oirection 
to his practical . tctivitiaa are derived from his social 
environnment. A man is, for instance, a Keachor, a lawyer, a 
writer, a doctor, or a member of : earliament. i the 
can only be any of these in a special soc: Lai context. 
The needs of the society have created te dc nand for t cse 
functions and he fits himself into auch of these as 
commend thoracelnoc to him,, by virtuo of his canacitiec 
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or interests. ýýis'station' in society has thus 
a Profound influence on the course taken by the life 
of the individual. 
The pattern of the behaviour of 
the individual is as a rule largely determine,. by 
the conventions of the society in which he happens 
to move and even h; _a conceptions of morality and 
his general ot. 2tlook on life is shaped by the influ- 
ence of the various institutions of which he is a 
member. 2he atomic concerption of societr as being 
constituted of ready-made individuals Is erroneous. 
No indiv-f; ual can be what he is ivithout the influence 
Wclicl he absorbs from Lia social environment. He 
cannot live apart from oociotý any more'than a plant 
can live apart fromm the GO-L1 fro. 7 : l" Ch It Uro`wG. 
It is true tLat tc: c iconoclast or social 
reformer does not necept the exibting Qu; toms, 
Institutions or viezwe wit: iout crit i. cism, lie apT lies 
a fres. l ^nd vigorous mind to : hic äocial heri ýý, e lnü 
ox: aýrl ý. re . 
ßt1 tlaE light of his 6, e-Ircliin,; ' crI w cism Qver; rtl: inKp 
týiw3t of icrc ,. CC0Pt without quoot10n. f' nO. aa result 
of th $ exanlin Lion he mý; T come tO reject ti- 
.e rene: ba1 
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notions, o7 r'_ ht anki prong wlaic; i r; -°e curre_t in 
the society he live-c- in.. 'Intºhc even 
initiate r, reat : aove-ýri _ ntc which iflodif-T the ones 1 
structure ans the conventions of the society. He 
is `original in 'a- 
21ze essence of orir; ýna1 ýttr, lZowever, 
doec no, consist in be in, r, mEroi: d, fforent from 
0 ttlur . if orig_na1? _-u- is couated vii-tin Lnere dif- 
f'ei'ence from o y'ciers 
d is t in; u ts'a t {'rom 
"ovelty is often a 
tIJG re would be 
tie aberrations 
3tril, inp feature 
notr::. ng to 
of the tluwau mind. 
of tic results 
an , ', l actions of an original wind. 3ut taco is due to 
t ie fish ^, ý, rcac, that n individual rii: iy malt© for 
the s olut on of a , il probleins,,. ; _-nCi 
the sincerity 
with k»h. ich he ri 'ht think for himself. Crifinality 
t:. ius const is of thinking for oneself, r; nd not of 
thin:: . n, *, differently from other, , ithoug', j as a, , -l 
result of his thinking for himself, an individual I-, ILg-y 
t: i i nk (or act) differently from others. i ven the ind i- 
viczua1 ý. ith an original mind, however, hao to talk.; his 
start from his social heritage and begin by assimilating 
of/ 
whatever 10 true worth in it, 
_ ný 
.: r 
-. 'ý 
"-. 129 '- 
The sccitty, however, Is not , atrely the source' 
of the contents of the life of the individual. 1t is 
not merely the backcround for his life or an environment invit 
wing h`s Yct ion and determining its specific nv ture . 
Other Individuals gre for him more than a means to an end. 
As t07 Pre themselves centres of action and feeling 
all his actions and reactions towards them come to be 
modified f in the light 'of this understanding,. auch a 
pracual trans for: ,. tion of the F. enora1 attitude towards 
othe indiv'± ? uals is beet illustrated by the tlevelop,, +ýment 
of the rela t. ionship of the mrAs ter to hid slazre 
4 <- - 
The master probably starts with cord 
interests of his own and bogies by looking upon his alavo 
only fror. the poi nt of view of hic capacity 'to further 
,ý : 'ý h1s interests L The slave has at this 'rta e an is Gru 
mental value, like that of the tool. The ' peter' looks 
after his needs as an engineer might 'look after 4is 
engine. Laut through his ow r Oxperience , )f dealing 
with the o1ave he might admire his a1. entc co much 
that to iýeginc to 'condült hiri about his own plane occr, s Lonall 
through grý: ator underctanuing, h© might eoaee to look 
iaiis upon tho o3 eve c me n to end only. f At tüiw Cte 
-i3ß - 
the ulave has come to be regarded as an end in hi, nself, µC, 
has the same status as the miiaster and bec Dinos 'iis equal. 
But further, through increased association he might evon 
come to have real affection- for him and might begin to 
enter into his purposes andhelp him t^ re-, l iÜo them. At 
this sta. e ,, he slave has become his fr. A. enci. 
Utilit? r is of cure #61je part of t'-, e value 
! of the slave-But so long as the masator is thinkn^; only 
of hin uti1it cnd is oblivious of hs personal worth 
his behaviour is bound. to express. only an Imperfect -- ý 
appreciation of the real value or tho alava. Elimination 
of all personal bias is almost _ lwayo a true. underatanc ing 
and appreciation of other human beings, an personal 
blas is usually due to the stress of. poraonal intoroots. 
The same social situation can look entirely 
different when It Is seen from the different points. of vioýr 
of the individuals entering . into it: obort srowntngle 
development of the Roman murder story in his 'hing and 
the Book* brings out this point very errectively. The 
same stoat is told-ten times in' the fora or monologues by ten 
of the 1eadin , -peroon , geo ü= ; oaring In tii story from their 
own point of Viers and each time our understanding or that 
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particular social s itun ion is supplemented an correcl'cä 
by a new perspective. All Vaal. Lro min,,,, - . ovs 
is to T ive 
a voice to each -, rincipal character and allows hire to 
reveal himself -no he truly is, in the course of such 
a narration. An we bev :. n to see how 
'Our hu. _. an speech. is naught, 
Our bn ,n to$t 
imony false, our f me 
And hurenn estimation wards and wind. ' 
This is, of course, the poets way of omphaeisinE; 
the eriormou: discrepancy that sometimes ox-Istu between 
the prima facie estimation of a sociihl situation 
whit'a Is very aft _n partial and superficial and only 
relat ive ly true, and an adequate appreciation, which in its 
impartiality coin ore: ionda it In .. 
its ontirc, ty. tie, ( are 
however, apt to forgot that the true zi; dprociation 
of the social situation involved. in the story is not 
maue by Dorne abstxract monster in whom tho different 
versions of the saris incidents are pile) together. It 
Is made only by, a Browning who hhav, the imginat, Ave 
cyrnpathy to grasp the oIgnifiCanca of tize actions or 
every character, as it were fron <. rr °ýthin, and who is 
at t; w s ; ale tý. rie Free fro°ai the per, -, ona1 bias which 
be on; Yc to t. em. 
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We do not red týze truth of a social 
situation by mereltr bringing; to(~ether the different 
points of view. It is only when these different 
views are -allowed to supplement and correct each other 
that there is an increw, ýs ing approalmation towards the 
true appreciation of anýT social situation. It is 
quite conceivable that one of the characters in she story 
rnight himself in a calm moment overcome the . iimitations 
of his view causeL'. by the stress of his own private 
interests and appreciate the soeia. L situation in its truth. 
r In fact, _41tII. ou -°, h personal bias is a trat 
h ndr? nce to , 
true appr©cl tion of a social situation 
pe! rona-I experience - direct or indirect - is the 
only way of arriving at it. i'% ;:,. so far as th, indivi- 
dual has the ca : acity to e1: U, nit-ite all p:. rsonal biss and 
do justice to the points of view of otiier . individuals he tends 
to become 'imp©roonal' To say, however, that he 
becoiiios Laporoonal lo coIr: ewhat miolcµci1ng since in 
becoming 'impersonal' the individual Is only carrying 
further an activity vhicti is irrt: ¬rMt in his personality. 
The phrase 'impersonal personality' is a Paradoxical 
way of brining out the c . '. ýaci. ty vrliicli an inCUv'üual tzar 
to Judge and react to 2ituatione objecttvej,, r. 
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Every individual has sorue oapaaity to 
appreciate the intrinsic value and significance of other 
individuals quite aRrt from any bearing which they may 
have -, pon his own personal interests. And the rocog; aition 
of the intrinsic personal worth of O 
AY individual 
tends to bring into existence an ideal society which would 
be in pant's famous phrase 'a 'kingdom of ends' " In 
this conception of the Ideal society we have in a sense 
a direct antithesis of the : ure1y organic conception 
of society. 
It i;; characteristic of the organic conception 
of society to look upon the individual as havin6 
no worth irJa 1rasclf. Any value w: ilch he may h-avo is 
derived from the contribution which hxo makes to the life 
of the society. Societtr Is, on this v. tevi, like an 
orpan: ism of which evercr Individual is a part* it 
1v 1(i has a, life of its own over and above the life of the : La .u 
.. ß, 1c of which it is constituted. end Just as Iran organ ism 
the part is coaipletely subordinaato to its seif-iin1Iritý-: riranos 
the inch iv 1aual alo o has a similar inctru ac ntc ]. si gni- 
iIr.. 
f'ic'-ýnce to Lh-e society. 
. gut the : 3. naiog, 77 between the society and the 
organism 'iao obvi. ou,; limits. Unlike the orpanisin, society 
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nac no life of its own apart from the lives of tuna 
indiviruaJ_s of \vuich it ! a- co stituted. It has no 
separate centre of concc . ousnesc in which it could reap 
the 
benefits of the contributions of the individuals. // It 
is tr,. e that the 'life of the individual would be extremely 
poor and even impossible unless he lives 1: h association 
with other individuals. But it is the int ivit ua1 who 
is the real and, thýonly centre of life. And it is a 
mistake to look upon him ns havlnF no worth in himself. 
He is not merely a cog in acme riuge machine. he 
would 14c4, --t ; 64-e , co resent any complete subordination 
to some other individual or individuals. rye thus get 
the assertion of the'ri ; hts' of the indivii3ual frorr time 
to time. The great democratic movements of history 
take their stand upon the e(, ubllty and liberty of all 
Individuals. 
ýn an ideal 3oc1ety the indivicLual will 
accept for himself a differentiated function, as in 
the case of the different parts in an organism. And 
th- function would be determined by his capacities and 
the nos of all the individuals taken to c,: ther. 
Bt' from the philaoophlc-"l point of view, the 
135 _ 
t equality $oeo not mean an identity or s liftilarity of 
' ct ions , but the recognition of 
the intr. inc is vrobth of 
the indivic5. ual, and the liberty amounts to hic clal%! 
to be t ive ý, j ac1equato opportunities for the fullest 
deve1o-rment of wlaicI he L0 c^ oab? e. 
If, however, the individual .+g to 
i 
represent an autono, aous unit having un intrinsic 
worth it 'would seem Lnpossible to avoid an utter chaos 
sind conflict of wills in a society where many individuals 
have to live to etcher. üut such a result does not 
follow because the individual is not an impervious 
entity but has the capacity to enter into the experience 
anc,. the rýurx? ores of his fellow- be! ng and ý. Eccept them as 4, e, Q3 
his own. From the . Dint of view of hi own good 
he finds it necessary to identify hiruself with others. 
It io by aiv-ng for others týiat he can realise hiitnsC1f. 
It 1.3 by Io3_InF his life that he gains it. 1c is a 
life of self-maintenanc© through self-transcendence. 
is life is as naught until he voluntarily dedicates it 
for the service o. 17 other 1, dividuals among lvlom he 
happens to live. 
lie corrtec to accept te conz:, jon good, Is 
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his os;; n good. UUis o: Idn hi, -,, hest food is not anything 
private to himself, but is essentially trans-subjective. 
'. Ehe good is of course personal, in the sense that it 
can be realised only in and by the c, ersons; but it 
is more than pcrsonal in the sense that it coý:: orehetýcis 
the s ooc',. of all. ý' we el , r, inate fro, ii 'is consciousness 
the interest/ he tr,! -ýe$ In his Ions, 
country church, ete., there remains practically nothing 
in which he can really interest hüns jf. 
It 's ; suite common to look upon the individual 
as having within h: iI, 1seif two utterly different kinds 
of interests. One set is supposed to be constitutt'ed 
by seif-re-ardinr; interests and the/Other by other- 
regarding int: _resto " Thi cri tinetion between egoism and altr 
altruism is very important for practical purpo, 3Gs but 
from the philosophical point of view any such 
c1azs;; ification of inter®ats cannot be CdnNlüere as being 
ultimate. Cn the one hand, ' even the other-re ; ardinS 
interests make th4onrsona1 life of the 'individual rich and 
fulfil its deepest need's. 'On the other -h Wid ; 'in 
antr normal nractic l activity tt, e is na conscious 
reference to the ego. 
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Egoism in the sense of a direct reference 
to the ego, cannot and does not exist because there is 
no such entity as the e, 70. In conoiderinF the ego 
as a rerlnanent entity we are really substantiating 
an abstraction. The ego is essentially of the nature 
of a powerful complex in the mind, nerve rtin E the 
r outaoina, activity chbLracterl'st. ie of all the manifestations « `, gA 
(ý, fi 
r ýNv E M k 
y ,ý of the spirit. It is- 1 `, ko a vortex in. the etirront of 
a river. Its realitz7 is constituted by its capacity to 
restrict the field of interests ansä shut out the larger 
possibilities of life. 
The problem of developin ;a cornprehonsiv© 
"at individuality is, therefore, to be conceived ao 
consi, ting in securing e balance between the self- 
reM_arding and the other- rorrn rding int, aresto by a kind 
of , mechanical adjustment with reference to sein© t: iird 
extraneous standard. But the e'scential feature of 
comprehensive individuality is the dissolution of the 
ego which is a hindrance to the fuller and freer life 
of the individual. freer and 
fuller life 4i*& the distinction betwo i the self ans , he 
others has to be completely transcended. It cannot 
i3 
provide us wit: any scientific basis for organising, 
the purposes of af7r individual. 
The higher reaches of the hu, aan spirit 
include experiences in which there is a more or less 
complete absence of the distinction between the self 
and t; ie other. In love, for instance, the individual 
is completely 'impersonal' in the sense of hating 
no thought of himself. It is a mistake to consider 
love as being only an instance of selfishness on the 
around that in love the individual rellices a value. 
The realisation of a value for himself is far from 
being a motive in genuine instances of love, although 
it is, so to say, an incidental - because unconternplated- 
result of love. in love the individual is concerned 
with the Food of the objects of his love ^nd not with 
any si nificance which it may have for himself. But 
at the sarrie time the object of love le not explicitely 
re , ardoQ. as being being an other. The sense of separate 
consciousness is not a constituent element in love. 
The structure of society as revealed by 
such . raanifed. tations of the human spirit as love, Is, alrno2t 
the antithesis of the ordinary legal conception of society. 
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. over4rda r morality, society is 
looked upon 
as being essentially a world of, claims and counter-olaiim3. 
Social justice, on this vier, consist: - in the propor- 
tionate adjustment of claims and counter-claims. . the 
contribution of the{indivtdual to the society must be 
adequate to the benefits which he der, i, 'vßs from the 
society.. ' The Idea of measurement or, proportion between 
the give and take of different individuals is the 
basis of social justice, from the standpoint- of law. 
But any such conception., of .. ndividu- 
alistic justice breaks -down In the list of philosophical 
criticism. Properly speaking there is no way of 
measuring or co, nparing the real contributions of 
different individuals. The device of money which is 
meant to facilitate social give and take tends to 
obscure thid fact. It is the nature of mopey to admit 
of being measured and to measure everything eise in, sz 
its ter-s. laut any assessment of the contribution. of 
the individual in terms of money is only a provisional 
device for the practical Purposes of life. It does 
not ind huts that the different contributthopa of different 
individuals are really capable of being compared with 
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O'jather. 
In the world of spititual riornborship, as 
Booanquet has pointed out, 'there gare no claims. and 
counter-claims. ' {1) In this attitudo the 1ndivi6ua1 
makes no claims, for himself - Nor do wo oxpaact that 
he will i ake an77 such claims. 'i'he at man in society 
does not and may not ask for rewards, His contribution 
to society is quite out of proportion*to what he may 
gain from 't in return. The true oouiception of 
unsocial justice. might, therefore, be summed up in the 
well-known formula `for each. acc, ording to hie needs, and. 
from each according to his capaciti©c. ' 
On the one hand, the society is constituted 
of individualc who : luve an inalienable and intrinsic 
worth of tine it own. But on the other hand, the Indi- 
vidual at his higheot, raak©s no revrsonal claims for 
himself. An ideal structure or, 'cociety will, therfore, 
have to be based upon the full recognition of these two 
(1) The Valuo and Dostinu of the individual, p. 15.5. 
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important features. There will be no room in such 
a society for any actions private or political, in which 
the individual comes to be regarded as a means only. 
But on the-contrary there will be opportunities for 
all for complete calf--development. And the incdivi- 
dual will be helped to develop his own linen and 
01 
make his ow unique oänttibution to the life of 
society. 
In fact each individual has the capacity 
to make to the life of society a contribution which 
no one else can make. It is true that any-indivi- 
dual might serve a particular purpose in a factory, 
And from the point -, f view of that purpose it may be 
often immaterial whether oolno other individual takes 
the place of that individual, But this feature of 
one individual being capable of being substituted 
by another appliea only to that kind of work which may 
be done even by a machine. It does not apply to the 
functions which are specifically human. In 4 family 
or an educational institution, or the political 
framework of the society, it may often happen that one 
individual cannot be subatitutcd by another without a 
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complete transformation of the specific function which 
he is expected to perform. 
The contribution of every individual 
is unique. There is, therefore, no poosibility of 
there being any individualistic Justice based upon a 
legal conception of an exact Mathematical proportion 
between what the individual receives from the society 
and what he gives to it. 
Nor is possible to look upon the 
society as a world. of claims and counter-claims, from 
the point of view of the i\ dividual himself. 
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XI. 
R 1ii ICI0 U0 co: sC :: OiiSITESS. 
Vie have seen that throughout oocial life 
tiac ina: 1viduai realises himself in and through his 
social relationships aria that any 'oelr. controdne'sow 
in his outlook exclude from h13 life many valuable 
possibilities of his, life and on the whole niakee it 
-no or. This feature of self-transcendence whtch is so 
ch. racter ctic of a developing personality is still more 
pronounceä. in religious experience, In religious 
consciousness there is self-. maintenance throup, h complete 
self-surrender. 
-? el i ous consciousness unust be aareruily 
distinguished from 1- the pursuit of moral valuoa 
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in social life, =ind als 2- from the pursuit of 
impersonal values like scientific truth or beauty. 
Moral values as well as other impersonal values are 
7 oo; ýel u ý:,:, as creations of the finite individual 
in time, although these values may be regarded as having 
their source in an eternal reality. But in religious 
consciousness the ideal is regarded not as a creation 
of s, finite individual but as an eternal reality, although 
the act of his contacting that reality may be in time. 
The implications of reli iou; consciousness, therefore, 
need separate discussion. 
Any account of huaan Individuality 
which does not consider- the aignifictince of religious 
consciousness is, bound to be incomplote. Like other aspects 
of human experience religious oxporionce also has Its 
own validity. But here also. as in otho ° sphores of 
experience the only way : to establ=ieh,. yal. idity, is to 
bring out the internal Inconsistency in the diverse ü 1ivo- 
ýnces 
of the experience, an to how that tueGe nro not 
contradicted but supported by otrier inuii. n ;s based on 
ot'ier aspects of human experience. 
Ro11g1o1 sl)Y., )i rlance has nn A. spor ý. cA1it con- 
IN 
- ]. 
f{E 
tribution to make to an7 complete philosophical 
theory about the nature of the universe or of the 
individual and to treat it as an uniwportant and 
illusory subjective phenornonon A to feil entirely 
to , ^rasp its real si ;na. '. ic tnce . ýs 3radley has 
pointed ot, 'thc r. --,, in wino de: ri nd^ reslit'r more 
solid than that of religious consciousness knows 
not what he seekk5. ' (1) Uth regard to the nature 
of the indiv, ýdua1, too, we raust viotiw with raýstrust 
and. suspicion any iucroly 'a priori) theories which 
do not do justice to the concrete roans: of experience 
criaracterioing hic conscious life; and religious 
experience is the deepest fors of human conscioucnee8. 
L eligion cannot, and need not be' baaod' bn. 
anything except religious consciouoneso. It cannot be 
derived from any. philosophy which does not in Ito data 
alroady include relIgiouo concciouoneaQ. All that 
11 -14 1 philosophy can do and must do is to intcrprQtt rel. igioua 
experience and ranke it yiO1c itc contribution to the 
i) Appearance and i-reality, 449. 
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theonr oc individu. azlä. tV. 
Thees^ence (1) of re] 1rious ex, -crience 
centres round the relation of value to renl, *, Ity. As 
Hof 'din hRa painted out, 'the f©e: iin? which is determined 
(1) It is necessary to subitit the available data, of 
reli, -ious conscious teas to constructive criticism. Vie 
data consist of ine, ellectual and non-intellectual elements. 
So far as the intellectual elements are concerned there 
is very little unanimity anon; the followers of different 
'historical religions. But the specific contritution of 
V reli-ious e:: perience to the life of the individual is , ' in its non-intellectual elements* 
Every concrete religious experience is ueüally 
accompanied by com. s myths, dogmas, creeds, beliefs or 
tenets. And the feeling -of, corthinty ý? hich originally 
belongs to the non-intellectual elements in religion 
- is as a rule usually communicated to the intellec'-, ual 
elements connected with these). ion- intellectual elements by 
a lair vdiich is psychological rather than logical. And such 
extension of the sense of certainty is in iaany cases 
quite Indefensible. 
But it would be equally unreasonable to allow, 
wit: iout sufficient justification, the distrust created by 
noticing, the diocrepanc es in the inteliecti. dl dletentc 
to spread over to the non- intellectual element 3 in 
religious consc iousnese ", critical analysis of, the data 
of reli ;:: _ou2; experience reveals that the discrepancies in the intellectüz lý$ elements exist mainly owing to the 
influence of traditions in inter 
, 
oreting r iigious experience. 
The non-intellecrual essence Of religious experience , however, remains largely untouched by these diocrepanejes. 
The task of adequntely Interpreting the essence of religious experience and building on ! to basis a theory 
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btr the fate of values in the struggle for experience 
is the religious feeling. ' (1) The individual zske with 
a certain amount of uneasiness whether life is meant 
to realise soiie eternal s ignifi. c-, -, 4ce or whether it is 
merely an accwdental episode 1n'thEblind hurry of the 
universe from vanity to vanity. ' (2) And relic; lous 
faith answers that in spite of all the t ppearancee to 
? -14e the contrary the individual must act as if all 
the drama of his life has some meaning. It assumes 
that the ultimate nature of reality is auch that it will not 
make the appearance of human values impossible, but 
will on the contrary permit their appearance and preserve 
them. 
of the nature of the . individual belong;, pr roperly 
sneaking to philosophy. In order to achieve this 
purnooe, however, philosophy must cot about to dis- 
entangle the esevitial elements in rellp, ouo con- 
scion [jess from the inessential ý: lem nts ýthich usu- 
ally het mixed up with them. 
(1) Philosophy of religion, p. 107. 
(2) w usso11's article on 'b'rae 'iorshi-. ' 
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In this form faith is not peculiar to 
relip, ious consciousness. Even science and everyday 
life proceed upon a similar faith of their own. it 
is true that if the individual discovers in science 
some exception to a law which he believes to be true 
he is ready to revise his notion of the law. ut there 
would be an end to science if he surrenders his faith 
in the conception of the necessary larw. If he cannot 
finti t' e law in a particular complex of events he doge 
not rush to the conclusion that there is no law oporattre 
in tb. em. 2ut on the contrary he aeeu. mee that there is 
a law there if only he knew it. 
In the came way re l ig i©us faith is 
not staked so much on any s, ý, ecific values a on the, 
principle of value. It admits that many particular 
values might be incapable of beim., realised by the 
individual. But it uncompromisingly rejects the view 
t h,;, t 
Life is a twice-told tale 
Told-by an idiot, 
'Full of sound and fury, 
uIgnifying nothing. ' (l} 
(1) Tacbeth. 
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It takes its stnnd on the harmony of reality 
wit. i some value, which would belong to th life of the 
individual under all coos s it"le c ireu; }ns tances . he 
religious faith at its minir. ium does not say that any 
specific values reust ultimýttely prevail in the future 
but t: aat the general , orinc ii le of value does lviay e 
rreva il. The real formula in this case is not that the 
'truth wil prevail' but that 'truth prevails. ' 
Such a rel i; r, ous faith, however, is not 
ex-, )! is `Ltly present In the 
It is often preceded by a 
from the contemplation of 
absence of relimt. oue cons 
minds of all the Individuals. 
feeling of uneasiness resulting 
the fate of the vales. In the 
c ious Hess, conteý-iiplEtive inui. vidutt1$ 
almost always hnve a sense of insecurity about the fate 
of huul i values. (1) There seems to be no guarantee 
(1) This sense of uneasi nese has been very effectively 
expressed brr Bertrabd Russell. k, eferrint., to the 1 ife, 
of tae individual on tha earth he : navy, fQn this tiny 
dot, tiny lumps of it pure carbon and water, of conralicated 
structure, with somewhat unusual phyo ic. a lrü 
bro ertina 
she ical 
, crawl about for a few years until they are 
co, apou-nded. They divide their tiino between ! about 
designed to postpone the rno: nent of dissolution for 
themselves and frantic struE le to hasten It for others 
of their, kind. Such is man s life viewed fror -tke outside. ' Q. uoted by '. oern'le in tud iea in 
, ontc;, po -ary gLetaphys ics 
- 
that the universe at large, has any sympathy for the 
ideals of the individual. Ani: ttz3., apprehension 
, rent . l/ produces some unrest 
But it is possible to exaggerate the 
pr-ictical 1riportance of this mental unrest. It has 
rarel; r that vita! significance which might damp roan's 
enthusiasm in a. 1s, life or its ideals. ut. -Ictly speaking 
even in the extreme case ofa would-be-euicid©, tgere 10 
some 'kind of faith in t}', etJoo3ibility of life itself. 
'. lope, however, d1m, re igne in the hearts of all even 
when their are in thEpreoence of death off. '' suffor. inG. Men 
would not of erwioe go to battlefields or welcome 
martyrdoms or live in the v . ciillty of aotive volcanoes,. _ 
The sense of un, eas Ines 4ibout the fate of human vn1us , ,,, w 
is not by any means a fundamental trait of hu, -,. ian nature; 
where it ex. st: it is -so to speak - super. inci. ucod. by 
reflective consc oumesa, It 10 very curious µnd signi- 
ficant-that ov©n at thin -star o the Individual does.. not 
surrender his Aspiration:, but in a stoic spirit buildo 
ti'iera on tLe fing foundaüion'of unyleldin& d spair. ' (1) 
Zi) Russell -in 'Free mang fror h. .' 
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He begins luv facing am accenting the facto of life, 
such as death and impermanence and rar es himself irnsiiune 
from the tyranny of his environment, renouncing of 
his own accord many of his desires. F. ere again i uasell's 
remarks are instructive. He' s_ ys, 'To abandon the struggle 
for private hapninecs, to expel all eagerness of 
temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal 
things, this is emancipation, and this is the fvuo man's 
worship. ' (1) 
There are thus bo irinin a of a religion: 
faith even in instances whore religious consciousness 
is not Dartißularly pronounced. But the fully developed 
roli-3 our, penße-i-ousnest faith is a characteristic of 
reiirious consclousnesc only and it is generally reached 
t': rou; 7h the experience of 'conversion'. In this 
exy-)erience the individual get rid of his mental unrest 
concerning the fate of values and becomes secure in the 
faiths ,. the conviction that in spite of aan, V events fand 
facts which seem to s'ug est the contrary, life has an 
ultimate meaning, which can be, must be, and will be 
realised. 
In conversions the inüiviüual `+ e gins by recogni o eng 
-12- 
that life as it is c=in be made 'north living, by welcoming, 
within himself -- =a complete change of outlook. 
He therefore entirely reureatee his character and 
Foes through a spiritual rebirth. During this process 
he identifies himself with h%$ higher pelf becomes 
conscious, as ' i11iam James has pointed out, that 
this higher part is conterminous and continuous with 
a more of the same qualitly which is operative In the 
universe outside hirn. On this more he relies in 
undisturbed confidence for the ultimate success of 
his spiritual enterprise in all moments of crises. 
From the psycholoL7ýal point of vievi 
it is important to ask whether this more is really 
external to the individual or whether it is only a part 
of himself. It is widely iecepted by modern psychology 
that the waking consciousness is only a slice of the 
total personality. And from the point of view of 
wading consciousness this morie is clearly both extcrrial 
and real. iteliý*ioUU consciousness is, therefore, 
justified in remanding this more as external. Psychology 
may it the same time be iustifled in trying to show continuity 
between the conscious part of the Individual and this more. 
13 l' 
., na from the metaphysical point of' view the hypothesis 
of. a collective super-consciousness which O_oes not 
belong to a single individual remains an open question. 
in religious consciousness the i'M, rore is 
conceived as an Lterna1 Ideal or a Divine Person. In 
the former case bech tique of ach eving this .: ore consists 
of persevering fidelity and in the latter cacc it consists 
of love and self-Gurrender. (1) The cl$inction between 
ttzeae two types of religious conccioucnesa 9.0 strictly 
speaking cra ted b° a difference of omphacis on some 
elements of religious consciousness rather than other 
elements. , 
'T'hey are however not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. 
In the first type the individual almost 
al0y{s has, beforQ his mental eye 
some historical or 
T 
Imaginary person whom he believea to be the eternal ideal 
of man. And in, the_ seQond type the divine person is 
(1) The flood of devotion which jig" char&otoriotic 
of. religious consciousness might overtake the individual 
in almost any Setting ýof intellectual theories= about the 
nature of the universe,. It cannot be silenced by the 
opppaitiön or mny 'intellectual , argurionta .*' Ito battle.. cry Ic, in the words,, of Emerson, 'Leave your theory 
as Joseph his cönt, in the hands of the harlot and flee*" 
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always taken to embody and symbolise the eternal 
ideal. 
In a fully developea form of religious consoiouanOsa 
both of these aspects ave fount öqually developed 
in 
the concept of the ni her" 
?n the beginning thia -111. 'her is ruppoced 
to be essentta117 external and at a cons hJerable distance 
from the inctivIdual" There io, however, no unbridgeable 
gulf bet peen this Higher and the individual. It can 
be realised by him. And having attaineu. the' Higher 
the individual is co much impressed with its reality 
that ne considers himself as having either an illusory 
of a derivative reality; and he is so much impraeaoO 
by its value that he looks upon himself as haV"Ing no 
worth in himself when taken in isolation from this Higher. 
whatever real worth he has he owes it to his being an 
embodiment or a vehicle of this Higher. 
The derivative reality and worth of the 
finite individual in religious consciousness follows from 
the recognition that the I#ighest alone has absolute 
reality and final value. `. there is, thereforö, an- i1lu4i-- 
nating and striking contrast between the formulae of moral 
and. religious consciousness. The former srioak of self- 
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--realisation while the latter prefers to sl9esllýc of the 
realisation of the'Self which is' th© seil' of selves', 
or the realisation of Cod, or 'The Truth' or, in uiore 
mystic moods of the realisation of 'It' or again in more 
d ring mood of 'nothing' or 'notd&dgdess', or sometimes 
onlwr of plain ýßenli$ation. (1) 
The Highest revealeC. in religious con- 
sciousness is conceived as a reality which is -, t once 
transcendent of and imalenent in all that exists. It 
i& in some suc'. i manner t1-iat the individual tries to 
r: sp from -, °; iti: in the unity of Being which rund in and 
through the a. iversity of its manifestations. The 
' rotherhood' of the living and the 'FatherhDod' of 
' oa thus hecomeA only two ao , ects of one oing1o integral 
experience. 
(1) 'Nothing' is probably an unfortunate expression 
for the highest which the indlviaual seeks to realise 
in religious consciousness. Some r ystles have, 
however, used it to ineiiu te, not the non-existence or 
the poverty of the object of religious aspiration but 
the incapacity of the intellect to describe it aclequato)4t. 'Nothing' is hare equivalent to 'ineffable' or 'indescribable'. 
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In the lieht of this analysis or religious 
experience, it is now possible to find out its implica- 
tions (1) on the nature of the individuality of the 
object of religious experience, and also 
(2) the nature of the individuality of the finite 
individual. 
It is characteristic `©f the religious attitude 
to look upon the object of religious experiý. race not 
as some abstract law or a concept, but we an eternal 
reality which is not less but more real than the finite 
individual who seeks to be one with it. This eternal 
reality is further not mere 3oing. The concept 
of pure being is arrived at through a orovess of 
abstraction from all the individual existents, by om ttin 
every quality which they have, in their concretehecs. 
Being in this sense is a feature of overytlhiin, & that exists. 
The Eternal ; tealitýr of religious consciousness is not 
such mere being but is a Universal Conoo ioUzsnesc . 
But the Universal Consciousness cannot again 
. as in ooä o types of 
idealism be depleted of all charao t ¬ri- 
stic8 except the intellectual. Any $uciltbloodless 
-1 
category' is far from giving, us too correct description 
of the xoality as revealed in religious experience. 
It is more than universal consciousness. It is 
Universal Life. 
Further, in so far as there is in the 
reli ous attttud© the distinction bottiveen_the subject 
and the-object the eternal reality io oven re oartie L as 
the Infinite ý Pers on rho is. from 'H iD side as much 
interested in realisin&. Uimsel. f in and through the 
finite indivIduals as the finite individuals are inte- 
rested interested in realizing themselves In ana through 
Him. Man loves-God and God loves man. There Is thus 
in religious experience co malete reciprocity between. 
Via subject and the object»-(1)In the . wordo of ". 
Tagor 
. 
'The love that tunes the strings of existence 
Breaks out in iuN is when r y heart . 
1s, won .' (PJ 
In attributing personality to God, as. revealed In 
religious consciousneet t, ioro is , ßOme risk of our 
tranE- 
fnverring to him on-bloc,, that l , ices concopt of porponality 
which we come to form. by an- analysis of° tho nature of the 
(2) Vishwabharatti Nevi, '" D©ce ber 1932. (. ) The distinction between the subject ana object, however, need not be -regarden s" ultimate in"i`Iove , ny 
more'-, than in knowledge See p. 61. (Chapter on Self-Conocioucnecs. ) 
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finite individual. The analogy of the finite individual 
cannot be used in this context wit: iout some necessary 
mod if scat ions . 
God cannot be adequately conceived as 
being confined within the limits of any finite fora. In 
I so far as He is Immanent, His life flows in and is shared 
by every living thing. And in so far as No is transcendent 
pie is the Formlos or the Unmanifest which is the 
eternal `, round and source of the entire world of mauifestation. 
But because God is in one aspect transcendent 
and unmanifest and in another aspect lives in and through 
the entire realm of finite individuals, it does not follow 
that he is not personal. If it is a mistalte to transfer 
the limitations of finite individuality to God, It Is a creator 
mistake to look, upon Film as lass than persona. * k'or 
religious consciousness. God must be capable of loving 
and of being loved. But as His love i all-comprehensive 
and embraces in its fold all the, finite ind +. viduala 
He is not just one person among others. He is 'the 
infinite apppehended as personal, and derives from our 
i; imediate experience of the infinite in finite persons. ' (1) 
(1) John Mfacmurray, Interproting the Universe, p. 124. 
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The term eupt personal which teas been eug ; eeted (1) 
in this connexion is perhaps the beat to describe the 
individuality of God, 
I- if' sufficient care is taken not to allow 
it jmeaning to dwindle down Imperceptibly 
into that which is , nprely impersonal, and 
2- if,, at tho same time, vie Guard- ourselves 
against the mistake of , akin tho porsonality 
of God cornpl ©toly external to 
,,, 
the l ifo 
, o- 
the 
finite individual. 
11 
( Conmuniori of man and God is not a hind of mechanical 
contact between two mutually exclusive entities. It is 
I 
an instance of a unique and intimate relationship in which 
the 'sharing' bf life is so complete as. to invalidato 
all theories which find a funda; ental duaiicn between ý, od 
and man and try to set one against the other. In 
religious conociouonesa we have the experience of God 
in the finite individual and of the finite individual in u, od, 
Cowing now to the Implication of religious 
Bradley, Appearance and'I', eality, p. 533. 
4 
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I 
experience for the nature of the finite individual we 
find that his consciousness points but to a complete- 
ness which does not belong to him cýua finite. Indeed 
in the light of the analysis of the religious experience 
it becomes impossible to look upon him as cuer: _ 
ltr finite. 
'Merely finite' is an abstraction from his concrete 
reality. He is an integral part of a greater reality 
in which'he lives and moves and has his being' and is 
not an absolutely self-sufficient and self-contained 
entity. : _e ie therefore essentially Janus-raced, 
human-divine, finite-infinite. Just aas the infinite exists 
in and through the finite the finit© also exists in rnü 
throw 
, the 
infinite. 
In reltMi©u9 experience the 'ntsus' 
for self-Itmowledg, e aru self-realisation leads t ie 
finite individual to turn away from the finite to the 
infinite. The njlroceas does not cone iot in the bare 
negation of the finite bt in an increayinz awaren¬eu 
of tae self-affirmation of the infinite in and tfirout h 
°' "` the finite. It is, therefore, a process of a; radual 
release from the thraldom of abstractions and partial views- 
It is an entering into a fuller understanding and anprecia- 
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tion of the one in the many, which is not merely a one 
Qk the many, or in -.; iliiaai James' striking phrase, 
'one of the eaches'. 
In the conscious realisation of the infinity 
of which he is an heir, the individual finds at once 
the complete satisfriction 66-his total personality 
and the only absolute basis for integrating all his 
activities in relation t^ otter finite incLividuals. 
i`hus throuEh reli7ious aspiration , inc. experience the 
inc; ividual rrraLlu , 
iy enters into -theljýo , session of his 
own hirhest value. The ciilmin,. týionl of this process 
his destin--ation. In that culmInaýion he realises 
the u1tifn-te atcaninß of his life, the final purpooe 
of his individual e; x steince. 'The task is done. ' 
,. 
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XII. 
HUMAN PSSOVALITY. 
TIL :P A3i2M of the nature of human 
personality is corplicc ted by the fact that although 
from the point of view of bodily existe ice it has, like 
other organisms an appearance of indcpenüonco end 
completeness, from the point of view of his conscious 
necc or his values his life is soon to be wovon wraith 
the social and the cosmic life very intimately, It is, 
therofore, nececaary to study hic nature in the lieht 
of the interpretation of his experience. 
... ,., x .: ýý, 
`. 
.a. 
ý,. ý. 
,ý, ýý:..: ý : ,.; ,. 
g 
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His expeni©nce is, in a very important sense, 
sharable by othora. It is true that considered from 
the psychological point of view, as constituting some 
events in the 1enta1 life-history of an individual 
the experience of a man is strictly private to himself 
and. is, as such, in its very nature, entirely in- 
communicablel to any one else. But from the logical 
and axiological point of view, the meaning and 
significance of his experience are communicable. And 
this raises the question as to whether human beings 
can be adequately deacribed as walled mönadc without 
any windows. 
It i, characteristic of pluralistic 
philosophies to. a. ook upon the finite 4indiv . dun1 na a 
unique existent chc, ractorieed by Imperviousness, inde- 
pendence and privacy, and to insist g upon the full 
rccognition of the reality and the itpontance of his 
freedom of will and of, hic initiative. It is 
not uncommon that in this endeavour to preserve 
the status of the . 
finite individual 
- in his ovWn bight 
the implication of the concrete. c9ntenta} of the life 
of the. a-inc ivBJäualýt©nd, tö Mbe},: ignöroci: 
x, 
& Bak "a careful 
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examination of the contents of the life of the finite 
individual brings out the inter-twining of his life 
with that of'others. It is, therefore, necessary 
to consider not only the 'linear' but also the 
'lateral' life of the finite individual, in 
order to estimate his real status, and'to make at 
least as much of coexistent being as of continuous 
succession. ' 
But when we examine critically the 
'lateral' life of'the- feinite individual, it is 
found that the apparent isolation, which seems to 
belong to him is not illusory but deceptive. 
The s i:: iple fact of the sharing of ideas, purposes 
or experiences would be quite impossible in t world where 
the individuals did'not, in so-rue' Wva , enter as 
elements int'O 'a, genuine' whole. 
The intdrrelation 'implied in any 
sharing of 'spiritual goods, is not primarily 
a matter of external and mechanical contact. It Is 
not possible to explain such sharing on any purely 
physiological or natur-qli, tic theory. It is ýa unique 
phhenomenon rooted in the st-ructuro "of the -world 
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of spiritual membership. All the parapherfla1ia 
of pe 'choph'iaical apparatus, (thIe stimulus, 
ianguage, nervous iinpulces, images, eto., ) is at 
best only a part of the conditions of there being 
any such sharing in 'spiritual goode. ' The dost 
irnpcrtant condition of there being any such shnrin 
býT the dIfferent finite individuals is that they 
should. i of only have a similar opiritual nature 
and a common world, but th. t they must also be 
party of o: iual unity vwb ich ineludes them 
in itself. 
Fiten apart from the implications of 
sharing, the further examination of the nature of 
the- pur? 7, ocee which they share ul o points to the 
came conclusion. We haVe seen that the ' supreme 
good og, the finite individual Is a_ common good and 
an such is essentially trans-subjective and that in 
religious conocloücnesc, - the finite -individual,; 
' 
recognicea his futidama t ,l unity 
`with that infinite 
spiritual -ren1ty'vwhich included all ether finite 
individuals. Not only, does the--, finite 
individual re cornise, =hIs : unity, with=thin iromlity 
but he hae,; a against it, _'- no , peroenal al. ß;. 1s 9nd 
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finds that his own reality and worth are, in some 
sense, derived from it. It is, therefore, nece- 
ssary to aetermine the precise sense in which we 
may recognise the independence of the finite incli- 
vidua10 
Owin' to t,,, -is impersonality and univorscalit, y 
of the content of huinan consciousness , some 
monistic philosophies regard the separateness of 
selves as unreal and d. nimportant. In ? 3osanauet'c 
Nell-known Gifford Lectures, for instance, the 
numerical difference between tbi© vatious finite 
individuals Is regarded as being rooted in their 
'impotence' only. The 'impotence' which keeps 
them a-. art is aP/Parent in the self-contradictory 
and fragmentary nature of'their experience; but these 
features-are, at least theoretically, capable of 
being remove ,, 'I. But for this 'itipotenco' than, they 
might 'coalesce' with each other or even with the 
Absolute, which} is the only perfect Individual. 
He, t! iorofor©, insists upon 'thy p'rocariou3 arrd 
superficial nature of their distinctness' and holds 
that there are ' -. et#. 1eUUeti indicatitns that some- 
thing deeper and more real undorlioo thern. '(l) 
(1) The value and Destiny of tho Individual, p. 58, 
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It is only in their formal aspect that they 
are distinct and different; but from the point 
of vier of the concrete content of their experience 
there is in them a growing tendency to come to 
share a common experience. It is, therefore, not 
very helpful to attach too much importance to the 
distinctness of their bodies and interpretA their 
nature on the analogy of 'things' . is pointed 
out by Professor Hocking, 'their existence is spent 
not behind the walls of their bodie$, 
6fraternising 
with chemical processes, but in front of them in a 
common world. 
"They, therefore, 'rneet and share their 
identity not t: lrouEh ineffable depths(alone) but here 
througti the fore, >rounds of common experience. 
' (1) 
It is, th©reforo, sugRewto that 
the finite individual is only 'adjectival' to 
t! 4 ealit r of which he Is a part.. By using the term 
'adjectival' Bocanquet does not wish to suggest a 
relationship similar to that /of the attributes to 
(1) cuoted b Bo anauet in Contemporary P'riilOsophy, p. 9. 
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an existent(1). But what he means to indicate 
by that phrase is that the interrelatedness of the 
finite individuals is not an instance of'co-ordinate 
relatedness)' between existents which might be 
what they are even prior to this relation, but 
on the contrary implies 'the plain fact', of 
'super, and subordinate reels. (2) The finite 
individual does not exist in his oven big1 t when 
taken in abstraction from the superior whole 
of which he is a part. i-ie is, therefore, 
. 
'adjectival' to that whole. 
iia against such a rioniotic vier which 
tends to swallow the reality of the finite 
individual, pluralism takeM its ipudßc13 to defend 
the independence, or 
. 
the Finite individual. It 
takes its stand on, the. r ct that 
>tt. © content 
of . experience or the finite individual is :.. ,s 
(1) 'lohe Aristotelian ; ýocietY, 6Ygiqpsium: Life and finite Individuality, a. E30. 
s a, u.. -k a Ibid. 
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much,, of an abstraction when taken apart fro:: the 
centre in which 'it comes alive ' as this 
centre would be when taken apart from the contents. 
: 3esi . es, 
it is a mistake to look upon this 
centre as a kind of passive receptacle into 
which the content, 4 of common experience pouro 
itself. The unity of the self is not to be 
looked upon as bette the same kind of unity 
which might belong to any tibd¢ct1of conscious- 
ness. The self exists for itself and, when 
viewed from within, has an inalienable intogrity, 
in spite of, the rragmentpry character of Its contents. 
The finite individual is an active centre of 
consciousness with a genuine freädom and crea- 
tiveness with regard to his acts, for Which he 
3. c in a read.. sense responsible. lie is not 
merely a vehicle of. the super . or life of the 
Absolute, but hhs a will of his own-. The 
numerical d . fference , of 
the f1n3. te, individuals, 
therefore, is not a merely 'superficial' feature 
of the world, but'it the basal eharAoteristio of 
- x.. ý. _. 
, 7n 
concrote exiatence(1). 
We thus get two types of theories about 
the nature and the status of the finite individual 
The monistic trend o' thought leads to a form of 
Absolutism in which the reality of the Absolute 
leaves no)' room for any independent reality 
and status for the finite individual. The 
nlüralistic trend of thought leads to a world 
in which the finite individuals have rýt. 
Jtive 
independence of existence and action as 
against each other and'to a certain extent even 
against God. 'Our wills ark,;; oura to wake t1iem 
thine', But this offer itself 1s taken to imply 
the prior possession of our wills by ourselves. 
i3oth monism and pluralism appeal to the same 
at exoerioncos of life and take these as 
their strating point. For the former the 
existence of a common purpose and the common 
good, the facto of love and self-sacrifice, and 
-tile 
(1) Pringle-Pattison In the Sympoiiu4i of the Aristotelian Society., Life and Finit© Individualit$r, 
P. 100 
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rel ig.; ious experience of Crod' all embracing 
love and reality, indicate the existence of 
the Absolute in which alt the mundane differences 
vanish. For the latter these very 
experiences imply a real differentiation of 
the Absolute into a number of finite centreo. 
In the pluralistic ehhoma, God is 
regarded as being one such centre of experience 
among,, other similar centres. This conception 
of God does not necessarily exclude his being 
infinite, in some sense,, 'God is infinite', says 
lofessor Dawes-Hicks, in the abstract of the fourth 
of hic Hibbert Lectures (1931), ' not because 
He is the world, nor because the world is part 
of Him, but because in and through Him the 
world has meaning and eignificcnce. ' It is true 
that God can have cuca meaning and sigtificance 
for all only if the fact of his having a aQparate 
centre of life does not Preclude him from including 
them in his love and life; but since antl out- 
going love and an objectively directed and ant 
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inclusive life is or can be - at least to a certain 
extent - within the reach even of the finite 
individual, in spite of his having a separate 
centre of existence, there is no reason why the 
same should not be true of the Divine Life. 
The truth about the issue between 
the monistic and tho pluralistic views soorie to 
be that ire have to,, crc !d it the finite individual 
with a certain amount of freedom and Independence;. 
But this freedom or independence is not 
absolute and unqualified but only relative and 
1 united. 
On the one hand, it is tl; uo that 
he would be nothing apart from the social and 
the divine life, which gives thin the very substance 
of his own life. Iris activity does not exist 
in a kind of vacuum but is conditioned by 
his natural and spiritual environment. lie gains 
his active life 'only= in, Fand, through the- p, antioi- 
pationýof` an objoctivo content, - which, in Dome oenso, 
is independent äfhim. Ile is reduced'=to the -bard 
0 
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potentiality of activity unless he is confronted 
with a determinate situation requiring a specific 
response or solution. Not only is his action 
thus condit'. oned by his circumstances, but the 
very nature of his action is, so to say, 
dictated by, tem. , 
Nor can we escape from this 
position on the 'ground that his concrete action 
is always a resultant of the nature of the circum- 
otanc©s as well as his own nature including 
his ideals); for his own -nature 
( including 
his ideRls), Io in oanse ultimately not a creation 
of his own, but-- is rooted in the `nature of the 
universe. 
But, on the other hand, It is equally 
r 
true 'that a1L thi looq not, in any way, intcr- 
fere vith-hio roal'fracdomtl) which- conoicto in 
(1) The different sencos, in which 
, 
the, term freedom 
is usu zllýv used -'is a`, 
frultful ooürcc %zýf contuc ion, 
The freedom of the will 'fo vth1cI1, ' tho' libertarians 
contended is' the `c. a city of the wi21 to- choose any Tine of `action -'withoutthe o er ti ä. `'ßa motive., Such 9, mysterious and completely inc culable and 
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his genuine authorsh ip of his own acts. 
Things do not simply happen in limn , 
in 
spite of him and, so to say, without his active 
co-operation. He is a genuine centre of a creative 
lawless capacity is sometimes supposed to be the 
essence'o the freedom of the . will of the 
individuals 
But no Individual really can act in a complete vacuum, 
and freedom An this sense cannot be said to belang 
to his will. 
The rtterapt of the libertarlano to save the 
freedom of choice in this sense was motived by the 
desire to zrn l, e, the indivi4ual, responsible for his 
own actions, since the opposing sch^: ol of determinism 
made the individual a tool in the hands of his 
isolated desires. But the lawless freedom of the 
libertarians is equally incompatible with a- real 
responsibility of the individual for his actions. 
-There is, then no ultimate £r© ; dom of ( choice as distinguished. from-the freedom which 
is realised in . choice. The fact of choice is 
` undoubte 
ly a characteristic-of human individuality, 
roe 'ut the nice is exercised by an elimination of sorie 
` alternati es -in favour, of .a particular line of action, 
ý 
owing to theroressure of the whole self against Its 
.. 
` parts. Freedom" In this :. sonso is., another name for 
self deterrninatio n. 
Zn-,.. its roc ativa ,. aspect _. fre do implioa the, overcoming of "some limitations of. -. obstacles.: 3ut ; here can be ý no obstacles 'or limitations to. over. corne 
unless there -id dome `poQitivcý, "endeavour, 1 In its 
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response to his natural and social environinent7df action 
and initiative. He is not a'telephone wire) 
alone: which the Absolute act©tor thinks. `(1) . in 
this sense he is a real agent with his, ov;, rn relative 
independence. The system of distinct and separate 
centre, of finite experience is, therefore, not a 
merely accidental or 'superficial' feature of the 
world of manifcatation (2) but is the very condition 
of its being chat it je. 
pooiti, ve aspect, therefore, freedom impliez tb. e 
capacity to will and act. Canc ct'e - `rocdö4t, an dintingu . shed from -a purely forma l= `fr, 6cdom , seemc to, be a natter, of degreon " It wil , 
'depend 'Upon, the 
aMo, unt of- _ir't©rha1 
harmony, an 
. -`Pömprahe oiori, vhich an indiVi ual-can Introduce In the c`onntive` tendencies 
which -9, re'a pürt of his nature. 
(1) The Ide!, of Goä, '. 'p, 2. °. 
. (2) From the point Q , `Vids7'. or- the htaanIfagt there Is, of course, ` no i tll. ' ip loitsy. " +` Foocros that wo oa not 
carry our peroonalitios -or: von °c or on ir of God into , ho t rn 3 ." It 12 not" pooaible, to look upon them s eternal i 'foront1 ,t jon: -'Of, -ad 
un: n ni"fa'ct . Mlle perconalittoc of, men anal-", aodý hood not have any beginning'- -or and In ti e, -and 'the -nüit'lllicity of the 
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If gyre reine; aber teere that ", hc real any'. ultimate 
bearers of values are only finite indiv1c1ual a 
it will be apparent that they - inciuý. ing the 
human and the non-human, tile eub-humsan and 
the super-human - are in a genuine senao 
the enil or the raison d' etre of the universe. 
: ý.. er© conservation of abstract values, as such, 
is inconceivable apart from the centred of 
consciousness. It is onitT WLZSn Ü1ae7 are 
realised in concrete and actual, Y existotts ý 
different individuals may even be an inalienable 
feature of the world of manifestation. But such 
a multiplicity cannot be present In reality, in its 
eternal aspect, as distinguished from its temporal 
aspect, which is characteristic of the world of 
.° 
`'; manifestation. 
It Is not possible to understand time, 
without postulating also the eternity which goeo 
beyond it, and at the same time Includes It. 
Eternity is not the came as time without a beginning 
or end. It is the timeless. aopoct of time. Eternity 
and time do not and Canriofi; ' ° pmr öriý each 
other. They are, like the unmanifest and 4 . e; . h- ßN-Ithe world of manifestation, diatin; uichablo but inseparable aspect of one Integral whole. 
The terms ' Unmanifeot' and 'r. ýanifo- 
station' seem to be lee a, mialoadjng.. thaaix the terms 'Reality' and 'Appearance' 
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who are capable of arýpreciating them, th at 
they even become values at all. It is 
true that the finite individual, as he 
actually is, may be very imperfect; but 
what he 'ictually is now is only a fragment of 
his pos-iibilitiec. And the worth of the 
life of the finite individual is to be estimated 
by the entire span of his life and the final 
attainment of his endeavours. 
lt was seen in the lust chapter 
that the ultimate purpose of the life of the 
finite individual is the realisation of that 
Eternal Reality which embraces in the unity 
of its life all the finite individuals. 
And we now find that the finite 
individuals are themselves, in a sonne, the end 
of the universe. gut this position does not 
in any . ray invlove any contradiction, and it 
does not Amov 
Tin a circle. It only brings out 
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the Reciprocity which is fundamental to 
the ctructure of the Universe. 
6 
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XIII. 
` 3wm , "LARY OF THE ARGUIMUTT 
IT IS NOW TILL to sum up the argument 
of the thesis. It is characteristic of idealism 
to understand man and the universe chiefly 
through the examination of the nature and the 
significance of ideas and Ideals, or knowledge 
and values 
It has been the tendency of succcscivo 
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idealist philosophers, from the tine of Descartes, 
to bring, out the primacy of the subject over the 
object. In England Idealism takes the form 
of theistic pluralism, Under the inspiration of 
Berkeley or of Absolutism under the influence of 
Hog; el. In both types, the problem of Individu- 
ality becomes central. 
THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUALITY. 
The individuality of a 'thing' is 
borrowed from and is relRtive to human purposes. 
But when we come to an organism we have a clear 
instance of intrinsic individuality. The indi- 
v1duality of the 
to the structure 
its capacity to 
consciousness in 
duality which is 
lower organisms. 
We can 
by examining the 
organism Is not primarily due 
of Ito body, but it is due to 
have value. The presence of self- 
. 
man makes poop ible a type of inUivi- 
hi gher that4 the individuality of the 
elicit the principle of individuality 
structure of human experience. Human 
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experience exhibits the operation of a synthetic 
principle which or anises the contents of conscious- 
ness - both theoretical anu practical - with 
reference to value. Value then is the main clue 
to the understanding of individuality. 
NATt E LIFE AND MIND. 
It is characteristic of naturalistic explana- 
tions to ignore the principle of individuality 
and to try to red4ca ©verythin& tto 
inctanccs of 
some abatract, unchangin13, blind and mechanical 
uniformitioes.  
But such _a procedure is governed 
by the old and faulty loG1c of an abetr act universal 
which makes light og the multiplicity and uniqueness 
which character. isen.. tho,, world of concrete. existence. 
The concept of 'a, , concrete universal', .,, sustaining 
and . explaining. the individuality of its constituents 
i2 . more, fruitful. 
It iM not. poaoiblo to understand the 
higher typos of individuality by npplyinG to them 
the categories which are primarily device to explain 
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the lower types of indittiüu i7 ity. in the realm 
of organic life, the c:, terory of blind mocha ism 
breRks down, owinC to the operation of Immanent 
teleo7. o ry. And the bioý o ical cute ory of immanent 
teleology breaks down in explaining the conscious 
purposiveness of human Bein o who can act with 
reference to an laeal in the future. 
TELEOLOGY. 
But it eoemo possible to understand the 
immanent teleolocy of organic life or the'unifor- 
mitiee of nature, in the light of the anal s1o of the 
n--ture of human purposiveneoc. In human beings 
purposive activity is characterised by conscious 
anticipation of the and, but at the oqm,, -ý timet it 
is possible to discern in human history the 
emergence of vi, lüäc, " "which were largely 
beyond the conscious p. ýn6 of any Individual 
whose corieciäüc' üurt0s'ive-'ncts 'arepnev6rthe1eoc 
contributnry to ýthel roali, atiori b t&6 o valuoi. ' 
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Ile ; find it, tier. efore, necessary to 
disassociate the concept of teleology froýa full 
anticipation of the and. The provision of this 
end may be partial only. Lhe n; o:; t ec. Iential 
tequi , ite a teleologica:.. activity is that it 
results in value. 
J. ut if 'the nature o1 tcleolaýrica' c tivi tyy 
is na1 ed in this way, it is pos2ible to -msiiilate 
to it the i. nýI. anent teleology of organic ýictivity. 
processes, e. g. ccllc, The constituents of organic 
r. ii v have a rudimentary form of conscious cohation 
which is contributary to the realloation of a 'whole' 
which hac value but which is at the e air ; tirzte beyond 
the plans of any of thou. 
The realm of nature which is usua11V 
conßiCered to be üaorganic ofrers more aiffjcultioj 
in this pn, rocees ai unaeratanaing the 4yt)e lower 
type )ff individuality by the higher. but for all we 
knöw, the constituents of this roaltn tbo may be some 
kind of organisms whoop nature cio cannot fully under. 
stand. And the 'mechanical' uniformities of nature 
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might be eosentially of the nature of habits 
which are originally due to teleological action. 
Teleology, then, oeemn to be that 
synthetic and synoptic principle which helps 
us to see the different types of individuality)ln 
their continuittr. 
CTT 
SELF-C ONSC IOU"iE$S . 
The principle of interpreting the 
lower types of individuality in term of the higher 
is, therefore, more fruitful than the principle 
of interpreting the higher by the lower. In human 
beinac we got the highest, type of individuality. 
The distinguishing feature of human individuality 
however, is not the presence of cohsclouanecc, but 
the oreSence of self-conccioucneso. He is 
conscious of being a self-Identical subject in and 
through h .s xperiences 
ry 
From the epistemological. point of vier 
the av 
reness 
of self--identity is conditioned by and 
- 
v^- 
ar v. sx ,. . ý3 
: 1h"Gr<. zöi FNS 
_" 
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proce : ds czri 2aGsu with the awareno of the u.. ity 
of the world of human experience. The Self knovvvc 
itself through the world and the wbrld_ knows itself 
through the self. The subject and the obiect 
are essentially correlates. , 
the po62ibl1ity of the aubjact 
inowinS itself is sometimes questioned to the 
ground that whatever falls within the knowledge of a 
subject must be an object. but tuore is no real 
difficulty, in, one and the snrae t ong being a cubject 
and an object at the came tdimo. 
If tie subject could know ito&lfvitthout 
knowing its objects or forgot lto - relatlon to the 
object, it-would. not, know itso f no, a cubjeot... _ 
It is better Fto call; thi typo , of solf-a wuron3c 
Pure Awaroneis". ->- . _The 5diitincti. oný betty ... an thin. , 
subject and thy, object : seems to; ar1ßC3 vii thin tl iu 
Pure Awarenes .:. a .. ý:. u :. 
Such awwarcne r is at least as much 
behind thdse objecta of. ~cori: ciouonoma-which are them- 
celvin o. then: eubjecte. But, An4O;;. 
_ , cioaracjou. 9ne33 
mi t,,, -alab be ; to -some degree Lv =fbaturß ýof the organic 
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as well as the physical world evory object could 
bejtreateC' as a kind of a subject. Ana in the 
l;. ý n+ of such an-z1sy. 3 is all kno 1e so ana-e iro to be 
the self communion of that Lure Awareness which 
differentiates itself into a multiplicity of 
subjects. 
THE EIAPI tICAL UELV- 
The spiritual unity of all 
subjects to which this analyst,, points doec not, 
however swamp the individuality of each subject 
who is conscious of boing an 'I` as distinguished 
from every other subject. The consciousness of 
being a self, however, is not something with wh1uh 
a fan is born. r'rom the psychological point of 
view it has a genesis and a development. it is 
through the constant intercourse with other individu- 
als that the child comes to know itooIf as a unique 
Sß1. f.,. 
ý . «.... _.,..... rkw ýý- "_ . 
4 
The empirical snir or the ' me' has 
not any inalienable or constant contents. 44ny of its Ca* might be incorporato1 into the 'not-sae'. But the division 
of the psyche into the me and the not-me is essential 
for the rational life of the individual, 
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because the 'ins' is that provisional 
organisation of some contents of the -syche which 
becomes a nucleus of special sig ficance for the 
organisation or all t .e contents of the putsche. 
The 'me' tends to be broken into 
different conflicting 'selves' i)ut the presence 
of such a conflict cannot a. tiount to the no at ion 
of the unit' of the Individual. The very posciblity 
of there being any conflict between these various 
'selves' presupposes the fact of their beine; owned 
by a single individual. horeover, the tendency 
of these 'sehest to entbr Increasingly into an 
integrated and harmonised rhdle also ppoints out 
to the operation of a unitary-principle in conscious.. 
ness. 
The accomplishment of an integrated 
self is an Ideal. But the activity of Inteyttion 
posits the operation of a teleological principle 
in human Individuality. 
3ut the concept of telool oa re maim 
an empty formula until It f oquirroa sOr1O ineanin , by a 
= ýýý 
study of the Values it creates. 
THE STATUS OF VALUES. 
It is a mistake to look upon values 
as purely subjective and private creations of the 
human mind. The denial of objectivity to vi1ues 
is a result of coniuoine the subjective procec; Q2 of 
desire and. being pleased, with the primary import 
of a judgment of value which has, 11 et Ue jud anent 
of fact, an objective reference. But at the same 
time Value cannot be caia to be a kind of quality 
belonging to the object. A value judgment is not 
in its essence merely descriptive or an expression 
Of a purely theoretical con; cl. oucnera,, but implies 
an approval or d#. oap roval which have their origin 
in the practical. conaciousneca o the inüivi ual. 
It ic. to determine 
essential nature of that which may, thus, _ 
be a 
bearer of value. -Apparently ý, u ý oe1 s to belong 
to such diverse things au. money, machines, a wort 
of art, human experience, natural beauty, or Individuals* 
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But money or machines have no intrinsic value of 
their own. Their value is derivative. A work 
of art has value in virtue of being an oxpres: lion 
of some experience. But an experience as such 
can have no value of its own apart from the Individual 
having it It, t'nerefore, seems that only the 
individuals can have value. 'ae hiave, fro,: -ýnotizer 
approach, an -iffirmattion of the Identity of inklivi. - 
aün11t7 --ind value. 
PRACTICAL 'COI, SCIOUSNESS. 
The eadential objectivity of values 
might be doubted on t`ie ground bf, their being rooted 
in the practical conesiouenoo¬ of the individual. 
But the objectivity- is derived, from the opera- 
tion in fractieai cOnooiouUnec , of a Universal 
TTorm which` häs its o1a raw On all, individualß nliko. 
Philooophical- opacia, nl. tion canno`t ' accept a 
ult irat8 the apparent, ä. Ivor 3 ity of the . valuco 'of 
the practical cdnsciöuotliaoo.,, 
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Although the dorm operative in the 
practical consciousness is not explicitly present 
to the consciousness of the individual, it to 
only In relation to this unitary ideal that we can un- 
th rstand him ää n'continual becoming. Even his 
theoretical consciousness must, in the long, run, 
be treated as an expression of txiß c©native urge to 
realise the value of truth. 
THE PROBT: LV41' OF EVIL 
If then the realisation 
of values is a fundamental characteriotio of the 
entire life of the individual, the problem of 
evil in his life presents some 'i ficultio . 
evil Is ýithor natural or moral. 
The difficulty. about natural evil is rooted in 
the purely, hedonic conception of value. But 
suffering makes possible the higher moral voluec 
like courage or oympathy. , And it tlaki often also, 
a good deal of eductilonal value for the individual. 
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(oral evil, on the other hand, does not scam to 
be in any sense neees; ary for the full development 
of individuality. 3ut it can be traced to the 
free will of the individual and is not inevitable. 
The possibilitfyouof' moral evil, however could t 
be alirlin t©d^ýb"yärcctrs. cting the free will of the 
individual, and thus making the ar)pearance of moral 
values impossible. 
IMMORTALITY . 
We thus find that we need not treat 
evil in the life of the individual as ultiun; te. We 
can interpret it in terms of value. Even the 
cutting short of the life of the individual, before 
the attainment of Perfection, an evil which must 
be accepted as ultimate. The pocoibility of the 
1. miriortality of the individual is indicated by the 
implications of motal and religious, coaoc iouonese " 
It is cpmotimeS arguod that the 
moral and reli ioue cons/lousneoe can remain satio- 
mied with the survival of human values in the wocietyJ 
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after the individual,. who created theca is dead. 
But the higher spiritual values are 
an inalienable part of the p ersonality of-the 
individual. The survival of values, tUeroforo, 
!, can have no meaning apart from the survival of tho 
individuals. The total siGnificance of the 
p'"' individual is not exhausted by looking upon him 
as being merely Instrumental to the life of the 
society. 
SOC IE'1'Y AND THE INDIVIDUAL. 
The organic conception of cooiety,. 
ý ý: ý.  does not da full justice to the poroonal 
worth and the,,. re4at ive worth of the indivi ü, ua1. 
The oociety has no life of its own apart fron the 
lives of the individualr. 
At the sane time tho individual 
cannot be what he is apart fror hic plane and. 
function in society. The atomic conception of 
society : -.. 'ý. ºý3i constituted of reac r-rande Individuals 
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is erroneous. : 3octety is the source of the 
contents of the life of the individuals . It 
is, indeed, raore than a mere source of the contents 
of his life, in so far as the individual can andt 
does share the PUPAS of his follow-beings. 
Ile comer to accept trio co non Cooc1 Aß his own. 
And he might identify himself with the society 
co complitely that the legal conception of 
society as a world of claims and counter-cla1a4o 
is not adequate for underctandin % its essentially 
spiritual structure. 
Tiieinü`ivlduäl rea . iooa 
himself by living for of ero. 
ItELIGIOÜ5 1 XPERI£PNCE. " 
VIE M' i jQcJ otf the individual 
to God, as we eet it in Kolb öü "o dar onev, is 
also very signific nt. wo cannot un . orctctni? the 
nature of the itaiviaue. l apart, from his oxperionco. 
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And relip-ious ex')erienee is the deepest forma 
of his conscious )ess. In rel i,,, ious ex)Derionce 
the individual retains his fuith in the ultirinto 
siomificance of life in the face of any 
ces to the contrary, b"" recognising that the 
source nc: the ground ofhie Life is, ultirn - 
tely a spiritual i". eal ity which is a congenial 
home for v9lues . 
It is uharactoristic of religious 
consciousness to look upob this reality as not boo 
but more than personal, and a ¬aeh including 
in its life all the finite individuals. 
The implication of religious 
consciousness for hwaan individuality i: that man 
is essentially Janus--faced, finite-infinite,, 
Through religious consciousness the 
finite Individual ror, lineB the Infinity cif which 
he is, with other finite individuals, an heir; an-nü 
thus finds here the only basis for int : gratin his 
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life, as well as tine ul;, i,, ate purpose of his exi tonte. 
ý, -uTMAN PERso, JALITY. 
The pro 1eri of human peneon i ity 
is thaws complicate, by the fact that life Is 
intit., t©1y iutortwinod with the social and the cos-Ac 
life. Pluralism and anon ioia have the sLiino data is 
com: ilon although their conclusions tiro Lvoxý; °ont. But 
out of the controversy some definite truth does seem 
to emerge. 
The capacity to share experiences 
and purposes as wejj as his capf uc itur for eo1uufufion 
with Clod points out to a hidden unity, to the fact 
of his being a member of a Spiritual Reality. At. 
is, however, not i merely 'adjectival' to this reality 
but has a relative independence of hic own. is 
a real agent, with a : enuine and unique creativeness. 
It might even be said that just astthe ; o. l of the 
life of the finite indivi 
. ual, is the Spiritual 
Reality of Which they are raombers, taxe , goal of that 
- 
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SpiEitual Reality is, in a sense, the creation of finite 
individuals. Both exist for the sake of and in and ttiroup; 4 
each other., 
APP E°N DI X'ý. 
G-OD AIND THE ABSOLUTE 
The multipl'icity' of finite individuals is thus 
the most fundamental feature of , -the , entire world of raani- 
fe$station. - And 1nß's6, far 'as the di'tti. `not ion betuen 
the subject and object is retained in the apprehension of 
this world of manifestation the oonoopt-of God is richer 
and not poorer than _tk e concept of *the Absolute. But 
a1thoup, h in forming the ° concept o the .. beolute the 
idea of 
value may be incorporate . into It leaves no roo s 
for the attitudeofl orehip"°and, - . eve through which alone the 
true value can-, be' ap ropric. ted i, . But 1n the cnuln with hod 
there io room , for the 'r-espo 6 of the total °pärsonttltty -of the 
finite individui l=, to the universe -, ao -a wholo. 
=the formth `f 7th cono¬ pt `ot th¬ ý'ýboo1 zte a c3O 
implies a 'dis. tinctionr-betwean, ý, tie subject-, n1 objocttn3 much an 
a forming the aoneepti of: "Göt: It iy l'Wr ya oomo finite cub joct 
who forme the concept anc& in doing 130-conceives it ac an object 
/of 
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thought. The doncept of the Aboolute, therefore, 
is as much conditioned by the distinction botvieon 
the subject und object as the concept of God-. 
The concept of the Absolute tti©c to 
r 
rý 
include within itself the totality of the universe 
including the subject as well as the object. 
And it is, therefore, strictly impossible to form 
a concept which will be completely adequate to 
the nature of the Al. -solute. Moreover all that can 
be included in the concept of the absolute is only 
an idea of value. lind a comp3e e recponao to value 
does not consist in merely apppohondine it in Lan 
intellectual proposition. Indeed, it is not . pocaible 
to apprehend anything as hnvinß value if the conutive- 
emotive functions nq-of an poroonality are coCIP011o1d 
to lie in abeyance. Wo might, therefore, cvy that 
the Absolute is more intlr ately known in the fullness 
of the concrete 'life of the finite individual t1a : nl 
in the-elaborate cyctems of armchair tnetcu ha. ya tc i no . 
ýts 
soemo to bo+ a satter for a troaltu. rtton and not 
merely for acrtdotnia 1. no'ilcd o. 
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The 3 ist inc tion b'tv. eý n t; ie subject 
. nci object, . owever, need 
not be considered as being 
ultimate ant final. It peuta iris to the -. Ci: iite incf i. -- 
vidual -ae finite. ; ut t ere is no reason for 
holdin that it is not pocsib: -e for consciousness 
to transcend the 1iiiiitation of finiteness, and. 
mar=e an increa: int, approach towards the Infinite. 
The limitations which exist for the actual -I ni-fo- 
st-ition of life on the physic ,l , 
plain in its 
practical sLopect need not be taken to Indicate the 
possibilitie's which lie open for inner con ciousnocc. 
'There is a1wayo a theoretical po3ci. bility of tie 
individual being able to drop in his consciousness 
the 1firn t 1gin: $ 3r ., yo`ducod n tic point of view 
by boing an "i', of an individual existent different 
from of or individual exictonto. Zuoh a poscibi. iity 
is further corroborated by the uttorancao of myotiao 
And if wo recognise the pooýibi . 
ity 'of thus entering 
into the t osmta or the infinite Consciousness It may 
c1tt ai for 3t 1 ýävaui"c "ý oh is even greater 
than the ordinary oozn$oi, ou nosy of, the f i., nita indlyi . ual. 
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It is quite true that this\is a rrere pos i- 
bility for most finite individuals. And any 
guesses as to the nature of the conteritc, of such 
a consciousness will have to bo purelTr hvp_othetleal. 
If the idea of knowlet' ge or value is frees from the 
distinction between the sub Ject and the object we 
Fret the nearest approach to the contents o' such 
a Consciousness. QLW discussion about Pure iivareneas (1) 
lends great plausibility to the possibility of such 
a Consciousness. All that we can definitely say 
about it is that if it exists or can come into 
existence, it is not necessarily loss valid in its 
claims for giving us the essential and ultimate 
nature of reality than the ordinary consciousness 
of the individual. Chat is psychologically last 
may be epistemologically ultimato, ý 
dust as our 
revised judgments may be truer than our unrovicoLL 
judgments although from the psychological point of view 
(1) See a discussion in the Chapter on Self-Conaciouone c pp. 61-64. 
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they might come , auch later than the revised judgments. 
It, therefore, seems that any di f 'erontintion 
into the multiplicity of individual existentti which 
teems to characterise the ordinary world of our 
experie iee is only a fg4ture of the world of manifestation 
which exists in relation to the point of view of 
the finite individual as finite. The Unmanifost 
source and ground or the world of Manifestation 
neap not have any such differentiation or multiplicity 
within itself. From the point of view df the world 
of anifestation finite individuals may have neither 
any beginning nor any end in time, and they might 
stand out as mutually distinct throughout the entire 
history of the World of Manifestation. But it would 
still be impossible to carry their distinct individua- 
<'` 
;+ý", litieo into the sternal, which is the timeless aspect r a-- 
10 
° of Time. 
